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Executive summary
This report reviews the current status of payments for watershed services in 
developing countries. It highlights the main trends in the evolution of these 
schemes, synthesising the available evidence on their environmental and social 
impacts, and drawing lessons for the design of future initiatives.
The interest in payments for watershed services (PWS) as a tool for watershed 
management in developing countries is growing, despite major setbacks. This 
review identified 50 ongoing schemes, 8 advanced proposals and 37 preliminary 
proposals for PWS. A previous review published by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) on markets and payments for environmental 
services (Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002)) identified just 
41 proposed and ongoing PWS schemes in developing countries, which suggests a 
considerable growth in interest in this approach.  
However, relatively few of the 41 proposed and ongoing PWS schemes reported in 
2002 are definitely still proceeding six years later, and it seems that many of the 
early proposals did not materialise. The reasons vary and include political unrest 
and lack of political and financial support. However, in some cases it was not 
possible to obtain enough information to verify the current status of some of the 
initiatives. This review applies a stricter definition of payments for environmental 
services (PES) than in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold, with the result that some of the 
schemes included in the earlier publication do not qualify and are classified as 
borderline in this review. The review’s criteria for PES stress the importance of a 
continuing externality related to watershed management and which is addressed 
through a payment, either to landholders, or from water users, or both. The 
borderline cases include land acquisitions and intra-village agreements where the 
buyers and the sellers are indistinguishable.
The PWS cases covered in this review vary greatly in scale: from a pilot project 
in Nicaragua that rewards just five families on 13 hectares of land, to a massive 
Chinese project that aims to reach 15 million farmers in 27,000 villages over 32 
million hectares of land by 2010. Almost half of the local schemes are part of a 
larger project, either a national programme or linked to an international project to 
promote or test PWS schemes.
Most of the cases are located in Latin America, where governments at the national 
and local level, conservation groups, and international funding agencies have 
2been enthusiastically promoting PWS. Asia shows fewer schemes, although the 
areas they cover are much larger than those in Latin America once the two national 
programmes in China are included. Most efforts in Africa are currently concentrated 
in South Africa, although in East Africa a large network has been launched to support 
and facilitate exchanges within the area.1
National programmes are emerging as the way for up-scaling. The Costa Rican 
PSA (Payments for Environmental Services, PSA, in Spanish) programme has been 
adapted in different countries, like Mexico and El Salvador. The World Bank is 
promoting the format in other countries as well. However, small local schemes, such 
as those being developed in Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, contribute important 
lessons that can inform development of national programmes.
Local schemes tend to target one or two specific watershed services as it is 
considered easier to convince water users to pay. In contrast, most national 
programmes aim to deliver a bundle of environmental services. This enables them to 
tap into a diverse range of funding sources.
Because of the challenges in measuring and attributing changes in the provision 
of watershed services, all of the ongoing PWS schemes identified follow a land-
based approach. Providers of watershed services are paid for changes to their land-
management practices that are believed to have a high probability of resulting in the 
desired impact on watershed services. One exception is the Rewarding the Upland 
Poor in Asia for Environmental Services They Provide (RUPES)-promoted RiverCare 
scheme in Sumberjaya, Indonesia, which is experimenting with payment according 
to extent of sediment reduction achieved.
Four main types of land-use proxy for watershed services are currently being 
used in PWS schemes. The most common approach both in local and national 
initiatives is improved land practices, improved agricultural and ranching practices, 
agroforestry, and sustainable forest management. Conservation and protection of 
existing ecosystems, for example forest conservation, is the other main approach. 
Reforestation is promoted in some schemes but rarely as the sole activity. 
Rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems for protection is used in a few cases.
The suppliers of watershed services in most ongoing schemes are private landowners 
with clear ownership of their land, particularly in national programmes. This reflects 
the need for security that those paid can control the land and hence deliver the 
service. However, the Mexico national PSAH programme (Payments for Hydrological 
Environmental Services, in Spanish) targets communally held forestland. In local 
1. The Pro-Poor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa (PRESA) is coordinated by ICRAF. It received 
a four-year grant from IFAD in October 2007 to begin works in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Guinea.
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3schemes, there is a greater diversity of tenure arrangements, and in a few cases it 
is an agency managing a national park that receives the payments.
Although over 70% of the local schemes receive some funds from the private 
sector or from fees paid by water users, there is still heavy dependence on 
government and international donors both for start-up costs and the payments 
themselves. Reallocation from central government is the main source of income 
for all but two of the national programmes. The private sector has been slow to 
commit significant funds to PWS, and when it does it is often for public relations 
reasons rather than perception of environmental benefit.
The ways in which supply and demand have come to be linked in PWS schemes 
are rather varied. In most cases several different organisations are involved. 
Concerns about water and flooding have been a primary driving factor in just 
under half the schemes but a significant proportion are supply driven, with PWS 
seen as a way of financing the solution to a perceived resource management 
problem upstream. The national schemes in Costa Rica and Mexico were both 
introduced to address threats to deforestation. Although government intervention 
and enabling legislation has been important for some schemes, particularly the 
national programmes, some local schemes have gone ahead without changes 
in national legislation and in some cases without changes in local government 
legislation. Facilitating organisations, non-governmental organisation (NGOs) 
mostly, have played a key role in bringing suppliers and water users together 
in the absence of government intervention or in getting greater uptake of 
government PWS schemes.
Payment levels are mostly determined administratively in the national 
programmes. In the local schemes, negotiation through an intermediary is more 
common. Direct negotiation between supplier and buyer occurs in very few cases, 
where there are special conditions; in particular, few stakeholders are involved 
and only one downstream buyer. Funds and transfer of payments are in most 
cases managed by an intermediary, often a specially set up trust fund. The few 
exceptions are the schemes involving hydroelectric companies in Costa Rica and 
local water utilities in Central America, which already have systems in place for 
collecting and managing funds from electricity and water customers.
Payment structures when cash payments are used are generally very simple, with 
flat rates per hectare for different activities regardless of location. Only a few 
schemes have payments which differ by location: the Mexico PSAH programme, 
which pays a higher rate for cloud forest, and the Sloping Land Conversion 
Programme in China, which pays more in an area where agricultural yields and 
hence opportunity costs are higher.
All that glitters
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Most schemes involving cash payments to landholders make use of cash 
payments. These are mostly continuous or fixed-period cash payments. In a few 
schemes, rather than payments, soft loans or guarantees are offered to farmers. 
One-off in-kind benefits, including technical assistance and inputs, are being used 
as the sole form of payment in 16 local schemes but are also commonly used 
in combination with cash payments. The conditionality attached to the payment 
is therefore low, making the activities on the supply side little different from a 
conservation project. The difference is on the demand side as the funds come from 
the water users. The Los Negros scheme in Bolivia, which uses beehives as a form 
of payment, was the only scheme identified with a periodic in-kind payment with 
some form of conditionality.
Monitoring of compliance with contracts is based on inspection of land use and 
varies from site visits to use of satellite images. The most common sanction 
applied in case of non-compliance is to suspend payment.
Land that is communally owned and likely to be associated with poorer groups 
is not well represented in the PWS schemes, the main exceptions being the 
national programme in Mexico where most forestland is held communally, and 
the targeting of indigenous reserves in Costa Rica. The inclusion of small farmers 
is case-specific and happens more by accident than design. For Costa Rica, the 
available evidence indicates that poor farmers are not well represented in the 
national scheme (at least until 2002).
However, some of the newer schemes being developed, such as the RUPES 
programme in Southeast Asia and Cuencas Andinas in South America, are actively 
targeting poor farmers and communities living in uplands.
Evidence of benefits to sellers of watershed services is mixed. The Pimampiro 
scheme in Ecuador reports payments equal to 20–30% of household income, but 
schemes in Nicaragua and Honduras report payments that are low relative to 
local incomes and to the money that could be made from keeping to conventional 
land uses and practices such as converting forests to agriculture. With one or two 
exceptions, the cash payments appear to be relatively insignificant and there is an 
opinion that they function more like supports or a bonus than a real incentive for 
land-use change (Ortiz Malavasi et al. 2003; Kosoy et al. 2005b).
As financial payments are often considered insignificant, non-financial benefits 
must be part of the explanation why farmers participate and continue to 
participate in these schemes. Strengthening of property rights, capacity building, 
and improvements in social organisation and in quality of life are the main 
benefits cited, but mainly by those running the schemes or involved as facilitators.
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There is little indication that PWS schemes for watershed services are adversely 
affecting access to water for poor households. Not more than 15 of the local 
schemes in our sample involve either a surcharge on the standard domestic water-
user fee or designation of a PWS share in a negotiated increase of the water-user 
fee. In three of these schemes (Jesus de Otoro, Honduras; Cerro San Gil, Guatemala; 
and ESPH, Costa Rica), payments are a low percentage of users’ income and are 
considered acceptable (Kosoy et al. 2005a). In another two, San Pedro del Norte, 
Nicaragua (Corbera et al. 2006) and Pimampiro, Ecuador (Echavarría et al. 2004), 
the payment scheme and the PWS user fee has been introduced without meeting 
any protest from water users. Another four schemes have mechanisms to reduce 
the impacts on the poorest users such as a lifeline tariff system (Cuenca, Ecuador; 
Echavarría et al. 2004) or voluntary contributions (Fidecoagua (Contreras 2005) and 
Zapaliname (Canales 2006), both Mexico) or payment in kind through contribution 
of labour (Esteli, Nicaragua; Ardón-Mejía and Barrantes 2003a).
Evidence of the delivery of watershed services has proved elusive. In many 
schemes, the reported impacts on water flow and quality are based on the views 
of users, local people or the scheme’s administrators rather than on on-site 
measurements and modelling of land use and water relationships.
Linkages between land use and water quality are well documented, and there 
is some consensus in the literature (Calder 2005). The links between forests and 
water quantity are more difficult to demonstrate. In both cases, impacts depend 
on a range of site-specific factors relating to topography and management of land 
after conversion. A key constraint on measuring environmental impact is that many 
of the schemes cover small areas, often because of their pilot nature. Even with 
detailed measurement it is unlikely that they would be able to demonstrate service 
delivery as they do not achieve a critical threshold level.
Changes in water quality have proved easier to link with PWS schemes. In China, 
silt run-off from lands reforested under the Sloping Land Conversion Programme is 
22–24% less than from comparable farming lands in the same area (Changjin and 
Chen 2005). This probably also reflects the large scale of this programme.
Evidence based on the characteristics of land included in payments schemes calls 
into question their effectiveness in impacting watershed services or environmental 
impacts upstream. Significant proportions of land included the Sloping Land 
Conversion Programme in some Chinese provinces were found to be low slope and 
hence not at risk of erosion. Research on the Mexican and Costa Rican national 
programmes  suggests that their additionality has been limited.
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Overall, although there is considerable enthusiasm among donors, governments, 
NGOs and researchers for payments for watershed services, there is little evidence 
yet that the schemes are matching up to the high expectations placed on them.
However, a second generation of schemes is emerging which have tried to 
incorporate lessons from the early schemes. At the same time, some of the early 
schemes have made a series of modifications to promote participation of small 
farmers and to strengthen evidence of land use and hydrological linkages. There is 
increasing interest beyond forests to the contribution of other land-use change such 
as agroforestry and organic agriculture.
Payment schemes, if they are to be financially self-sustaining, whether through 
private or public money, need to be driven more by the water users and become 
an integral part of water resource management and allocation policy. For this to 
happen, better evidence is needed of the beneficial impacts of sustainable land-
management practices on water flow and quality and on the ability of payments 
to influence the behaviour of landholders. This can enable legislation that 
acknowledges and promotes land-based activities as means to provide watershed 
environmental services.
Better evidence of land management and delivery of watershed services, coupled 
with enabling legislation, may be effective in bringing in more private companies 
as buyers. However, judging by current experience, PWS schemes are unlikely 
to be the route to major sources of new private money. Proponents of PWS will 
increasingly need to make the case for earmarking tax or water revenue rather 
than (or as well as) tapping private willingness to pay.
If dependence on public money is to continue, there needs to be a better case 
made that PWS has advantages in meeting public objectives over other approaches. 
This requires better targeting of land to ensure effectiveness in delivering 
watershed services. Targeting can also be used to achieve social objectives 
such as promoting the participation of certain vulnerable groups and preventing 
adverse social impacts. Better understanding is needed of the effectiveness of 
such approaches and of the tradeoffs involved with the achievement of watershed 
service delivery and other environmental objectives. 
It is also necessary to be realistic about what PWS can achieve in contexts where 
there are serious deficiencies in water infrastructure, where water is provided free 
or at subsidised rates to certain groups or where commercial agriculture is heavily 
subsidised. This underlines the importance of deploying PWS as one element in a 
water-resource management policy. PWS is likely to work best when it is coherent 
with water-resource allocation and pricing.
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1  Introduction
1.1 The problem: watershed services as a public good 
Ecosystems provide multiple direct and tangible benefits to humankind as well as 
intrinsic cultural services.2 However, as demonstrated in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, (MEA), many of these ecosystem services are being degraded or used 
unsustainably. The MEA also noted that actions to increase one ecosystem service 
such as food production often causes the degradation of other services (ibid.). 
Among the ecosystem services that have been degraded globally over the past 50 
years are those associated with watersheds, namely supply of fresh water and 
water purification, and to a lesser extent water-regulation services (MEA 2005). 
Economic growth and increases in human population are leading to higher demand 
for water resources, while increasing pressure on the ecosystems that provide 
watershed environmental services. Economic policies to promote agriculture have 
raised demand for water for irrigation and led to widespread clearing or 
modification of natural ecosystems. 
It is generally accepted that land-use decisions can affect the provision of 
watershed environmental services, although there is sometimes disagreement 
about the extent and nature of the effects (Bruijnzeel 2005; Calder 2005; Van 
Noordwijk 2005; and others – see Table 1).
2. Broadly speaking, “environmental or ecosystem services” refers to the benefits people obtain 
from natural ecosystems, in contrast with man-made structures that could be substitutes. Benefits 
can be direct, such as provisioning services (i.e. food or water) or regulating services (i.e. control of 
floods, erosion regulation and water purification and waste treatment; or indirect, through supporting 
services which for the functioning of ecosystem processes (i.e. nutrient cycling; soil creation; and 
photosynthesis). Ecosystems also provide people with non-material benefits such as aesthetic pleasure, 
recreational opportunities, and spiritual and cultural sustenance (MEA 2005).
Source: based on Van Noordwijk (2005).
Ta
bl
e 
1
Watershed service Description
Quantity or total water yield Water transmission (total water yield per unit rainfall)
Evenness of flow Buffering (above average river discharge per unit 
above average rainfall), gradual release of stored 
water supporting dry-season flows
Quality of water (for its use as 
drinking water, other domestic uses, 
industrial use, irrigation or as a 
habitat for fish and other organisms)
Maintaining water quality (relative to that of rainfall)
Stability of slopes, absence of landslides
Tolerable intensities of net soil loss from slopes by 
erosion
Microclimate effects on air humidity and temperature
Watershed services that can be influenced by land use
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However, managing land and water interactions is difficult because of the public 
good characteristics3 of watershed services. Landholders upstream can affect water 
quantity and water quality downstream through their decisions on land-management 
practices, but they have little incentive to consider these impacts because they are 
not affected directly. Water users have little incentive to pay for improved watershed 
service provision if they cannot exclude non-payers from enjoying these benefits 
(Pagiola et al. 2002).
The conventional approach to influence land-management practices has been 
through regulation, with restrictions on land uses such as prohibition of forest 
clearing. These have proved difficult to enforce in practice. They also raise equity 
concerns because they often limit livelihood options for poor farmers and users of 
natural resources.
Market-based mechanisms for the provision of environmental services are thought  
to offer potential in several ways. They can complement these regulatory 
approaches, or they can become the key tool to deal with environmental problems 
in the absence of a regulatory framework. They can support decentralisation by 
enabling local resource management problems to be tackled at the local level. They 
also appear to offer a way of improving livelihoods, or at least lessening the adverse 
livelihood implications of land-use restrictions.
The challenges involved in creating market-based mechanisms for the provision of 
watershed services are numerous. However, recent years have seen a significant 
increase in interest worldwide. Experiences range from small, pilot projects in 
Nicaragua, to very large-scale national programmes in China. International funding 
agencies such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and bilateral donors are 
including projects on PES in their portfolios. Governments, especially in Central America, 
are laying the foundations for new legislation dealing with environmental services.
1.2 Background to the project on markets for watershed services 
and improved livelihoods 
Market-based mechanisms for watershed protection were one of four main types of 
environmental-service market reviewed by Landell-Mills and Porras in 2002. They 
identified 66 market-based incentives (including bundled schemes), of which 42 were 
located in developing countries (Figure 1).
3. Public goods are a type of externality. Depending on the service, they can have different degrees of 
non-excludability (it is difficult to exclude people from using them) or non-rivalry (consumption by one 
person does not affect the overall pool of the service).  
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The review urged both optimism and caution about the win–win potential of 
markets, payments and incentive systems for environmental services. It also called 
for special attention to be given to the potential pitfalls as well as opportunities 
facing poorer groups.
IIED and its partners sought to respond to this challenge by engaging with, and 
attempting to shape, efforts to set up payment and market mechanisms for 
watershed services. The project Developing Markets for Watershed Protection 
Services and Improved Livelihoods was initiated in October 2001. An inception 
phase involved diagnostic studies in India, South Africa, Indonesia and four 
Caribbean Island States.4 A three-year implementation phase of the project 
began in late 2003 and was designed to “increase understanding of the role of 
market mechanisms in promoting the provision of watershed services to improve 
livelihoods” (IIED 2003). Both phases of the project have been funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID).
An important component of the project was to disseminate lessons learnt from 
existing schemes and to promote exchange of experience. The decision was taken 
therefore to revisit the 2002 review to examine progress with the ongoing and 
proposed schemes identified in it, to identify new initiatives and to provide an 
update on the lessons in sustainable development emerging from the initiatives. 
Fi
gu
re
 1
4. These reports are available from the website http://www.iied.org/NR/forestry/projects/water.html.
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Africa
South America
Central America and Caribbean
Asia
North America, Europe
and Australia
Number of cases
Total cases reviewed 66
Total cases in developing countries 42
Note: the total number of cases includes those reported originally as ‘bundled’.
Source: Landell-Mills and Porras (2002).
Regional breakdown of watershed service markets reviewed by 
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002)
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This comprehensive review of the state of the art of market mechanisms for 
watershed services would complement the more site-specific action learning 
activities in the pilot countries. A web-based database was compiled of ongoing and 
proposed market initiatives for watershed services in developing countries, building 
on those identified in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?. Profiles of the cases identified 
were prepared and presented on a website developed specially for this purpose: 
www.watershedmarkets.org.
1.3 Terminology: from markets to payments
The earlier review, Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?, focused on markets for 
environmental services, using the term in a broad way to cover any situation where 
there was a buyer and a seller of an environmental service, whether government, 
private sector or individuals or communities. The effect of this broad definition was 
that initiatives involving use of economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies 
were included in the review under the banner of markets. Yet, as pointed out in 
Pagiola et al. (2002), a market transaction, strictly defined, would meet two criteria. 
It would be a voluntary transaction and the price would reflect the conditions of 
supply and demand. Many of the initiatives covered in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? 
were not markets according to this strict definition, but could be considered as 
market-based mechanisms, or economic incentives.
A variety of other terms have been used in the literature and by practitioners, each 
with slight difference in emphasis. However, a notable trend is the use of the term 
“payment” rather than “market”, whether for environmental services (Wunder 
2005) or for ecosystem services (Bishop 2005; UNEP 2006). The pioneering scheme 
in Costa Rica was given the name Pago por Servicios Ambientales (Payments for 
Environmental Services). Many schemes created afterwards have adopted the 
same term or adapted to the service concerned, for example the national scheme 
in Mexico, Pago por Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos (Payments for Hydrological 
Environmental Services). Other terms in the literature include compensation for 
environmental services (Rosa et al. 2003) and rewards for environmental services 
(van Nordwijk et al. 2004).
Of the terms listed above, PES is used most widely and is not associated exclusively 
with a particular organisation. Many of the schemes we are examining in this 
review are formally called “payments schemes” rather than “markets”. For these 
reasons, and to avoid confusion related to broad definitions of markets, from this 
point on in the review, we use the term “payments for environmental services”5 
(PES) and more specifically “payments for watershed services” (PWS). We thus 
diverge from the terminology adopted in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?.
5. See 2.3.1 for a discussion of the defining characteristics of payments for environmental services in 
the context of watersheds.
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Beneficiaries of downstream watershed services include biodiversity
1.4 Objectives of the review
This review draws from the case profiles prepared for each PWS initiative. The 
ultimate aim is to provide lessons from existing experience on how and to what 
extent PWS schemes can be designed to be economically efficient, effective in 
meeting environmental objectives and equitable in terms of improving livelihoods 
or at least not causing adverse social impact.
To achieve this aim this review sets out to:
1. Examine the trends in promotion and implementation of payments for watershed 
services initiatives since the publication of Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? in 2002.
2. Review the main characteristics of these schemes, developing a case profile to 
allow comparisons across the schemes.
3. Assess the evidence on the economic, social and environmental impacts of the 
ongoing initiatives.
4. Highlight the most important lessons for promotion and design of payments for 
watershed services schemes.
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1.5 Structure of the report
The next chapter sets out the approach taken to conduct the review, including the 
criteria for defining and categorising PWS schemes and the sources of information. 
This is followed in Chapter 3 by an analysis of the trends in the development 
of PWS schemes since the previous review in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? in 
2002. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the key characteristics of ongoing and 
proposed PWS schemes in different regions. Chapter 5 reviews the evidence on 
the socioeconomic impacts of the ongoing PWS schemes. Chapter 6 examines the 
evidence on the environmental impacts of the schemes, in particular their ability 
to deliver watershed services downstream. Chapter 7 summarises the lessons that 
can be drawn for future development and operation of PWS schemes and makes 
recommendations. A series of annexes gives a complete listing and key statistics on 
the PWS schemes reviewed, explanations of terminology and the template used for 
the case profiles. 
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2  Approach
2.1 Identifying the PWS schemes
In identifying the cases, we initially took a very broad approach, including any 
ongoing or proposed schemes relating to watershed services labelled as markets 
for environmental services (MES), PES, compensation, rewards or other similar 
terms by their promoters or by researchers. Our starting point was the 41 schemes 
included in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?. Additional information on new schemes was 
obtained from an FAO workshop in Arequipa, Peru, in 2003. Some further schemes 
were identified from other international events, in particular the Katoomba Group 
meetings and country reviews of markets and payments for environmental services 
by researchers. At this stage we identified 123 schemes (listed in Appendix 2).
The aim was to achieve complete coverage of ongoing and proposed PWS schemes 
in developing countries. However, because the situation changes very rapidly, 
with many new proposals being introduced each year and proposals reaching 
implementation stage, we cannot guarantee that coverage of our review is complete.
2.2 Preparation of the case profiles
The next step was to prepare detailed profiles of each of the identified cases. At 
this stage it was necessary to exclude 21 cases, mostly early proposals identified in 
Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?, because it appeared highly likely that they had been 
abandoned. 
Information on the remaining 102 cases was then sought to prepare a case profile, 
following the template in Appendix 1. The aim of the Case Profile was to provide 
details on:
l The background to the introduction of the PWS scheme or proposal: the main 
drivers.
l The stakeholders involved in the scheme: the suppliers of watershed services, 
the buyers or users of watershed services, and the various intermediaries and 
facilitators that bring them together.
l Market design: the mechanisms for linking supply and demand, the terms of 
payment and the institutional and legislative framework.
l Economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the schemes.
The profiles were prepared from published and unpublished material and Internet 
searches. Information was also sourced from presentations on schemes and contacts 
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made at international workshops. Direct contact with key protagonists in the 
initiatives was pursued as much as possible to fill gaps and provide detail of the 
particular schemes. However, it was beyond the scope of this project to conduct 
fieldwork in each case site. In several cases it was possible to draw on fieldwork 
conducted as part of IIED projects or by other researchers/organisations (Table 
13). Except where a specific source is provided, the information on the individual 
schemes described in this report is drawn from the case study profiles on  
www.watershedmarkets.org
2.3 Narrowing down for multi-case analysis
Before statistically analysing the cases, it was necessary to ensure that our final 
sample was restricted to cases that met minimum criteria for PWS. It was also 
necessary to distinguish between ongoing schemes and those that were only at the 
proposal stage.
2.3.1 Criteria for PWS
To determine which initiatives could be considered as PWS, we adapted the criteria 
for PES set out by Wunder (2005). Wunder’s five criteria are:
1. A voluntary transaction where
2. a well-defined environmental service (ES) (or a land use likely to secure that 
service)
3. is being “bought” by a (minimum of one) ES buyer
4. from a (minimum of one) ES provider
5. if, and only if, the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality).
We consider these too restrictive for our purposes, as they would exclude too many 
of the schemes. For example, the PES scheme in Costa Rica and several others 
that are primarily funded through government tax revenue (see 4.3) cannot be 
considered to involve voluntary transactions on the part of the buyer.
As emphasised in Robertson and Wunder (2005), no so-called PES initiative in 
Bolivia would meet all these five criteria simultaneously. The key criterion for 
inclusion in our review is that some form of payment is being used to address 
an externality affecting watershed services. This distinguishes PWS schemes 
from conventional approaches to dealing with externalities such as regulation 
of landholders and government projects. Either payments are received by land 
or resource holders, or water users are paying to address an external impact of 
land management on the watershed. In some cases, both types of payment are 
combined in the same scheme.
All that glitters 15
B
ox
 1
It is necessary to distinguish between payments received by the provider and 
payments made by water users, as they are not always present in the same 
scheme. In some schemes, a central government agency makes the payments to 
landholders; water users have little involvement in the decision. In a few schemes, 
however, the externality is addressed more from the demand side. Private water 
users and decentralised government agencies make payments to a fund or to a 
government programme to finance watershed protection projects which do not 
necessarily involve payments to landholders. 
Working for Water, South Africa: water users paying to address an 
externality
Working for Water (WfW) is a government-led programme that aims to alleviate poverty by 
providing employment on watershed enhancement projects, involving mainly the removal 
of invasive alien plants. Problems of water scarcity and reduction in stream flow have been 
attributed to the spread of invasive alien plants that consume large amounts of water and 
cause other environmental problems such as flooding, fires, erosion, siltation and strain on 
native species.
Most of the funding for the programme (about R500 million) comes from the government’s 
poverty relief fund, but about 10–15% comes from water users. The annual contribution of 
the Department of Water Affairs to the WfW programme amounts to about R58 million. The 
water price charged to its users (33,000 domestic, industrial, agricultural and forestry water 
users) includes a “water resource management fee”. This fee covers clearing of alien invasive 
plants as well as planning and implementation, pollution control, demand management, 
water allocation and water use control.
The public company TCTA, the specialised liability management body for bulk water supply, 
has also contributed R8 million to the WfW programme (over three years).
Some local governments, interested in preserving or increasing water supply, contribute to 
the programme with regular annual donations to fund the removal of alien invasive plants in 
the catchment areas where they derive their water. In Hermanus municipality, for example, 
a block rate tariff was introduced to control high water use and a significant percentage of 
the revenues collected transferred to the WfW programme. Similarly, Georges municipality 
has committed R400,000 per year to the programme as a parallel investment to the new 
augmentation scheme to supplement the capacity of its Garden Route Dam.
Where the externality is internalised through payments to landholders, this in turn 
requires that landholders can decide whether to take up the economic incentive; 
that is, it is a voluntary transaction from the perspective of the service provider, 
otherwise it would be little different from regulation. It also implies that there 
is some conditionality associated with the payment. To access the payment, 
landholders have to meet certain conditions.
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Our criteria can be summarised as follows:
1. Environmental externality addressed through a payment: there is a provider or 
seller of environmental services responding to the offer of a payment whether 
from a private company, NGO, local or central government agency,
 and/or
 there is a user of watershed services, who is distinguishable from the seller and 
is not a central government agency, making payments so that watershed services 
can be enhanced or protected through land management. 
2. Voluntary in principle on the supply side: the provider of environmental services 
enters voluntarily into the transaction.
3. Conditionality in principle: the payment is conditional on previously agreed land 
use that is expected to provide an environmental service.
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Schemes Reason for exclusion
Arvari (India), Myrada (India), Eastern 
Training Institute (ICO, Bolivia)
Intra-village arrangements where buyers and sellers 
not distinguishable
Uganda Breweries (Uganda) Company is paying compensation for its polluting 
impact rather than paying to address an externality 
associated with the management of the wetland
Working for Wetlands (South Africa) Government programme to improve wetland 
management with no indication of payments being 
made to landowners or payments being made by 
water users
ICO (Bolivia), Campoalegre 
(Colombia), Shutan Bajo (Ecuador)
No continuing environmental externality  
Downstream users buy land upstream to influence 
land management 
Environmental externality
Application of the first criterion resulted in the exclusion of seven initiatives, some 
of them previously included in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?, in which there was 
either no continuing environmental externality associated with land management 
or the externality was not being addressed through payments. Table 2 lists the 
schemes and the reasons for excluding them.
These are considered as “borderline” examples of watershed service deals and are 
included in the case profiles because they offer some useful lessons. However, they 
are not included in the general statistics for the analysis.
Voluntary in principle
All the schemes identified could be considered voluntary in principle on the supply 
Borderline PWS schemes
All that glitters 17
side, so no exclusions were made on this criterion. However, not all of the schemes 
are necessarily voluntary in practice. For example, although China’s Sloping Land 
Conversion scheme is voluntary in principle, it appears that the selection of areas is 
often by the local government unit, and extent of farmer autonomy varies by area. A 
survey of participants and non-participants in 2003 found that only 15% of participants 
and 28% of non-participants felt they had any autonomy in choosing whether 
to participate (Xu et al. 2004). In other cases, it is possible that landholders are 
responding to hidden pressures of expropriation or eviction (Campamento in Honduras, 
Social Forestry programme in Indonesia) rather than making a voluntary decision.
Conditionality in principle
All the schemes involve some degree of conditionality, or at least aim for 
conditionality, so no exclusions were made on this criterion. However, significant 
differences in the extent, duration and effectiveness of conditionality in practice 
were identified in the course of analysis.  Reasons for differences in conditionality in 
practice include:
l Payment is conditional on meeting initial eligibility criteria entry requirements: 
most funding from the Watershed Conservation Fund in the Philippines is diverted 
to short-term projects such as health and water supply, and has a weak link with 
the provision of the environmental service.
 Payments diverted to poverty alleviation in Maasin (the Philippines) where 
people consider them as a reward “due to them” (Arocena-Francisco 2003).
l One-off transactions that result in immediate benefits that cannot be withdrawn 
or discontinued in case of non-compliance.
l One-off, short-term payments given to support landholders in a transition to 
alternative management practices; which, it is hoped, will provide sufficient on-
site benefits to cover the additional recurring costs. Examples include:
 l payments for reforestation during the first five years in Costa Rica  
 (compliance expected for at least 20 years), farmers are able to  
 commercialise the timber;
 l switch to organic farming in Bhoj, India;
 l orange orchards in Meijiang, China;
 l shade-grown coffee in Sierra de las Minas, Guatemala; and Campamento,  
 Honduras;
 l silvopastoril projects in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua;
 l Cuencas-Andinas project in Fuquene, Colombia, and Ambato, Ecuador.
With the exclusion of the seven borderline and 21 uncertain or abandoned cases, 
we were left with 95 schemes (50 ongoing, eight advanced and 37 preliminary 
proposals). Sufficient information was obtained to draft 81 case profiles (67 of which 
are now available on www.watershedmarkets.org).
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2.3.2 Status of the schemes 
Further criteria were needed to distinguish between ongoing and proposed PWS.
l Ongoing schemes. These are initiatives in which payments for watershed services 
were being made either by the users (direct and indirect), or were being received 
by the suppliers, or both. We identified 50 PWS initiatives that met these criteria 
(most of which have profiles available on the website).
l Advanced proposals. This includes those in which advanced baseline studies 
had been conducted, stakeholder negotiation meetings had been held, but no 
payments were actually taking place. Eight of the proposals had reached this stage.
l Preliminary proposals. This group includes proposals that had been announced 
but for which there was either limited information available or little background 
work completed. We identified 37 proposals in this category.
2.3.3 The final sample of PWS
Table 3 shows the PWS schemes in our final sample. We distinguish between 
national programmes and local schemes, and between ongoing and advanced 
proposals. We also show the spectrum of PWS schemes covered by our review 
based on the type of payment used. Type C is closest to a purist definition of PWS, 
with financial payments made by water users directly or indirectly to landholders. 
Moving upwards and downwards from Type C, the concept of PWS becomes more 
stretched. Type A includes schemes where the payments to landholders are one-
off financial and in-kind or more general support to projects and in two cases to 
park administration, suggesting weak conditionality in practice. There are also no 
downstream users contributing: central government or international donors cover 
the costs. At the other end of the spectrum, in Type E, there are three schemes, 
where water users are contributing to the costs of watershed management but 
there is no mechanism for transferring funds to landholders.
Most of the ongoing PWS schemes in this review involve payments to landholders. 
Somewhat fewer involve both payments to landholders and payments from water 
users in the same scheme (Type C). There are a few PWS schemes that are included 
in this review primarily because they involve payments from water users (Types 
D and E). These include three of the national programmes (Plan Verde, Colombia; 
Watershed Rehabilitation Fund, the Philippines; Working for Water, South Africa)  
and 17 of the ongoing local schemes.
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 National Local Advanced proposals
Type A  
One-off financial and 
in-kind payments, 
access to land, loans, 
guarantees, and  
project support to 
landholders only
6  
Meijang, China
Sumber Jaya, Indonesia 
Mangla Dam, Pakistan 
Procuenca/Valle de Bravo, Mexico 
Esteli, Nicaragua
Fuquene, Colombia
Type B 
Financial payment  
(to landholders only)
5 
Forest Ecological 
Compensation, China 
Sloping Land Conversion 
Programme, China 
Mexico PSAH Costa Rica 
PSA Direct Forestry 
Assistance, Guatemala
4 
Silvopastoral (RISEMP), Colombia
Costa Rica 
Nicaragua 
Los Negros, Bolivia
Type C 
Financial payments 
to landholders 
(continuous and fixed 
period and including 
continuous in-kind) 
and payments from 
water users
1 
Ecoservicios,  
El Salvador
14 
Sukhomajri, India
Cidanau, Indonesia 
Fidecoagua, Mexico 
Costa Rica local schemes:  
La Esperanza, CNFL, ESPH, Energia 
Global, Platanar, ICE, La Florida 
Morazan, El Salvador 
Jesus de Otoro, Honduras 
San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua 
Pimampiro, Ecuador
3 
Makiling,  
the Philippines 
Sierra de las Minas, 
Guatemala 
Alto Mayo, Peru
Type D 
One-off financial  
and in-kind 
payments, loans, 
guarantees and 
project support to 
landholders and 
payments from  
water users
2 
Watershed Rehabilitation 
Fund, the Philippines 
Plan Verde, Colombia
15 
Kuhan, India 
Brantas, Indonesia 
Kulekhani, Nepal 
Maasin, the Philippines 
Mt. Kanla-on, the Philippines 
Zapaliname, Mexico 
El Imposible,* El Salvador 
Tacuba, El Salvador 
Cerro San Gil,* Guatemala 
Campamento, Honduras 
PCJ Consortium, Brazil Cauca Valley, 
Colombia Cuenca, Ecuador Fonag, 
Ecuador Pedro Moncayo, Ecuador
5 
Bhodi, India 
Bhoj, India 
Singkarak Lake, 
Indonesia 
Tarija, Bolivia 
Ambato, Ecuador
Type E 
Payments from  
water users only
1 
Working for Water,  
South Africa
2 
Lake Toba, Indonesia 
San Jeronimo, Guatemala
*Payment is to the Park Administration, the official landholder. 
The final sample of PWS schemes 
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2.4 Constraints and information gaps
The following constraints and gaps in the review should be noted:
l The review is based primarily on secondary information. Although efforts have 
been made to triangulate and check this information, it is difficult to guarantee 
its quality.
l Although the use of a common profile for each case facilitates comparison 
across schemes, not all cases had the same level of information available. The 
opportunity exists, however, to update these cases as additional information 
becomes available in the future.
l In some cases, information was mostly provided by project managers or those 
proposing the schemes, and it was difficult to obtain additional independent 
(and potentially more critical) sources.
The status of the cases can change rapidly from proposal to ongoing. It is possible 
that some very recent changes are not captured in this review.
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3  Brief overview: general trends since Silver 
Bullet or Fools’ Gold?
The interest in market-based mechanisms for watershed protection in developing 
countries has increased significantly since the publication of Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? 
in 2002. This chapter presents the main trends in payments for watershed services in 
developing countries since 2002, setting out their status and geographical coverage.
3.1 Status: many new cases but major setbacks
Development of PWS schemes has not been easy. From 25 schemes reported as pilot 
or mature in 2002, only about half are still ongoing (plus two more which have been 
reclassified as borderline). Only three of the 17 proposed schemes reported in 2002 
have proceeded to a pilot stage. A significant proportion of both pilot and proposed 
schemes are either known to have been abandoned or have uncertain status as no 
current information is available on their operation, suggesting that they have been 
discontinued (see Table 4).
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Region
Status 2002 (Silver 
Bullet or Fools’ Gold?) Status 2006
Status Number Ongoing Proposal Borderline Abandoned, 
discontinued 
or uncertain
Total Ongoing*
Proposals
25
17
12
3
0
3
2
1
11
10
Africa Ongoing 
Proposals
 3
 2
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
2
Asia Ongoing 
Proposals
11
 4
3
1
-
1
2
-
6
2
Central America, 
Mexico and the 
Caribbean
Ongoing 
Proposals
 6
 8
4
2
-
2
-
-
2
4
South America Ongoing 
Proposals
 5
 3
5
-
-
-
-
1
-
2
What has happened to cases reported in 2002?
“Ongoing” represents mature and pilot cases.
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Some explanations for these trends include:
l Some of the proposals listed in Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? were at a very early 
stage. In some cases they were more early ideas than proposals, and did not 
proceed further. For example, the international Bermejo scheme in Bolivia and 
Argentina proved too complicated to take forward. However, several (independent) 
schemes are being developed in Bolivia. Similarly, the Watershed Fund in San 
José in Costa Rica or Chagres in Panama, reported by Johnson (2000), did not 
materialise as formal proposals.
l The PWS component of a wider initiative (usually a national programme) did 
not get approval, although the initiative itself proceeded. For example, in Chile, 
trading in water rights was implemented, but the proposal for the PWS forestry 
component of the scheme did not receive support at the time and was not taken 
further. The same applies to the Stream-Flow Reduction Licences scheme in South 
Africa where the “additional” water flows obtained from changes in land use 
cannot yet be used as an exchange commodity in the licence system.
l Political instability affected development, as in the Integrated Catchment 
Management in Dryland areas in Zimbabwe.
l In some cases, it was not possible to obtain further information, such as the water 
boards in Malawi. Five cases reported for China (the provinces of Guangdong, 
Jiangxi, Shiangxi, Hebei, and Northwest) have probably evolved into the national 
Sloping Land Conversion Programme.
l Some cases have been reclassified as “borderline”, as discussed in 2.3.
Many new proposals and initiatives are emerging all over the developing world. This 
review has looked into several new schemes (proposals and ongoing) in Africa, Asia, 
Central America and the Caribbean (including Mexico), and South America. All of 
these schemes are at different stages of implementation, and their scale varies from 
national programmes to very small, local initiatives.
3.2 Regional breakdown of initiatives
Table 3 shows the regional breakdown of payments for watershed service schemes 
by region and country. Most of the schemes (pilot and ongoing) are located in 
Latin America, primarily in Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, and almost all the countries 
in Central America (except Belize). Many of these proposals are donor-led, with 
significant German and Swiss cooperation and involvement from the World Bank.
There has been considerable preparatory work in Asia, especially in Indonesia and 
the Philippines steered by RUPES, and major international groups like the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF); CARE and IIED are supporting feasibility studies in the area. 
However, so far, Asia has fewer ongoing schemes than Central and South America. 
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In terms of hectares covered by PWS schemes, it is probably ahead of the other regions 
because of the large size of the China national programmes.
Africa has seen relatively little progress with development of payments for watershed 
services, although there has been interest in carbon and biodiversity services. Only one 
case is ongoing, Working for Water in South Africa. There has been important work in other 
sites in South Africa, and the World Bank has recently approved a loan for background 
studies on PES around Lake Victoria in Kenya. Cooperation and exchange of interest 
and information is growing in the region. Recently, Katoomba Africa was formed and 
information about environmental services for the region is posted on its website (www.
katoombagroup.org/africa/pes.htm). There is also a proposal led by the World Agroforestry 
Centre (ICRAF) to establish a cooperation network in the East Africa Region (Pro-poor 
Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa: PRESA) similar to RUPES in East Asia.
3.3 Geographical scale of operation: international, national and local
The PWS schemes identified operate at different levels:
l Forty-one local schemes, some of which form part of internationally linked projects (like 
CONDESAN in South America, or RUPES in Asia) or are linked to national programmes;
l Nine national-level programmes.
Most ongoing schemes are local, operating at a watershed level, although there is  
a marked emergence in national-level programmes and several multi-country  
coordinated programmes.
3.3.1 Local schemes
Approximately half of the local schemes reviewed either have links to a larger, 
international project, such as RUPES in Asia or Silvopastoril in Latin America, or are 
developing alongside national-level programmes. In most of these cases, the local 
initiative receives financial and/or technical assistance in establishing negotiations 
among stakeholders, preparation of baseline studies, design of mechanisms for collecting 
and allocating payments and general management of the scheme, and in some cases 
additional funds to complement those collected at the local level.
The relationship between national programmes and local schemes varies:
l National programmes support pre-existing local schemes. For example in Valle de 
Bravo in Mexico, funding from the national Payments for Hydrological Environmental 
Services programme was used to supplement the existing voluntary contributions to  
an environmental fund created in 2000.
l National programmes lead to creation of local schemes. For example in Costa Rica, 
the existence of the national-level PSA programme has provided the framework 
and institutional capacity to spur local-level agreements with several hydroelectric 
companies.
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Country Programme name Status Description
China Forest Ecological 
Compensation
Ongoing since 
2004
The programme represents the beginning 
of a shift in Chinese environmental 
management policy as it provides support to 
managers of forests with special ecological 
interest and with stricter land-management 
requirements. In principle, this support 
should constitute compensation to the forest 
managers for the environmental services 
they are providing, or for their forgone land-
use options
Sloping Land 
Conversion 
Programme
Ongoing since 
2002
Farmers must set aside erosion-prone 
farmland within critical areas of the 
watershed of the two largest rivers in China: 
the Yagtze and Yellow River (sometimes 
called the Huanghe River). Compensation is 
given in cash and in kind. Total investment is 
US$4.3 million a year
l Local schemes lead to the creation of national programmes. For example the small 
local schemes coordinated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) / Programme for Sustainable Agriculture on the Hillsides of Central America 
(PASOLAC) in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras are helping to create the 
momentum for the creation of national-level programmes.
l Local schemes set up as a pilot for national programmes. This is the case of 
Coatepeque and Jaltepeque-Jiquilisco in El Salvador, where the new national 
programme Ecoservicios is being piloted.
At the same time, half of local schemes are emerging independently of a regional 
or national programme. Most of these schemes are very small scale in terms of 
geographical area and number of landholders targeted. They provide, however, 
important lessons in how to address local problems.
3.3.2 National PWS schemes
The number of national-level programmes, in which payments for environmental 
services are either the main component or only part of a wider policy, has increased 
significantly. In 2002 the main programmes reported were the Costa Rican PSA, 
Plan Verde in Colombia and South African Stream-Flow Reduction Licensing Systems. 
Currently, there are nine ongoing national-level programmes, ranging from the very 
large scale of the Chinese Sloping Land Conversion and Forest Ecological Compensation 
programmes, to the relatively small Ecoservicios in El Salvador (Table 5).
National programmes for environmental services
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Colombia Plan Verde Ongoing since 
1999
National governmental forestry plan 
aiming at recovering forest cover while 
protecting micro-watersheds, regenerating 
areas affected by forest fires and degraded 
mangroves. Driven by the government’s 
recognition of the need to protect the 
ecosystems that influence hydroelectricity 
production, drinking water supply and 
irrigation. Although the programme is 
effective in extracting payments from service 
users, it remains vague about targeting 
service providers
Costa Rica Payments for 
Environmental 
Services (PSA) 
programme 
(conservation and 
reforestation)
Ongoing since 
1997
Government-led national scheme that 
rewards forest owners for protection of 
water, carbon sequestration, biodiversity 
protection and landscape beauty from 
forests. Most of the funding still relies on 
state funds derived from a fuel tax, with 
increasing participation from the private 
sector (especially hydroelectric projects). The 
programme will get significant new funding 
from the newly approved water tax, to be 
applied to all water users in the country. The 
National Forestry Fund (FONAFIFO) manages 
the programme
Certificates for 
Environmental 
Services (CSA)
Piloting since 
2005 
A recently created mechanism designed by 
FONAFIFO to facilitate business’s participation 
in the PSA scheme and capture funding 
beyond the already over-subscribed PES 
scheme. Each certificate represents one 
hectare of forest for conservation. The first 
stage of the CES is focusing on protection 
and regeneration of 7,000 hectares of forests 
in the Guanacaste area. Current buyers 
range from these local industries, to private 
individuals or foreign ethical investment 
companies
El Salvador Ecoservicios Approved in 
2005: specific 
sites relatively 
piloted or at 
early proposal 
stage
This is a comprehensive World Bank/Global 
Environment Facility(GEF)-funded project 
that aims at creating a national system of 
PES as a sustainable funding mechanism for 
conservation by: (1) establishing a functioning 
environmental services fund, FONASA 
(National Environmental Services Fund); and 
(2) designing a programme of payments for 
environmental services, and providing technical 
assistance and monitoring contract compliance 
by the environmental service providers
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Country Programme name Status Description
Guatemala Direct Forestry 
Assistance Pilot
Initially 
branded 
as PES for 
GEF funds, 
it was later 
absorbed by 
the Ministry 
of Agriculture 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Ranching and 
Food (MAGA) investing approximately US$0.5 
million per year for protection of forest 
located in strategic water areas in central and 
western Altiplano
Mexico Payments for 
hydrological 
environmental 
services (PSAH) 
Ongoing since 
2002
Mexican country-wide scheme that targets 
areas of well preserved natural forest for 
protection of their hydrological function 
in critical watersheds and over-exploited 
aquifers and proximity to water sources 
that supply settlements of more than 5,000 
inhabitants, which might in the future take 
over the payment through their own local 
government and/or water utilities
The 
Philippines
Watershed 
Rehabilitation 
Fund
Ongoing since 
the mid-1990s
Reforestation, watershed management, 
health and/or environment enhancement 
fund being managed by the Department of 
Energy to compensate communities hosting 
energy projects. This government-imposed 
programme demands “social responsibility” 
compensations from electricity generation 
companies to host communities of such 
generation facility. It could potentially 
become an effective mechanism to improve 
watershed management, although currently 
it still targets mostly social projects 
South 
Africa
Working for 
Water
Ongoing 
since 1995
The Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry includes a water-resource 
management fee in the price of water 
charged to consumers. This includes a 
charge for clearing alien invasive plants 
and for activities such as planning and 
implementation, pollution control, demand 
management, water allocation and water-
use control. Charges for clearing alien 
invasive plants are levied in 13 of the 
country’s 19 water management areas
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3.3.3 Internationally linked PWS projects
Internationally linked PWS schemes are not aimed at transboundary watersheds. 
Instead, they are mostly donor-led projects that support the introduction of 
payment initiatives in selected countries, in most cases in the same region. In 
general, these projects aim to take into account existing experiences and lessons 
from other projects. Stronger emphasis is placed on the design of baseline studies, 
monitoring and information sharing. Currently, the most developed regional 
programmes are RUPES, in East Asia; GEF/WB Silvopastoral in Nicaragua, Costa Rica 
and Colombia; Cuencas Andinas in South America; and SDC/PASOLAC in Central 
America (Table 6). IIED has also supported a series of action-learning sites in Bolivia, 
India, Indonesia, South Africa and the Caribbean. More recently, a consortium by 
WWF/CARE/IIED6 has supported feasibility studies in several sites in five countries 
(Guatemala, Tanzania, Peru, Indonesia and the Philippines), and ICRAF is shaping a 
RUPES-type programme in East Africa, PRESA.
6. The project, “Equitable payments for watershed services: delivering poverty reduction and 
conservation” specifically targets conservation of forests as means to reduce poverty and promote 
social justice and equity. The feasibility studies aim at probing whether it is possible to accomplish 
those objectives while still meeting the “business case” for downstream users.
Nicaragua has several small payments for watershed service initiatives
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Project Name Countries Status Description
Cuencas 
Andinas
Peru, 
Ecuador, 
Colombia
Mostly at 
proposal stage
A Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)-funded project aiming at 
promoting sustainable land use in 15 watersheds 
in the Andean region of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru, through the creation of PES schemes among 
other management initiatives. The objective of 
the project is to implement innovative methods, 
of which payments for environmental services 
can be one, which can capture the potential for 
sustainable development within these watersheds. 
The project will run for 8 years. For the first stage 
(2003–2006), the objectives were to improve water 
management plans and implement PES schemes 
as a new institutional arrangement to manage the 
watersheds. The target groups are the technical and 
managing staff of the municipalities, local projects 
and NGOs, and the local communities
SDC/PASOLAC Central 
America:  
El Salvador, 
Honduras 
and 
Nicaragua
Mostly ongoing 
small pilot 
projects
PASOLAC (funded by SDC) is piloting 10 initiatives in 
Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador through local 
municipalities. The important lessons for PASOLAC 
are the evolution of relations between stakeholders 
and the way in which soil and water conservation 
technologies are introduced, based on contractual 
obligations between private farmers and water 
institutions. PES is a useful instrument to promote 
discussions among stakeholders and find solutions 
based on contracts and agreements
RUPES 
(Indonesia, 
the 
Philippines, 
Nepal)
Indonesia, 
the 
Philippines 
and Nepal
Different 
stages of 
implementation, 
but mostly 
proposals
RUPES is testing environmental service reward 
mechanisms in six sites: the Philippines (Kalahan 
Reserve & Ancestral Domain and Bakun), Nepal 
(Kulekhani) and Indonesia (Bungo, Sumberjaya 
and Singkarak). In addition, there are other 
“associate sites” where there is shared learning 
with partners but limited financial involvement 
from RUPES. RUPES is mostly funded by the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), and they work alongside a consortium of 
international institutions
Silvopastoral Colombia, 
Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua
Ongoing  Funded by GEF and the World Bank, it aims 
to: (1) evaluate the potential of silvopastoral 
land uses as providers of environmental 
services and socioeconomic benefits for the 
communitiestainable intensification livestock 
activities and PES
International projects in payments for watershed services
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4  Key characteristics of payments for 
watershed services 
In this chapter we examine the essential characteristics of PWS based on the 
evidence from our sample of ongoing schemes and advanced proposals. We start 
with the main environmental services demanded and the proxies used to enable 
payment. We then look at key aspects on the supply side, in particular the main 
characteristics of service providers. On the demand side, we focus on the main 
types of service user. This is followed by an examination of how the supply of 
watershed services come to be linked with demand, and how public good barriers 
can be overcome. We look at the legislative changes, the underlying drivers and 
the role of facilitating organisations. Finally, we examine the main features of the 
payment mechanisms.
4.1 What are the environmental services demanded?
A key expectation in payments for watershed services is that changes in land 
management can be linked to improvements in the provision of watershed services 
or that prevention of changes in land management, for example prevention of 
deforestation will ensure the sustained provision of watershed services.
As Table 1 sets out in the Introduction of this review, the three main changes in 
watershed services that can be influenced by land use relate to:8 
l quantity or total water yield (streamflow);
l evenness of flow; and
l quality of the water.9
The relative importance of the watershed service depends on the on-site 
conditions, the direction of a land-use change, the type of water users and 
where are they located along the watershed. There might be cases of conflicts of 
interests, but also potential for collaborative work. For example, some users might 
be more interested in reduced sedimentation, or higher dry-season flows. Table 7 
presents some examples of the types of service demanded by water users. Chapter 
6 discusses in further detail the evidence on the links between land management 
and environmental services.
8. See section 6.1.1 for a discussion on the linkages between land use and water.  
9. PES mechanisms are useful for dealing with non-point pollution, such as sedimentation. More direct 
approaches, like regulation, may be more effective in dealing with point pollution.
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Water user
Service demanded
Quantity Quality Examples
Annual and 
intra-annual 
reservoirs
Maximum water 
supply throughout the 
year (seasonality not 
so important). The 
impact on total water 
yield may be small 
unless the areas with 
improved land use are 
large
Reduced 
sedimentation, the 
importance of which 
depends on the 
reservoir capacity 
to accommodate 
sediments
 
Mangla Dam 
(Pakistan); Lake Toba 
and Sumberjaya 
(Indonesia); Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund 
(the Philippines); 
Platanar, Energia 
Global, CNFL, La 
Esperanza and ICE 
(Costa Rican Institute of 
Electricity) 
Daily reservoir 
projects
Maximum daily 
supply, especially 
during dry seasons 
when rainfall is 
limited
Run-of-river Maximum water 
retention in the 
watershed to provide 
constant flow 
throughout the day. 
Changes from soil 
quick flow (saturated 
forest soils) to 
overland flows will 
have some effects on 
buffering river flows 
and hydroelectric 
operation
Population centres: 
Urban and rural 
residential water 
consumers (through 
municipal and private 
water utilities)
Constant water 
supply throughout 
the year for drinking 
(i.e. 150lt/day/pc). 
Reduced flood risks in 
the wet season and 
water shortages in 
dry season
Improved water 
quality especially 
in catchment 
areas that reduces 
treatment costs
Most cases in Central 
America and Mexico; 
Ecuador National 
Water Fund (FONAG), 
Pimampiro, Ambato 
and Cuenca (Ecuador); 
PCJ (Piracicaba, Capivari 
and Jundiaí rivers, 
Brazil); Alto Mayo 
(Peru); Working for 
Water (South Africa); 
and Sukhomajri (India)
H
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Description of hydrological service by end user
All that glitters 31
Source: Based on The Conservation Finance Alliance (2003), Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), Van Noordwijk (2005) 
and information collected in this review.
Agricultural 
sector: irrigation 
projects, 
farmers, 
agricultural 
markets
Constant flow of 
water – especially 
in dry season – for 
agriculture. Reduced 
risk of floods
Water quality in 
terms of toxics, 
salinisation, etc
Mexico national 
programme; Cauca 
Valley, Fuquene, Plan 
Verde in Colombia; 
Ambato (Ecuador)
Distilleries, film 
processors, 
microchip 
manufactures, 
food processors
Constant flow of 
water throughout year
Reduced 
contamination of 
water
La Florida (Costa Rica); 
Uganda Brewery; 
Sierra de las Minas 
(Guatemala); Kanla-on 
(the Philippines)
Commercial 
fisheries, sport 
fisheries, fishery 
management 
agencies, etc
Reduced 
contamination of 
water. Reduced 
aquatic productivity 
and destruction of 
coral 
Lake Coatepeque (pilot 
site in Ecoservicios, El 
Salvador)
Tourism Water available 
throughout year, 
especially dry (tourist) 
season
Improved water 
quality, reduced 
degradation of 
tourism sites
FONAG (Ecuador), 
Lake Coatepeque 
(Ecoservicios, El 
Salvador); Sukhomajri 
(India)
Ecological flows (i.e. 
wetlands)
Availability of water 
flows especially in dry 
seasons
Reduced siltation, 
sedimentation, 
suspended toxins 
from agriculture, etc
Working for Water 
(South Africa); Costa 
Rica PSA; Ecoservicios 
(El Salvador)
In
du
st
ri
al
 w
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er
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rs
In local schemes, there is a noticeable practice of targeting one or two specific 
watershed services (rather than watershed services in general) as it is considered 
easier to convince water users to pay. Almost half of ongoing local schemes (and 
nearly all advanced proposals) aim to change water quantity, either as total yield or 
as regulation of flows. Water quality is an environmental service commonly paid for 
in local schemes (Figure 2).
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Most national programmes, in contrast, aim to produce or protect multiple 
environmental services. This reflects the intention to tap into multiple sources 
of funding (for example, from carbon sales or biodiversity conservation groups). 
The PSAH in Mexico and the PSA in Costa Rica specifically target conservation of 
forests as a means to deliver watershed services alongside other services such as 
biodiversity protection and landscape beauty.
Increasing water quantity is not explicitly written in any of the Costa Rican 
examples, as regular precipitation is usually high and the country has undergone 
intensive debates over the role of forests and water. There are, however, many 
cases where it is expected that protection of existing ecosystems will result in 
water security.
4.2 What is paid for?
A key challenge for the development of market mechanisms is the “packaging” of 
the environmental service into a commodity that can be sold or made the subject 
of a contract. Because of the challenges in measuring and attributing changes in 
the provision of watershed services, all of the ongoing PWS schemes identified in 
developing countries follow a land-based approach. Providers of watershed services 
are paid for changes to their land-management practices that are believed to have 
a high probability of resulting in provision of the environmental service.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Water quantity
Water quality
Bundled services
Advanced proposals (Local, N=8)
Ongoing (Local, N=41)
Ongoing (National, N=9)
Note. The statistics shown in the graphics represent the environmental services specified in project 
documents. The selection of each service is not mutually exclusive, and each scheme, especially 
those at national level, might try to pursue several environmental services at the same time.
Summary of watershed services demanded 
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The same also applies to many of the proposals. One exception is the RUPES-
promoted RiverCare scheme in Sumberjaya, Indonesia, which is experimenting with 
payment according to extent of sediment reduction achieved (Box 2).
B
ox
 2
Payment according to service delivery: the RiverCare experiment
In Sumberjaya, the National Electricity Company is facing problems of high sediment load and 
siltation in its reservoir.
RUPES set up a pilot project within one community and one sub-catchment area to test a 
mechanism of payment for reducing sediment. RiverCare is a community group that performs 
soil and water conservation practices to reduce sediment going into the hydropower reservoir. 
RUPES supplied technical assistance as well as taking on the role of stand-in buyer, to pay 
the group for their work. RUPES and the RiverCare group have drawn up an agreement which 
states that at the end of 2007 RiverCare will receive:
US$1000 for a reduction of 30% or more
US$700 for a 20–30% reduction
US$500 for a 10–20% reduction
US$250 for a less than 10% reduction.
The aim is to provide demonstration to the potential buyer, the National Electricity Company, 
that payments to RiverCare can deliver the environmental service.
Source: Suyanto (2007).
Table 8 presents several examples of how services are converted into proxy 
commodities in different schemes.
A solid scientific base is very important, but so are the perceptions that stakeholders 
have of the impacts of their land-use decisions (see Porras and Miranda (2005) 
for more on perceptions). At the same time, the choice of the commodity and 
the marketing mechanism will ultimately be affected by the local administration 
capacity. More sophisticated approaches that are more cost-effective (such as 
credits and transferable licences or spatially differentiated pricing that can improve 
targeting) are mostly used in developed countries such as the USA and Australia.
Until now, PWS schemes in developing countries have used four main types of land-
use proxy for watershed services. Their distribution in local schemes and national 
programmes is shown in Figure 3.
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Service proposed Commodity Place Status
Improved water quality Rehabilitation of degraded areas 
through tree planting at pilot sites
Brantas, 
Indonesia  
(LPT3-IIED)
Ongoing 
(pilot)
Improved water quality Improved land practices through switch 
to organic agriculture
Bhoj Wetlands, 
India
Advanced 
proposal
Improved water quality and 
quantity
Improved land practices through soil 
conservation and zoning
Bhodi-Suan, 
India
Advanced 
proposal
Reduction of sediments in lake Improved land practices through soil 
conservation techniques, use restriction 
through reduced grazing intensity and 
tradable water rights. 
Sukhomajri, 
India
Ongoing
Improved water quantity Protection of existing forests Los Negros, 
Bolivia
Ongoing
Biodiversity protection, carbon 
sequestration, regulation of water 
flows and quality, reduction of 
environmental vulnerability to 
landslides, scenic beauty
Protection and restoration of existing 
forests 
National 
programme 
EcoServicios,  
El Salvador
Advanced 
proposal 
(ongoing on 
pilot site)
Regulation of water flows and 
quality, reduction of landslide risk, 
scenic beauty, carbon sequestration, 
biodiversity protection
Improved land practices through 
combining trees with agricultural 
production (agroforestry, silvopastoral 
practices, shade-grown coffee, live 
fences)
Regulation of water flows and 
quality, reduction of landslide risks
Improved land practices in agricultural 
land (mulching, low tillage, live 
barriers, conservation works)
Protection, conservation and 
management of strategic water 
sources
Improved land practices mostly through 
soil and water conservation techniques 
in small watersheds; no slash-and-burn, 
management of crop residues, natural 
regeneration of forest through selective 
logging, management of coffee farms, 
conservation of forest, use of wind 
barriers and live fences, and use of 
coffee waste for compost
PASOLAC, 10 
initiatives 
in small 
watersheds in 
Central America
Mostly 
ongoing
Improved water quantity and 
quality
Conservation of existing forests and 
reforestation
Mexico (national 
programme)
Ongoing
Improved water quantity and 
regulation
Mostly conservation of paramo and 
natural forests, but also some improved 
agriculture measures
Pimampiro, 
Ecuador
Ongoing
Reduction of sediments and 
improved water regulation
Mostly conservation of existing forests 
and prevention to conversion
Platanar, Costa 
Rica
Ongoing
Examples of watershed services and associated proxy commodities 
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The main (land-use based) proxy commodities used for PWS schemes in developing 
countries are:
1. Improved land practices
These practices, which are often proposed by project planners as ways to ensure 
the environmental service while generating medium- to long-term on-site returns 
to the farmer, include:
l Improved agricultural practices (alternatives to slash-and-burn, soil-conservation 
land techniques, organic farming or low pesticides; integrated pesticide 
management). Examples include the orange orchards project in Meijiang, China; 
and San Pedro Norte in Nicaragua.
l Agro-forestry (including shade-grown coffee). Examples include the PSA in Costa 
Rica; SumberJaya in Indonesia; and Jesus de Otoro in Honduras.
l Improved ranching management (including silvopastoral schemes). The main 
example here is the Silvopastoral programme of projects in Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua.
l Sustainable forest management. The largest example is the Forest Ecological 
Compensation scheme in China.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Management
Reforestation
Conservation
Restoration
Note: some schemes involve a combination of practices.
Ongoing (National, N=9)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Management
Reforestation
Conservation
Restoration
Advanced proposals (Local, N=8)
Ongoing (Local, N=41)
Land-based proxy commodities for watershed services  
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This is the most common approach in both local and national initiatives, applying  
to 24 of the ongoing local schemes, seven of the advanced proposals and four of 
the national programmes.
2. Reforestation for commercial plantations
Although reforestation could be considered as a sub-category of improved land 
practices, it is categorised separately here as it might not always represent an 
improvement for watershed services, particularly where monoculture and use of 
exotic species are involved. Depending on local circumstances, reforestation can help 
to reduce sediments and improve access to NTFP. Fast-growing species, however, can 
result in reduced water flows, which could be a problem in dry areas. The process of 
reforestation, like other changes of land use, can also be highly disruptive.
Reforestation is less commonly used than improved land-management practices and 
rarely as the sole activity. Six national schemes, including the two schemes in China, 
and the Costa Rica PSA scheme, promote reforestation. At the local level, 11 schemes 
include reforestation. It is notable that only one (Tarija) of the eight advanced 
proposals is likely to involve payment for reforestation, suggesting that concerns 
about the environmental and social impacts of this type of land use have reduced its 
appeal to PWS scheme promoters.
3. Conservation and protection of existing ecosystems
This category refers to the prohibition or restrictions of use of existing ecosystems. For 
example, avoiding conversion of forest to other land uses, protection of riparian areas 
and protection of strategic water-recharge areas. Such activities are reported in 23 
ongoing local schemes and three national programmes. Key examples at the national 
level are the Payments for Environmental Services scheme in Costa Rica, where over 
80% of payments are for forest conservation, and the Payments for Hydrological 
Services in Mexico, which is based entirely around the conservation of forest. In 
the case of Costa Rica, the high emphasis on conservation also reflects farmers’ 
preferences as conservation implies lower initial investment than other activities such 
as reforestation or agroforestry. The national schemes in Guatemala and Colombia 
are also aimed at forest conservation, but they are less directly linked with payments 
to forest landholders. Schemes at the local level focusing on conservation include all 
watershed projects in Costa Rica (hydroelectric projects CNFL, Platanar, Energía Global, 
ICE, and La Esperanza, and water-based companies ESPH and La Florida), which aim 
to increase or protect forest cover as means to reduce potential sedimentation and 
reduce flash floods, Pimampiro in Ecuador, and Los Negros in Bolivia.
Interestingly, only one of the eight advanced proposals (Tarija) specifically 
contemplates payments for forest conservation. This suggests a shift in focus of 
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the promoters of PWS away from forest conservation to broader land-management 
issues, although the sample of proposals is too small to draw firm conclusions.
4. Rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems for protection
This refers to the promotion of activities leading to recovery or rehabilitation of 
degraded ecosystems that will provide environmental services. These recovered 
areas will be protected afterwards and productive land uses prohibited (hence the 
difference from agroforestry). Incentives are given to support restoration costs. In 
some cases, there can be a flow of payments for protection afterwards. In other 
cases, they can be given to comply with legislation requirements (for example, 
where initial conversion was illegal). Schemes promoting this approach include PCJ 
in Brazil, where farmers are being given assistance (or one-off in-kind payment) to 
restore riparian forest.
4.3 Supply: who is being paid?
There are five main categories of supplier being paid  in ongoing national and local 
schemes:
l Private landowners. They have clear ownership of their land, with either land 
titles or undisputed informal possession rights.
l Private reserves. Private entities (individuals or groups) registered as reserves 
and committed to conservation of specific ecosystems. This category is 
especially used in Costa Rica, where reserves (registered as private individuals, 
associations, or NGOs), receive payments for environmental services (i.e. in the 
case of La Esperanza, Rojas and Alyward 2002).
l Informal occupiers of public lands. This group consists of farmers living on 
public land (often land that has been designated as a national park or has some 
protected area status even if poorly enforced). In some cases, farmers may have 
long-standing informal rights to the land and are in dispute with the government. 
One example is the FONAG water fund, which focuses on the Cayambe Coca and 
Antisana Reserves where landowners lost their land title when these reserves 
were created but were never compensated (Echavarría 2002).
l Communal landholders. Farmers living or drawing their livelihoods from 
communal land. This includes the ejidos in Mexico, where forestland is mostly 
communally owned.
l Government or NGO managing protected areas. Most schemes in this category 
deal with land owned (or managed) by the government for conservation, 
some located along buffer areas of national parks. Cases where a national 
park receives payments include El Imposible in El Salvador; Cerro San Gil in 
Guatemala; and Cuenca in Ecuador, where funds collected through user fees are 
also used to help administer the Cajas National Park located in the upper parts 
of the watershed. 
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Most ongoing schemes target private landowners as their main suppliers (Figure 
4). All but one of the national programmes involve private landowners as the main 
target group (in the PSA in Costa Rica this includes private reserves). This reflects the 
need for security that those paid can control the land and hence deliver the service. 
The exception is the Mexico National PSAH programme, where most forestland is 
held communally (see Box 3). There can be some flexibility about land tenure in 
local schemes because there is greater knowledge and trust about informal land 
rights. Other forms of land tenure are less common in national programmes, with 
only the WfW scheme in South Africa involving public lands.
The inclusion of various types of land tenure is more common in local schemes, 
where monitoring and adapting to local conditions is easier. Although private 
landowners are the most common type of supplier, other categories such as 
communal landholders were identified (five ongoing and three cases proposed), and 
occupiers of public lands (three ongoing and two proposed). Most generally, these 
types of tenure tend to include many people, usually grouped as communities, 
making management of the scheme harder. For example, over 700 farmers are 
farming land inside the Makiling Forest Reserve. The University of the Philippines in 
Los Banos manages the reserve, and is shifting its efforts from eviction to promoting 
active participation of the informal occupiers in land management. The FONAG 
project in Ecuador works with 27,000 people in small communities located in the 
Cayambe-Coca and Antisana Ecological Reserves.
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0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Occupiers of public land
Communal land
Private (individuals)
Private (reserves)
National parks
Participants in markets for watershed services: payment recipients
Note: Excludes Lake Toba and San Jeronimo (no payments to landholders/suppliers).
Local-ongoing (N=39)
National (N=8)
All that glitters 39
B
ox
 3
Dealing with common property in Mexico
Current land tenure in Mexico is based on agrarian reform more than 70 years old. At that 
stage, large private estates and public land were redistributed among organised groups of 
peasants in an institutional arrangement involving both individual plots and common property 
areas. These arrangements are known either as ejidos (which include more individual plots), 
and agrarian communities (mainly common property). Reforms introduced in 1992 granted 
ejido members more clearly defined individual property rights for their plots, making them 
almost private property. Because it is under common property that most forests are owned, 
their land tenure rules have important implications for the design of PSAH.
Initially the PSAH considered two options for dealing with ejidos. The first option involved 
direct payments to individual owners in proportion to the percentage of rights over the 
benefits from the commons stated in their land title. This would have the advantage of directly 
compensating households for bearing the costs of limiting timber and firewood extraction, 
as well as their restraint in expanding the agricultural frontier over the forests. In the second 
option, payments would be given to the entire collective through their representative and 
executive body called the Comisariado Ejidal. In this case, the entire Ejido Assembly would 
decide what to do with the resources, either directly or through the guidelines given to their 
Comisariado. The second option was chosen by the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) 
under the argument that it had more legal support for the idea that the owner of the forest 
is the Ejido, not the individuals.
Source: Muñoz-Piña et al. 2005.
4.4 Demand: who is paying for watershed services?
It is important to make a distinction between payment for delivery of the service 
and financial support for the establishment of the payment scheme. Contributions 
for the latter often come from national and international sources.
The most common sources of funding in payment for watershed services are:
1. Government: Re-allocation of (national and local) government general budget. 
For example, the Mexico National PSAH, which relocates money from irrigation to 
forest conservation; both China national projects; part of the funding for the Plan 
Verde in Colombia; and the WfW in South Africa.
2. Private sector, including:
	l Voluntary contributions from private sources (hydroelectric projects in Costa 
Rica, brewery), including contributions from parastatal groups;
	l statutory requirements for industry contributions to watershed management 
(Watershed Rehabilitation Fund, the Philippines).
3. Water user fees
 Reallocation of water revenues or surcharges on domestic or agricultural user fees 
(environmental fees in Heredia, Costa Rica, Juntas de agua in Central America), 
including user associations charges (Cauca Valle in Colombia).
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4. Donor funds in the form of international grants (GEF, GTZ, SDC, IFAD, etc.) and 
loans (World Bank).
Figure 5 shows the sources of funding for national and local schemes. National 
programmes are mostly funded through reallocation of general budget (eight cases) 
and donor funding (five cases), including loans from the World Bank (Costa Rica, 
Mexico and El Salvador). The sources of funding are more varied at the local level. 
Donors still fund a significant number of schemes, mostly to cover start-up costs, 
but in some cases contribute to the payments themselves (such as the national 
programmes in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Los Negros, Bolivia). Earmarking of water 
revenues or surcharges on water fees (domestic and agricultural) are used in 17 local 
schemes, and reallocation of general budget from private sector and municipalities 
are used in 14 and five cases, respectively. Allocations from national budgets also 
complement funding sources for several local schemes in Mexico and Costa Rica.
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Unfortunately, there is insufficient information to assess the relative importance 
of the contributions from each source. However, in most cases where information 
exists, the private contributions are relatively small compared to the other sources of 
funding such as donors or public resources. This raises questions about the financial 
sustainability of the initiatives. 
4.4.1 Re-allocation of (national or local) government budgets
National or local government agencies may act on behalf of water users and 
allocate funds to payments for strategic watershed services.
0 5 10 15 20
Domestic water fees: reallocation or surcharge
Agricultural water user fees
Reallocation of municipal budget
Reallocation of company budgets
Reallocation of national budgets
Donors
Local-ongoing (N=41)
National (N=9
Sources of funding for national and local schemes
Note: Funding can come from several sources so totals exceed the number of schemes.
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Reallocation from central government is the main source of income in all but 
two of the national programmes (the Philippines watershed rehabilitation fund, 
which relies on raising funds from the private sector or parastatal companies; 
and Ecoservicios in El Salvador, which so far has been funded by a World Bank 
loan with a view to leveraging private sector payments in the future). National-
level programmes, like the PSA in Costa Rica or the PSAH in Mexico, have annual 
government budgets allocated for payments for environmental services. In Costa 
Rica, the main source is the 3.5% of collections from a 15% tax on fuels. In Mexico, 
a fixed amount of approximately US$18 million per year, taken from a fee charged 
to bulk water users, is allocated to the PSAH (Munoz-Piña et al. 2005).
The disadvantage of public funding is that there is the risk of changes in priorities 
when new governments take office. For example, the Payments for Environmental 
Services scheme in Costa Rica has been changed several times, and pledged amounts 
have not been always delivered (A Saenz, FONAFIFO, personal communication 2007).
The timing of allocation and required expenditure of government funds is not always 
compatible with the most effective operation of the scheme. Requirements to spend 
budget allocations before the end of the financial year can lead to implementation 
problems. During the first year of the Mexican PSAH, the management unit had very 
few personnel to cope with a demand exceeding three times the available funds, 
and only had two months between publication of operational rules and the deadline 
to accept the 2003 beneficiaries of the programme (Braña 2004).
Also, there may be resistance from government sectors to the use of innovative 
mechanisms different to their standard practices. In a recent workshop in Kenya, 
looking at possible incentives to promote soil and water conservation in the Tana 
Basin,10 The Kenyan government heavily discouraged the use of cash incentives 
because it feared that its use might undermine the current system for promoting soil 
and water conservation based on technical assistance, and might raise expectations.
For local schemes, there is greater reliance on user fees (discussed below), so 
reallocation of budgets is less common as the sole source of funding. In Kulekhani, 
Nepal, the local government agreed to earmark a share of the hydropower royalty 
it receives through the central government from the Nepal Electricity Authority 
for an Environmental Services Management Special Fund. This is being used to 
support conservation and development projects proposed by the upland people of 
the watershed (Upadhyaya 2007). Other local schemes combine funding from local 
10. Stakeholders’ discussion during the Green Water Credits Workshop in Nairobi, 11–12 October 2006. 
This project is only at the stage of very early feasibility studies and is not included in the review. 
However, insights from the Workshop are useful as they overlap with those for the Western Kenya 
Integrated Ecosystem Project.
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government budgets with private-sector investment, for example the three local 
schemes in Costa Rica involving hydroelectric companies, or more rarely with user 
fees, the only example being San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua. 
National programmes in some cases support existing local schemes. For example, 
the Coatepec municipality in Veracruz began negotiations to establish a trust fund 
in 2001. A small payment scheme to avoid further deforestation in riparian areas 
was introduced in 2002 with funds collected through a water user fee. Later on, 
funds from the national PSAH have allowed the municipality to extend payments 
to a larger area of forest beyond the strategic areas. In Valle de Bravo, Mexico, an 
NGO (Pro-Cuenca Valle de Bravo) began in 2000 to gather voluntary contributions 
to finance projects aiming to conserve the forests and rivers of the region. 
Subsequently, it began to access funds from the national PSAH.
4.4.2 New sources from the private sector
Company donations
The response from the private sector has been slow in terms of commitment 
of significant funds. Moreover, some of the most significant contributions have 
come from parastatal energy companies or water utilities rather than fully private 
companies. In some cases, private and parastatal water users are already paying 
taxes or royalties to government for the use of the resource. For this reason, 
they have been reluctant to make additional payments to upstream farmers and 
landholders. This was the argument made by the Nepal Electricity Authority for not 
making additional payments in the case of Kulekhani (Upadhyaya 2007).
Fourteen local schemes and three national programmes receive money from private 
and parastatal companies to fund watershed programmes. In most of these cases, the 
cost is not transferred to the final consumers. Instead, the funding comes from the 
company’s profits and is usually registered as a “donation” (in many cases implying a 
tax concession) in their annual budgets. The public relations and goodwill motive for 
companies may be as important as their interest in the provision of the environmental 
service. In the Philippines, the company Kanla-on Spring Water Plant (KSWP), draws 
water from springs that can be traced to the innermost strict protection zone of the 
park. Its business therefore depends on the maintenance of the water quality in the 
watershed. The company fears that continual degradation of the forest is resulting 
in losses, and is investing in reforestation and local training. In all the hydroelectric 
projects contributing to the PSA in Costa Rica, funding for payments comes from the 
companies’ general budgets and is not added on to the price charged to consumers. 
This is because prices of electricity are regulated by government. 
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Statutory requirements for industry contributions
Three national schemes receive funds as a result of externally imposed regulations 
and requirements. In the Philippines, hydroelectric companies pay a fee for 
watershed protection. These funds are not earmarked and therefore the link 
between user and provider is weak. A new law in Costa Rica (Canon del Agua, 
approved in February 2006, to be applied in stages) will enforce compulsory 
payments for all raw water users (including irrigation and hydroelectricity). Current 
payment levels for water are very low and do not even reflect delivery costs. 
Approximately 20% of new funds collected will be transferred to FONAFIFO, to be 
channelled as payments for environmental services in the watersheds where they 
are originated. The Plan Verde in Colombia establishes watershed management 
contributions from hydroelectric and agricultural users.
4.4.3 Water user fees
Domestic water users
In 17 local schemes funding for payments comes from fees charged to domestic 
water users. In some cases, (at least seven) the PWS part of the water user fee is 
clearly additional, in the form of a surcharge. A percentage premium is added to the 
final water bill (for example, 20% in Pimampiro, Ecuador, or 5% in Cuenca, Quito), 
or a flat rate per cubic metre (1.90 colones per cubic metre in the ESPH in Heredia, 
Costa Rica). In Zapalinamé, Mexico, where contributions are voluntary, water users 
can select the payment level they want, with contributions varying from 1 to 1,000 
Mexican pesos per month. Most users (88%) pay less than 6 pesos per month. Once 
the amount is chosen, the extra fee appears in the monthly water bill.
In two cases, a share of the water revenues is earmarked for the payments 
and water consumers are not explicitly charged any extra to fund the payment 
scheme. One such case is PCJ in Brazil, where the municipalities in the watersheds 
of the rivers Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundiaí (PCJ) formed an Inter-Municipal 
Basin Committee to manage a watershed protection fund, pooling contributions 
from the budgets of the municipal water utilities.  The water utility of Piracicaba 
contributes R$0.01 per m3 of distributed drinking water.  The other case is Maasin 
in the Philippines, where the water utility is required by law to pay 1% of its gross 
revenues to the Maasin local government in the upstream part of the watershed. 
In the other eight schemes, the distinction between earmarking and surcharge 
is not clearcut.  For example In some of the schemes, promoted by PASOLAC in 
Central America, in particular, Jesus de Otoro (Honduras), San Pedro Norte and Esteli 
in Nicaragua, the allocation for payments has been agreed as part of a process of 
negotiating an increase in the water user charge. 
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Some user fees are introduced after consultation with the local population to 
establish willingness to pay, but their final amount is more a reflection of the policies 
of the water utility and the estimated costs of watershed protection. In some cases, 
user fees are ultimately determined by an independent regulating authority (such as 
in the ESPH in Heredia, Costa Rica). In a few cases, they are the product of intense 
negotiation of local stakeholders to determine a politically acceptable level both 
of the water use fee and the proportion that can be allocated to the payments 
upstream (for example, the municipality of Jesus de Otoro in Honduras).
Water utilities that belong to the public sector depend on political will, which can 
easily change, with different administrations threatening the long-term sustainability 
of the initiatives (Yaguache Ordoñez, personal communication, 2005, Pimampiro, 
Ecuador). The creation of these user fees is easier for water utilities already 
providing a good water service, with acceptable quality and distribution system 
(ESPH, Costa Rica). End-users can actively decide to contribute, as in Fidecoagua 
in Mexico where, after a period of serious drought, the mayor asked for voluntary 
contributions (pers.comm. Contreras-Lopez, 2005). In other cases, there has been 
little or no consultation, as in El Imposible in El Salvador, where most water users 
are not aware of their contributions, because only the projects’ representatives and 
members of governing boards participated in the negotiation of the agreement 
(Rosa et al. 2003). 
Where charges for raw water are seen as politically inappropriate (for example, 
water is considered a right), an environmental fee may be perceived as a first step 
towards the privatisation of water resources. A clear example of this is in Tarija, 
Bolivia, where despite evidence of downstream willingness to pay for watershed 
conservation, the NGO promoting the scheme decided not to pursue a the option 
of an additional user charge because of concerns about its political feasibility 
(Robertson and Wunder 2005).
Agricultural water use fees
Even though agriculture is often a major water user, only one national and five local 
schemes have been identified where agricultural users of water are contributing 
directly to fund payments schemes. 
4.4.4 Grants and loans from international groups
This review has identified 16 local schemes and five national programmes using 
donor funding. In many cases, donor funding is primarily used to cover the costs of 
establishing the schemes. In Pimampiro, Ecuador, for example, an initial donation of 
US$15,000 from international donors helped to set up a trust fund for the payments 
for an environmental services scheme. However, significant amounts of donor 
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funding also go to cover running costs (including the payments) of the schemes, 
raising concerns about donor dependence.
Two of the five national programmes (Costa Rica and Mexico) have used a loan 
from the World Bank to partly cover payments for environmental services. Similarly, 
Los Negros, Bolivia, several of the PASOLAC supported schemes in Central America, 
and some of the RUPES pilot projects in Asia (RiverCare in Sumberjaya) have used 
an initial donor grant to cover payments to farmers while local sources are firmly 
established. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent these schemes can  
be self-supporting.
In some cases, the payments are financed from donor funds but are not intended to be 
permanent. The payments made in the Silvopastoral schemes in Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
and Colombia are entirely covered by funds from the World Bank and GEF, but this is 
a demonstration project and the payments are not intended to be permanent but to 
cover the costs of transition to improved practices. It is expected that after the transition 
period these improved practices will be self-sustaining financially. In one case, Fuquene, 
Colombia, seed capital from GTZ provides the collateral necessary for commercial banks 
to approve loans for improved agricultural practices.
Several more projects, involving considerable donor support, are in the pipeline 
(Table 9).
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Country and region International 
cooperation 
contribution  
(US$ millions)1
Description
Costa Rica (Ecomarkets) World Bank: 32.6
GEF: 8
KfW: 12.7
Effective 2001. Supports PES programme.
(German cooperation focusing on 
reforestation/carbon in northern region)
Silvopastoral Ecosystem 
Project
GEF: 4.5 Effective 2002. Piloting PES to promote 
adoption of silvopastoral practices
South Africa: Cape Action Plan 
for the Environment
GEF: 9 Effective 2004. Uses PES to conserve the 
Cape Floristic Region
Mexico: PSAH World Bank: 45
GEF: 15
(Approved in March 2006.) Will 
strengthen and increase efficiency of the 
country’s PES system and develop new 
financing sources
Environmental service schemes with support from the World Bank, GEF and 
German cooperation
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Kenya: Agricultural 
productivity and sustainable 
land-management project
World Bank: 4.1
GEF: 4.5
Will pilot use of PES to reverse land 
degradation, and promote income-
generating activities for rural farmers 
and to contribute to improved rural 
water quality. ICRAF provides technical 
assistance
Costa Rica: mainstreaming 
market-based mechanisms for 
environmental services
World Bank: 30
GEF: 10
(Under preparation.) Will ensure long-
term sustainability of the PSA programme 
by developing new financing sources and 
improve the programme’s efficiency
Venezuela: Canaima National 
Park Project
GEF: 11 (Under preparation.) Will use payments 
from HEP producers to support 
conservation of Canaima national park
Panama: Rural poverty and 
Natural Resource Management 
II
GEF: 6 (Under preparation.) Will use PES to 
improve biodiversity conservation and 
generate water services
Honduras, Biosphere Reserve 
Rio Platano
KfW and GTZ2: 11.5 Shade-grown coffee, improved cattle 
pastures. Other agencies: Corporación 
Hondureña de Desarrollo Forestal 
Colombia/Rio Magdalena 
Watershed
KfW2: 28.1 Reforestation, protection of existing 
forests, sustainable forest management. 
Working with Federación Nacional de 
Cafeteros de Colombia
Ecuador/Cordillera Chongón-
Colonche
KfW2: 9.6 Reforestation, enrichment planting, 
shade-grown coffee and cocoa, improved 
pastures and communal forest control. 
Together with Fundación Natura
Ecuador/Biosphere Reserve 
Gran Sumaco
GTZ, KfW2: 9.6 Shade-grown coffee and naranjilla, 
improved pasture, reforestation. Together 
with Ministry of Environment
Peru Jaén – San Ignacio Bagua GTZ, KfW2: 6.4 Shade-grown coffee and cocoa, 
reforestation. Together with Instituto 
Nacional de Desarrollo, and a local project 
in San Ignacio
Paraguay/central and eastern 
region
KfW, GTZ2: 9.6 Soil conservation, reforestation, natural 
forest regeneration
Dominican Republic/Alto Rio 
Yaque del Norte Watershed
KfW, GTZ2: 8.9 Reforestation, shade-grown coffee. 
Together with the Ministry of Agriculture 
and DED
1. World Bank financial assistance is in the form of loans and GEF, and German cooperation through grants. 
2. Except for the Costa Rica project, none of the projects supported by German cooperation are explicitly 
called “PES”, although they refer to payments to change land uses. In these cases, the PES-type component is 
integrated into a broader conservation or forestry programme. Sources: World Bank, Environmental Economics 
and Indicators website; Hartmann and Petersen (2004).
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4.4.5 Final consumers (retail sales)
None of the ongoing payment initiatives for watershed services in our sample rely 
on retail-based trading to provide incentives to landholders, but there are some 
proposals. The aim is to tap into consumers’ willingness to pay for environmentally 
friendly products associated with watershed protection. Although retail-based 
trading might not necessarily result in higher prices, it can be a strategy to expand 
market share (for example, a retail strategy from the brewery La Florida in Costa 
Rica is the promotion of “the environmental beer of Costa Rica”). This mechanism 
usually requires certification and labelling from a trusted (independent) group to 
generate consumer recognition and encourage willingness to pay. A proposal for 
organic agriculture in Bhoj, India, depends on the possibilities of farmers entering 
niche organic markets that will either guarantee a higher price or at least a special 
market for their produce.
4.5 Linking supply and demand
In the introduction, we highlighted the public-good characteristics of watershed 
services, which means that there is little incentive for landholders to consider 
the downstream effects of their land-use decisions. How is it then, that supply 
of and demand for watershed services come to be linked? Although government 
intervention has enabled or directly brought about the introduction of PWS schemes 
in some cases, this is not a sufficient answer for several reasons. Several schemes 
have gone ahead without government intervention, whereas in some cases it 
has required active promotion by an NGO or international agency to get uptake 
of a government scheme. For example, in the Sumberjaya scheme, government 
made the legislative change, allowing farmers to get land tenure in exchange 
for undertaking certain land-management activities, but it was promotional and 
capacity-building activity by RUPES that enabled the scheme to gather momentum 
and get a much larger group of farmers on board. There are also situations where 
other government legislation works against the operation of PWS but schemes are 
still introduced. It is also necessary to ask what leads governments to make the 
legislative changes required to establish a PWS.
In reality, a wide range of entities, governmental and non-governmental, academic 
and financial, are involved in the genesis and subsequent operation of the schemes. 
Figure 6 shows that fewer than half of the local schemes (for which information 
is available) are managed by governments whereas most are managed by NGOs, 
user associations, trusts and academic institutions. Moreover, most of the schemes 
involve a range of other facilitators in other roles.
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4.5.1 The role of legislative change
National schemes
In six cases, the national programmes have been accompanied by a legislative 
change, enabling payment or compensation for environmental services as in Costa 
Rica and Mexico, or creating obligations for water users to contribute to watershed 
management, as in the Philippines (Table 10). The other three schemes have been 
introduced without a separate law or decree on environmental services, as part of 
a more general forestry programme (Guatemala and Colombia) or in response to 
a specific problem of alien invasive species (Working for Water, South Africa). It is 
notable that in most of these cases the legislative or policy change is related to 
forestry either to recognise environmental services in the forestry law or to provide 
for forest incentives in national programmes. The role of agriculture and other 
ecosystems in providing watershed services has had relatively little recognition in 
the national schemes.
Local schemes
For local schemes, the situation is more varied. In Costa Rica, the recognition of 
environmental services in the Forestry Law set a framework for the introduction of 
subsequent local schemes. However, many local schemes have been able to proceed 
without changes in the law at national level, and in some cases without changes at 
the local level. Most local schemes set up without links to a national scheme usually 
require some specific changes to municipal legislation to allow the introduction of 
additional fees for water users, or the investment of water revenues or municipal 
tax revenues in watershed management (particularly if the areas where action is 
required fall outside the municipality’s territory, for example PCJ), and the creation 
and management of an environmental fund (Box 4).
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Trusts
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Government (national)
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Facilitators and their roles in ongoing local schemes
n=40
Note: Excludes Lake Toba.
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Scheme Legislative  change
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation, Sloping Land 
Conversion
Forest Law (1998) and the Water Law (2002) formally 
recognise the importance of compensation for 
environmental service provision
Colombia – Plan Verde Launched in 1999 as part of the National Forestry 
Development programme
Costa Rica – Payments for 
Environmental Services
Environmental services explicitly recognised in the 
Forestry Law No 7575 of 1996
El Salvador – Ecoservicios Executive Decree 50 (draft) contains specific rules about 
environmental compensation
Guatemala – Direct Forestry 
Assistance Pilot programme
Forest conservation incentives are part of the National 
Forestry Incentives Programme, set up under the 
Forestry Law 1996 (rather than a separate law or decree)
Mexico – Payments for hydrological 
environmental services (PSAH)
Environmental services incorporated into the Federal 
Forestry Law
The Philippines – Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund
Electric Power Industry Reform Act, 2001 stipulates that 
a levy on electricity sales must be paid to the financial 
benefit of the host communities
South Africa – Working for Water Launched in 1995 as a programme administered by 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry without the 
need for additional specific enabling legislation
Legislation underpinning national programmes for PWS 
Introducing a change in municipal legislation to accommodate PES can be time-
consuming because of the need to negotiate with water users and farmers, and 
because of changes in government. In Tacuba, El Salvador, discussions on PWS began 
in 2002. Four years later, although water users were being charged, PWS was still 
not fully incorporated in a municipal regulation and landowners were not being paid, 
even though they had taken measures to protect the water source (Marin 2006).
In other cases, the schemes have gone ahead based on agreements between 
facilitating organisations and the main water users. For example, the scheme in 
Zapaliname, Mexico, which involves voluntary payments, does not appear to have 
involved any change in municipal legislation, but has evolved as a result of the 
national PSAH programme. One of the longest running schemes, in Cuenca, was 
introduced within existing regulations and without involving national government. 
The municipal water utility has been making a surcharge on the water bill for 
watershed management since 1984.
Natural Resource Issues No. 1150
B
ox
 4
Municipal legislation on PWS
l The municipalities in the Piracicaba, Capivari, Jundiai Consortium in Brazil, had to pass 
legislation to allow funds raised from a percentage of their water revenues to be invested 
in forest restoration projects managed by the Consortium in the whole of the watershed 
(Viana et al. 2002).
l In San Jeronimo, Guatemala, water users were invited by the municipal government to 
participate in discussion on a new municipal regulation on sustainable management of 
water to provide for PWS and regulate the use of water for irrigation and industry.
l Jesus de Otoro, Honduras: the local NGO Council for Administration of Water and 
Sanitation (JAPOE) began discussing the possibility of PWS with local farmers in the 
Cumes watershed. A municipal regulation in 2002 covered the creation and management 
of an environmental services fund with a specific reference to the micro-watershed of 
the Cumes River but with the flexibility to extend to other watersheds as necessary. The 
regulation also assigned responsibility for managing the fund to JAPOE.
l Pedro Moncayo, Ecuador: a municipal decree allocated a share of the water charges to a 
watershed management fund to implement the proposed payment scheme.
FONAG, in Ecuador, was created by an 80-year contract signed initially between  
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Quito Municipal water and sewage agency 
(EMAAP-Q), and later by Quito Electric Company (EEQ), both municipal companies.  
No legislative change was needed to set the scheme up. However, on three 
occasions in eight years, there have been changes in city leadership. TNC has had to 
invest effort in lobbying the new mayor each time to honour the contract. For this 
reason, steps are being taken to introduce municipal legislation to institutionalise 
FONAG and protect it from political changes (Krchnak 2007). 
In some cases, introduction of PWS at the local level has been facilitated by changes 
in other legislation, not specifically related to payments. In particular, moves to 
decentralise responsibility for environmental management and water and sanitation 
to the municipal level have facilitated the introduction of PWS schemes. An example 
is the Los Negros scheme in Bolivia, where the municipality has started to contribute 
to the scheme. 
Legislation conflicting with PWS
In some cases, legislative barriers can prevent PWS from proceeding to 
implementation. In the Mount Makiling Forest Reserve in the Philippines, negotiations 
for a PWS scheme have been under way since the late 1990s but without progress 
to implementation. The University of the Philippines in Los Banos, which manages 
the reserve, wants to introduce a watershed protection and conservation fee, which 
would be added on to water bills and channelled to a reserve trust fund. Progress has 
been delayed because of lack of clarity over the legal authority of the university to 
levy this new fee. The local government has a clear authority to levy the charge but 
All that glitters 51
would also want to take over management of the reserve. For this reason, this option 
has not been pursued (Arocena-Francisco 2003). 
In some cases, including those where legislative change is made specifically for PWS, 
a failure to address other areas of conflicting legislation and policy can reduce the 
scope and effectiveness of PWS. Some categories of water user such as irrigation 
farmers have often been given free or highly subsidised access to water, in many 
cases without extraction limits. Introducing a PWS in such contexts means that only 
a subset of the water users contribute and that the scheme is designed in isolation 
from water-resource allocation policy. This applies particularly to local schemes. 
In Pimampiro, Ecuador, the potential for scaling up the pilot scheme is quite 
limited because the major users, the irrigation farmers, are unwilling to contribute 
(Echavarría et al. 2004). 
In a few cases, changes in policy or legislation after the PWS has been in operation 
may reduce its effectiveness. This has been observed in the case of the Cauca Valley, 
where irrigation users’ associations contribute to watershed management through 
voluntary fees paid jointly with water use fees. Membership of the associations has 
declined and consequently there has been a drop in the funds collected. Although 
this partly reflects economic instability in Colombia, a major factor is the increase 
in the water use fees made by the regional environmental department which has 
affected willingness to make voluntary contributions. Until 2005, a 25% discount on 
water use fees was given to association members but this has now been deemed 
illegal, further reducing incentives for voluntary contributions (Blanco 2006).
4.5.2 Drivers of change
This diversity of legal and policy contexts in which PWS operate raises the question 
of what ultimately drives the introduction of PWS, whether through legislative 
change or without it. What motivates governments or other stakeholders to develop 
and promote a PWS scheme?
There are in theory two main problem situations leading to promotion of a payments 
watershed services scheme:
l Demand led. There is a problem downstream with water flow or quality, and it is 
believed that this is related to land-management practices upstream. Payments 
are seen as a way to give landholders an incentive to change their land-
management practices.
l Supply led. There are threats to a protected area or natural ecosystems upstream 
and/or land and resource management is considered unsustainable. Payments 
from water users are perceived as possible sources of funds for the improvement 
and protection activities required.
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A more recent driver is the promotion of PWS as a solution whereby an external 
organisation such as a donor organisation or an NGO (including IIED) seeks to 
identify situations where a PWS scheme might be feasible. These can be considered 
as solution led.
Determining the main driver for a payment scheme is complex as there is usually 
some element of more than one. Schemes that are led by water users may reflect 
considerable promotional efforts by organisations concerned about upstream 
conservation or land management. This is particularly likely for some of the local 
schemes in Costa Rica that are linked with the national programme. Supply-led 
schemes may target areas where there are known to be problems of water supply 
and quality. Similarly, a solutions-led approach would rarely involve introducing a 
PWS entirely from scratch. Usually the organisations concerned in choosing where 
to focus their efforts are looking to build on existing activities and initiatives. Figure 
7 presents our judgement based on the information available on the nature of the 
main driver for each ongoing and proposed scheme.
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Just under half of the initiatives can be considered primarily demand led. These 
include two of the national programmes, Forest Ecological Compensation and 
Sloping Land Conversion in China where the government has been responding to 
problems of floods, and of the local schemes, Jesus de Otoro, Honduras, where 
water users downstream were in conflict with coffee producers upstream about 
declining water quality.
Fifteen schemes can be considered supply led. They involve the intervention or 
facilitation of a government agency or a conservation or development organisation 
seeking to address a resource management problem upstream and seeing PWS as 
one possible means of achieving this. This applies to the national payment schemes 
in Costa Rica and in Mexico, both addressing the threat of deforestation, as well 
as the incipient scheme in Guatemala, where government interest in extending 
locally managed protected areas and restoring vegetation cover to deforested 
land is identified as a major driver underpinning the National Forestry Incentives 
programme. It also applies to several local schemes: for example Los Negros in 
Bolivia where Fundacion Natura was aiming to prevent further loss of cloud forest; 
Zapaliname in Mexico where the NGO ProFauna Mexico was interested in increasing 
the funds available to manage the Sierra de Zapaliname Reserve; and Cerro San 
Gil in Guatemala where The Nature Conservancy and local partner, FUNDAECO, 
purchased land in the upper watershed to consolidate the Cerro San Gil National 
Protected Area and facilitated an agreement with the municipality water utility.
Even the schemes involving cash payments from water users only (the Type D 
and E schemes in Table 3), have not all been driven primarily by water users. The 
FONAG scheme, in Ecuador, was promoted by TNC and a local environmental NGO, 
Fundación Antisana, which proposed it to the municipality of Quito as a way of 
financing the Condor Biosphere reserve, particularly the Cayambe Coca and Antisana 
nature reserves (Krchnak 2007). 
Many of the international projects are primarily solution driven, in particular the 
RUPES suite of schemes in Asia, the Silvopastoral programme of the World Bank 
in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and the local schemes tested in India and 
Indonesia in the IIED project. In addition, the national programme in El Salvador, 
EcoServicios, is primarily aimed at creating a national system of PES as a sustainable 
funding mechanism for conservation. 
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4.5.3 The role of facilitating organisations 
Several players of different types, including national or local government agencies, 
environmental NGOs, development NGOs and funding institutions, are involved in 
linking suppliers of watershed services with the service users to enable a payment 
scheme to develop and operate. They operate various stages of the process from 
initial stakeholder dialogue to design, implementation and operation of the PWS, 
and are involved in most PWS. There are very few schemes in our sample where  
the suppliers and the buyers make arrangements for payment without the help of  
a facilitator at some stage of the process, and they tend to involve special 
conditions (see 4.5).
The roles for facilitators are:
l Between farmers and downstream users. Their participation could be transitory. 
The dialogue will help to identify the environmental services expected by 
downstream users.
l Programme design. Feasibility studies, designing the payment mechanism, 
developing management plans and establishing monitoring systems to ensure 
the delivery of watershed services.
l Support to suppliers. This helps create the technical, social and institutional 
capacities to implement the land-management practices required by buyers.
l Administration of the scheme. Draw up contracts, collect and manage funds, 
transfer payments to suppliers, coordinate overall monitoring and technical 
capacity.
l “Wholesale” managers. In these cases, a facilitator will take the risk of the 
intermediation process by buying the environmental services (usually bundled) 
from landowners. They try to sell these services to different users by pooling 
demand from local and international sources. This type of intermediary in practice 
becomes a “first-stage” demand for environmental services. Because of the risk 
involved, the role of “wholesale” manager is usually taken by a government 
agency, particularly for national-level schemes.
The roles that facilitators play depend on the type of PWS scheme. Where prices 
are set administratively at the national level (see 4.6), facilitators are useful to help 
suppliers deal with local applications. For example, in the PSA scheme in Costa Rica, 
local organisations (many NGOs, but not all) such as FUNDECOR take on this role. 
Where prices are determined through negotiation (at the local level), facilitating 
organisations are needed to create a negotiation forum and to assist the weaker 
party (usually the suppliers) with the negotiating strategy.
In some cases one group can do several tasks (for example, Fundacion Natura in 
the Los Negros scheme, Bolivia, has been involved in dialogue brokering as well 
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as technical advice and scheme administration). Some facilitators can also have 
a transitory character, for example assisting during the initial stages of a scheme 
(facilitating dialogue or information) but withdrawing as the scheme gathers strength 
and other institutions or groups take ownership. In Pimampiro, Ecuador, the NGO 
CEDERENA helped the local municipality establish the scheme, and then withdrew 
once it was fully operational. However, it is still uncertain whether the municipality 
will be able to obtain the additional resources needed to manage the scheme.
No schemes have been identified in our sample where a facilitator operates as a 
market player, taking on risk by buying watershed services from landowners and 
selling them on to different users. This reflects the limited market-like nature of 
the schemes reviewed. The closest example is the Costa Rica national PES scheme, 
where FONAFIFO pools funds from different sources to pay the landholders and takes 
on risks associated with managing an investment portfolio/fund. However, it does 
not use the price mechanism to match up supply and demand and instead rations 
access to the scheme.
4.5.4 Types of facilitating organisation
In only one national programme (Ecoservicios, El Salvador) has a new institution 
been created to manage the programme. In  all other cases, existing government 
institutions have been allocated this responsibility. In Mexico, responsibility for 
administering the PSAH scheme was assigned to CONAFOR, the government agency in 
charge of forests. Both Chinese national programmes and the Guatemala programme 
are facilitated by the forest departments in conjunction with local municipalities.
In local schemes, there is more diversity in the arrangements. In 14 cases the main 
administrator is national or local government. In 11 cases an NGO has taken on this 
function (seven of which are in Asia). Trusts have been created in six schemes, all 
of them in Central or South America. The academic sector is only involved in the 
administration of the Silvopastoral scheme in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
reflecting the action-research nature of these schemes, however.
Other facilitation roles apart from management are mostly played by NGOs, 
international ones in particular, followed by government, national and local, and the 
academic sector. Such NGOs are usually environmental NGOs, promoting sustainable 
land use and/or forest conservation, for example Cederena in Pimampiro, Ecuador, 
Fundacion Natura in Los Negros, and the Mexican Fund for Nature Conservation and 
WWF in Zapaliname, Mexico.
Non-governmental organisations play a key role in the facilitation of PES 
schemes. Their experience and knowledge at the local level can help break down 
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communication barriers between different stakeholders. Personal intermediation 
by a (independent) promoter of PES can play an important role in motivating and 
informing landowners, leading to increased participation (for example, Fundecor and 
Codeforsa in Costa Rica). They have been able to provide continuity to counteract 
the high turnover of personnel in government agencies. They are also better 
connected with experiences from other countries and so are able to bring ideas and 
lessons from elsewhere. In South America, where decentralisation is proceeding 
fast, NGOs and international donors have been particularly important in supporting 
local governments in the creation of PES-type schemes. For example, the support 
provided by GTZ has been crucial in the creation of the Cuencas Andinas project in 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
In general, facilitators play key roles and are nearly always needed in the design 
and operation of payments for environmental service schemes. They have a 
diversity of tasks, and therefore many of the PWS schemes involve partnerships 
between different types of organisation, government groups (like ministries of 
environment and water), non-governmental groups, academia and international 
interest groups. Although government entities play a very important role in 
addressing the public-good characteristics of watershed services, NGOs are important 
at the local level as they are flexible enough to respond quickly to local-level 
conditions, and strengthen the link between providers and users at the local level.
4.6 Payment mechanisms
The linking of supply and demand for watershed services finds its practical 
expression in the payment mechanism, whereby the agreed amount of payment 
goes from the users to the providers in return for the watershed services or proxy 
land-based activities agreed. There are four main issues related to payment 
mechanisms for watershed services:
1. How are payment levels determined?
2. How are payments transferred from buyers to sellers?
3. What is the unit (cash or in-kind) and timing (one-off, ongoing) of payments?
4. How is contract performance monitored and enforced?
4.6.1 How are payment levels determined?
There are three types of mechanism used for price determination in the schemes 
reviewed:
1. Administratively determined (non-negotiable) payments.
2. Direct negotiation between buyers and sellers.
3. Negotiation through an intermediary.
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It is not unusual for schemes to have a combination of price discovery mechanisms. 
For example, in the national PSA programme in Costa Rica, although payment 
levels to providers are administratively set for the national programmes, payments 
made by water users are determined through negotiations with FONAFIFO, the 
government agency administering the scheme. Many of these national-level 
intermediaries work alongside local facilitators, who help to bridge the final gap 
with local farmers and water users.
More sophisticated methods for determining payment levels include auctions, 
but these were not used in any of the ongoing schemes reviewed, nor are they 
proposed in the advanced proposals. Differentiated payments based on opportunity 
cost of land, or quality of the environmental service provided obtained through 
auctions, have been proposed for the Costa Rican or the Mexican national 
programmes, but at the moment they still remain theoretical. In an auction system, 
farmers make bids specifying the payment level they would be willing to accept. 
In so doing, they reveal their opportunity cost, enabling the desired amount of 
land in different locations to be brought into a scheme at least cost. Auctions are 
more popular in developed countries such as the USA or Australia where controls 
are stricter. An example of auctions is the Conservation Reserve Program in the 
USA, which encourages agri-environmental objectives through “retiring” land from 
production using fixed contracts (Ferraro 2008). 
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Mechanisms for determining payment levels to suppliers in local schemes
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Determining payment levels in Heredia, Costa Rica, and Los Negros, Bolivia
The Heredia PWS project in Costa Rica used a combination of opportunity cost to estimate 
“capture values”, and substitutes costs to estimate the cost of protection and recovery of forest. 
These values suggested an upward revision of 7.59 colones per cubic metre as a water fee (tarifa 
hídrica). The national regulating body authorised an increase of 3.8 colones per cubic metre.
A 2003 survey in Los Negros, Bolivia, showed that 70% of downstream farmers would be willing 
to pay collectively approximately US$12,500 – 19,700 per year, equivalent to a contribution of 
approximately 2% of average household income for each family (Robertson and Wunder 2005). 
It took some time to overcome mistrust, and by 2007 the municipality (in representation of 
downstream users) was covering part of the project costs ((Asquith and Vargas 2007).
a. Administratively determined (non-negotiable) payments
In this type of approach, the authority administering the scheme determines the 
payment level, in some cases after conducting studies of opportunity costs for 
landholders or of water users’ willingness to pay (see Box 5). Although there is 
some stakeholder consultation and lobbying by different interests, there is little 
negotiation directly with landholders or water users. If the number of applications 
from landholders exceeds the funds available at the fixed payment level, there 
is no adjustment of the payment level as in a market system. The allocation of 
funds to landholders is done a first-come first-served basis or the ability to meet 
certain criteria. This approach to determining payment levels has been used in 
most of the national-level PWS, where it is not practicable to conduct negotiations 
with all the landholders in the scheme. Local schemes have a wider range of 
mechanisms to determine prices, although administratively based decisions count 
for 40% of cases reviewed. 
All but one of the national schemes involving payments to landholders have 
administratively determined payment levels, leaving little scope for farmers to 
negotiate them. The exception is the incipient national Ecoservicios scheme in El 
Salvador, where there have been negotiations between government and local 
stakeholders but only in the context of a local pilot project.
The three national schemes involving payments from water users, have 
administratively determined transfers from electricity or water charges (for example 
Colombia, Box 6).
Several local schemes involving payments to landholders appear to have 
administratively determined payment levels with little prior negotiation.  
For example:
l Five local schemes in Costa Rica, which have simply adopted the payment levels 
of the national scheme with which they are linked (CNFL, Energia Global, ESPH,  
La Florida, Platanar). 
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Determining contributions from hydroelectricity producers in Colombia
The Plan Verde national government forestry programme in Colombia aims to increase 
forest cover and rehabilitate micro-watersheds. The programme is managed by Regional 
Environmental Management Corporations (Corporaciones Autonomas Regionales, CARs), 
which are decentralised bodies of the Colombian Ministry of Environment. Among other 
sources, the CARs are financed by transfers from the hydroelectric sector. A 3% share of the 
returns from electricity sales is directed to their budget for investment in environmental 
protection in general and of the watershed in particular. Half of the amount received (in 
1994–2000 this amounted to US$ 135 million) must be channelled to protection of watersheds 
where energy is generated, following the watershed management plans. However, it has 
been highlighted that a large portion of these funds is spent on administration costs and 
other activities not related to watershed investment (Quintero and Estrada 2003). 
l The three silvopastoral pilot schemes in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua have 
payment levels determined on the basis of studies of costs of adopting alternative 
management practices.
l In Pimampiro, Ecuador, the municipality and the local NGO designing the project 
determined payment levels without any prior examination of opportunity cost. 
The formula was simple: available monthly funds collected from user fees divided 
by the total area they wanted to target. Payments were slightly adjusted by the 
degree of degradation. For example, primary forests and páramos get $1 per 
hectare, whereas intervened landscapes receive less than that (Echavarría et al. 
2004). Studies of opportunity costs conducted after the payment scheme had 
been implemented provide more formal support for the price levels set (Ordóñez 
and Puglla 2004).
b. Payments based on negotiation
Payment terms and levels can also be determined through negotiation either directly 
between buyer/water user and supplier or more commonly through an intermediary. 
Negotiations address contract details outlining land-management practices in 
exchange for agreed payments (cash or in-kind).
Direct negotiation. There are no examples of direct negotiation in national 
programmes and relatively few cases of direct negotiation in local schemes (four 
ongoing schemes and two advanced proposals). Direct negotiation is mostly used in 
situations when there are few stakeholders involved such as La Esperanza in Costa 
Rica and San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua (Box 7).
Negotiation through intermediaries. Almost half of ongoing local schemes rely 
on negotiations through intermediaries (48%) for price discovery, almost equally 
distributed between NGOs, trusts and government entities (local and national). 
In Los Negros, Bolivia, negotiations between farmers and downstream users 
were facilitated by the NGO Fundacion Natura to establish the “exchange rate” 
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4.6.2 Mechanisms for transferring and managing funds 
As well as agreement on the amount of payment to transfer, there has to be a 
decision on how funds will be managed and transferred among stakeholders. These 
mechanisms vary according to their degree of complexity and in our sample include:
a. Direct payments from buyer to seller eliminating the need for management of 
funds by an intermediary.
b. Payments through intermediaries, with the implication that funds have to be 
managed by the intermediary (including trust funds).
a. Direct payments from buyer to seller
Service users can make direct transfers to the providers. The conditions are usually 
the same as for direct negotiation of the payment level, that is, few providers 
and usually one main downstream user. These conditions are found only in local 
schemes, and all national PWS schemes in our sample require some level of 
financial intermediation.
However, some local schemes involving administratively determined prices also 
have a simple transfer mechanism for the payments. A requirement in this case is 
that the user has the financial and technical capacity to administer payments. So far, 
there are only seven ongoing local schemes where payments go directly from the 
service user to the service provider. Two of these cases are hydroelectric companies 
(ICE and La Esperanza in Costa Rica), and the others are local water utilities (usually 
managed by the municipality): ESPH in Costa Rica, El Imposible in El Salvador, 
Campamento and Jesus de Otoro in Honduras, and Pimampiro in Ecuador. Such 
organisations have systems for collecting and managing funds from electricity and 
/or water consumers and this gives an important advantage. For example, the ESPH 
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Negotiations and conflict resolution in San Pedro Norte, Nicaragua
In this scheme, the local municipality, supported by PASOLAC, entered negotiations with local 
farmers to introduce alternatives to deforestation and slash-and-burn agriculture (including 
stone ditches and barriers). At this pilot stage, five farmers, covering 18% of the critical area, 
receive approximately US$25 per hectare per year. So far, promoters of the agreement are 
satisfied with the benefits received, both environmental (increase in availability of water in 
creeks and natural springs), and social (conflict resolution). This initiative has been proclaimed 
as a highly participative model, involving many local stakeholders (institutions and civil 
society). The municipality is currently trying to raise available funds to include five additional 
farmers located in the critical areas. Source: Pérez (2005); Velazquez-Pereira (2005).
of beehives for forest, with final agreement on 10 hectares of primary forest, but 
also allowing for different amounts for intervened forests. Initially, most of the 
negotiations took place between the farmers and the intermediary, who in turn 
tried to raise trust with downstream users. Until now, downstream irrigation groups 
have been unwilling to commit, but the local municipality has agreed to contribute 
to the scheme on their behalf (Asquith and Vargas 2007).
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in Costa Rica collects payments from end-users through a surcharge on the water 
bills. The money related to the surcharge is placed in a separate Environmental Fund. 
Payments are subsequently transferred from the fund directly to the farmers, without 
the need to go through an intermediary like FONAFIFO.
b. Payments through intermediaries (including trust funds)
In all other local schemes reviewed which involve payments to suppliers and for 
which there in information available (30), contributions are transferred through 
intermediaries. These manage the funds and make the payments. Their role is 
particularly important when the existing water user does not have the financial 
ability or willingness to manage the payments, or when there are several users. For 
example, the CNFL in Costa Rica  relies on the national intermediary FONAFIFO to 
allocate payments to farmers rather than engaging in activities that are not core to  
its business objectives.
Environmental funds are emerging as an important type of intermediary in PWS.  
When payments come from different types of source at different scales of time (for 
example, annual lump sums, monthly payments from users or one-off grants from 
donors), it becomes necessary to establish a fund to pool the different sources of 
finance. Separate funds, with defined legal structure, are also preferred by donor 
agencies to ensure sustainability of funds.
The PWS schemes reviewed differ in their legal and financial structure (see Table 
11). In terms of their legal structure, several schemes have been set up as trust 
funds with legal separation from the finances of the host organisation. Trust funds 
are separate accounting entities, with a designated trust fund manager, or executive 
coordinator). This ensures scope for financial planning without interference from the 
host organisation. In some cases (for example Cuenca) a multi-stakeholder committee 
decides on the use of the income.
Funds also differ in terms of their financial structures. In most cases, the funds receive 
periodic contributions from users and so disburse payments on a regular basis (either 
as cash payments, or supporting projects for watershed management like FONAG). For 
example, a trust fund created in the Mexican PSAH ensures that the payments could 
be maintained over five years. Other funds, like the endowment funds, invest their 
main capital and spend only the interests generated. For example, in the case of Quito, 
Ecuador, the fund was established by users’ payments and left to capitalise for several 
years. The revenues generated by interest are used to fund watershed conservation 
activities. Revolving funds, on the other hand, imply a cyclical movement of cash flows 
out of the fund as loans are disbursed and back into the fund as loans are repaid. This 
provides a continuing source of money for specific activities. Examples of revolving 
funds include Fuquene in Colombia, and Cuenca in Ecuador.
Natural Resource Issues No. 1162
Ta
bl
e 
11
Central America
San Pedro Norte, Nicaragua (ongoing). Seed capital obtained from PASOLAC (US$12,000) and 
the same amount is expected from the municipality. The municipal government created, through 
a Municipal Ordinance, the Association of Water and Resource Management that is to take 
charge of PES contracts, water tariff collections and management of the fund. This association is 
recognised by the National Assembly.
Campamento, Honduras (ongoing). Fund for Environmental Services (FONSAM) was set in 
2002 by the local water board. Uses seed fund from PASOLAC and annual contributions from 
the municipality (not clear how much) including funds collected from: fines, 50% of funds from 
licences, permits and concessions for sustainable management of natural resources, products 
and rents from the funds invested, any donations that the municipality receives and, in the 
future, revenues from the environmental users’ fees.
Guatemala, Sierra de las Minas Water Fund (proposed), which will include representatives from 
the biggest user groups – industry, agriculture, hydroelectric plants and local authorities, as well 
as environmental organisations, such as Defensores de la Naturaleza.
Guatemala, MAGA (proposed). Creation of the Trust Fund Water and Forests for Peace, with 
representation from several government bodies and financed though allocation of public funds.
El Salvador, FONASA, Ecoservicios. FONASA will pool contributions from users and invest into a 
trust fund.
North America
National PSAH, Mexico (ongoing). Funds are channelled through the Mexican Forest Fund, an 
instrument created to finance forest conservation and restoration projects, by pooling funds from 
different sources. As such, the fund also supports other programmes managed by CONAFOR.
Fidecoagua, Mexico (ongoing). Fund for the Promotion, Preservation and Payment for Forest 
Environmental Services in the Mountain areas of Coatepec, Veracruz. FIDECOAGUA is the 
organisation responsible for engaging with the participants and managing the funds collected, 
though its technical committee.
South America
FONAG, Ecuador (ongoing). Created in 2000, to which water users in Quito (drinking water, 
agriculture, hydroelectric power (HEP), tourism, etc.) contribute with the aim of sponsoring 
watershed management projects.
Ambato, Ecuador (proposed): Thungurahua Páramo Management Fund. Contributions currently 
agreed are: from the council of Tungurahua Province: 5% of their budget; from the municipal 
water utility company: US$ 30,000 annual. Under negotiation: secure regular contributions 
from the irrigation water boards; in the future, all users are to be charged a fee for páramo 
conservation. Fund to be constituted by an executive secretary, a technical advisor and a 
secretary. The sponsors and the indigenous movements will form part of the board. Payments 
made through community projects.
Asia
Makiling Reserve, the Philippines (proposed). The project proposes that a watershed protection 
and conservation fee be introduced as an addition to existing water charges. The revenue 
generated would be channelled through a new Reserve Trust Fund that is to be overseen by a 
multi-stakeholder management board.
Schemes using (and proposing) trust funds to manage funding
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Simpler arrangements are adopted in some cases because of political resistance 
to financial separation. In both the ESPH in Costa Rica and Pimampiro in Ecuador 
the watershed services fund is operated through simple earmarking of a share of 
the water bills. Wunder and Albàn (2008) warn that keeping funds in a savings 
account rather than a fund with legal restrictions could potentially be a threat for 
the long-term viability of the schemes. Similarly, the National PES scheme in Costa 
Rica although originally intended to operate with funding from a Trust Fund has 
annual allocations from government central budget, making it vulnerable to changes 
in priorities. In China, the Forest Ecological Compensation programme was initially 
conceived as a separate fund using earmarked fees. However, owing to lack of 
political support, the programme is now funded through central budget.
4.6.3 Terms of payment
Payment can differ in unit (cash, including low rates and guarantees, or in-kind) 
and timing (periodic or one-off) (see Figure 9). Cash payments can be continuous 
or for a fixed period. Six of the eight national programmes that make payments 
to landholders use cash payments. Almost half of ongoing local schemes make 
continuous or fixed-period cash payments, most in Central America.
Payment structures for cash payments
Payment structures when cash payments are used are generally very simple with 
flat rates per hectare for different activities regardless of location. The national 
scheme in Costa Rica, for example, pays different rates for forest conservation, 
reforestation and agroforestry, but these rates apply over the whole country without 
any spatial differentiation to account for differences in forest type or quality or 
of the opportunity cost of land. Similarly, the three silvopastoral schemes involve 
payment according to a complex set of points for different land-use practices but 
without taking into account differences in the location (Pagiola et al. 2004).
Where there is spatial differentiation, the different categories are kept to a 
minimum. The national scheme in Mexico has two categories in its payment 
structure: cloud forest, which commands a higher payment, and all other forests 
(Muñoz-Piña et al. 2005). In Pimampiro, Ecuador, the payments vary according 
to the degree of intervention in the vegetation (conservation of primary forest 
commands double the payment for secondary forest) (Echavarría et al. 2003). In 
the Sloping Land Conversion Scheme in China, account is taken of differences in 
opportunity cost of converting agricultural land to forest. The in-kind payment of 
grain is set at 2,250 kg per hectare in the Yangtze River Basin where average yields 
are higher and at 1,500 kg per hectare in the Yellow River Basin (Xu et al. 2004).
The national scheme in Costa Rica has been criticised for its lack of spatial 
differentiation in the payment structure (Rojas and Aylward 2003; Pagiola et al. 
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2005; Wünscher et al. 2008. Critics argue that linking the level of payment with 
the expected delivery of environmental services or with the opportunity costs of 
the land would enable more cost-effectiveness in the payment scheme. However, 
FONAFIFO has resisted these calls for differentiated payments on the grounds of 
increased transaction costs (Rodriguez, personal communication, 2007).
Other types of financial payment
In a few schemes, rather than cash payments, soft loans or guarantees are 
offered to farmers. In Fuquene, Colombia, for example, farmers are able to access 
commercial loans to cover the costs of transition to organic agriculture because of a 
guarantee provided as part of the PWS scheme (Rubiano et al. 2006).
In-kind payments
One-off in-kind benefits, including technical assistance and inputs, are being used 
as the sole form of payment in 15 of the ongoing local schemes, but are also 
commonly used in combination with cash payments. Only in one case are there 
periodic in-kind payments. The Los Negros scheme in Bolivia gives one artificial 
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beehive (and apiculture training) per year to each landowner who agrees to set 
aside 10 hectares of primary forest for conservation. Contracts are renewable on 
an annual basis (Robertson and Wunder 2005). The conditionality attached to the 
payment when using in-kind benefits is low, making the activities on the supply 
side little different from a conservation project.
In-kind transactions, including technical assistance and inputs, are being used in over 
30% of ongoing local schemes, most of them located in Bolivia, Ecuador, Indonesia, 
India and China. Some examples of in-kind payments are presented in Table 12.
4.6.4 Monitoring and enforcement
Monitoring of contract performance
As 4.2 shows, delivery of hydrological services is measured (or expected) through 
land-based proxies. The information collected in this review suggests that most of 
the schemes in our sample that do monitoring of contract performance focus on 
visual inspection of land use, rather than monitoring the amount of environmental 
service produced. The Mexican PSAH and the Costa Rican PSA programmes, for 
example, monitor changes in forest cover. One exception is the experimental 
RiverCare scheme, which is being promoted by RUPES in Sumberjaya, Indonesia 
(Box 2). As RUPES is trying to promote payment according to outcome, i.e. reduction 
in sediment in the river, it is also conducting monitoring at various sites in the 
river and involving the community in these activities (Suyanto 2007). This is an 
experimental scheme with RUPES acting as a “stand-in buyer”. It remains to be seen 
whether it will be taken up by the local hydropower company and whether it will 
continue this monitoring approach.
Monitoring methods used depend on the scale of the scheme, and can go from very 
specific examination of compliance through site visits to more general examination 
based on satellite images. For national-level programmes, satellite images as 
used in the Mexican PSAH provide quick information about forest cover that can 
be verified by field technicians if necessary. In Costa Rica, each new contract is 
entered into a database that contains information about the property, landowner, 
total property size and area under payments, geographic information system (GIS) 
map, reference number, and inscription number in the land registry (this last one 
with online access to verify land ownership) in case of sale of the land while the 
contract is still valid. The database contains digital photos and a short video. An 
authorised forester, who is in turn also subject to external audits, is in charge of 
field monitoring. Some local schemes also use satellite images for monitoring, for 
example Fidecoagua, in Mexico.
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Case Status Description
Brazil (PCJ) Ongoing Farmers living along riverbanks in targeted areas receive a 
reforestation plan (including approval of the relevant environmental 
authorities and technical assistance) and (native) tree seedlings; 
plantation and maintenance are responsibility of the landowner; 
there are no further incentives given after this initial phase
China 
(Meijiang)
Ongoing Orchard investors are able to lease land from small landowners 
through a village committee. The investors make significant profits 
in establishing the orchards, and they have obligations to conserve 
the hilly land and prevent soil erosion as a requirement to access the 
lease. The government can provide one-off subsidies to help with 
the soil and water conservation practices
Guatemala 
(Sierra de  
las Minas)
Advanced 
proposal
Improved land practices and conservation projects with farmers in 
buffer areas of the Sierra de las Minas National Park are financed 
through training and capacity building. The project aims at providing 
cash payments at some stage if enough funding is raised
Honduras 
(Campamento)
Ongoing Technical assistance to farmers for improved agriculture methods 
(especially coffee), as well as community projects and installation of 
latrines to deal with human waste
India 
(Sukhomajri)
Ongoing Upstream villages refrain from allowing their animals to graze 
on the watershed hills (to maintain vegetation cover for soil 
protection). As compensation, villages receive access other pasture 
areas, construction of rainwater collection dams that improved 
water supply to the village and allocation  of water use rights to all 
households within the village (later replaced by water use fees)
Indonesia 
(Sumberjaya)
Ongoing Improved land practices through community agroforesty in exchange 
for land tenure for 25 years, with a trial period of five years; plus 
multipurpose tree seedlings provided by the Forestry Service. RUPES 
is also testing an additional direct financial payment and/or in-kind 
payment from management of hydropower company and domestic 
water users
Pakistan 
(Mangla Dam)
Ongoing Farmers living above the Mangle Dam receive technical assistance 
and other inputs for the construction of soil and water conservation 
structures upstream from the dam reservoirs. Farmers contribute the 
equivalent to 30% of labour maintenance costs
The Philippines 
(Mount  
Kanla-on)
Ongoing Agroforestry activities with farmers living within Mount Kanla-on 
Park aiming at stabilisation of riverbanks and soil conservation 
measures to arrest soil erosion in the recharge area for a spring 
water plant. In-kind payments made through tree-saplings, two 
nurseries and reforestation with 100,000 fruit and timber trees. 
Farmers also receive technical assistance to adopt sustainable 
agroforestry practices such as SALT (multi-storey, rock walling and 
use of organic fertilisers)
Examples of in-kind payments
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Monitoring is more difficult in more remote places, with limited access to satellite 
images and physical constraints for visual examination. This is one of the most 
difficult administration issues for Natura, the NGO managing the Los Negros 
scheme in Bolivia. Even annual visits can be difficult and expensive. Monitoring 
for compliance can be challenging for projects with the magnitude of the Chinese 
Sloping Land Conversion Programme. In this programme, monitoring is done by 
random inspections by officials from different levels of the government. In some 
cases, this leads to inefficiencies, with local governments planting on all steep 
slopes regardless of any target, or planting  close to roads as “showcases” for 
visiting officials (Bennett 2008).
Enforcement and sanctions
Group or peer pressure is important for communally owned land, and where 
payments or rewards are distributed to the communities instead of to individual 
farmers (Ruhweza and Masiga 2007). The main examples of cash payments 
distributed in communally owned lands are found in the ejidos in Mexico, and in 
A forested lakeside in Nicaragua
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indigenous lands in Costa Rica. In Costa Rica, the indigenous association applies  
for the payments, signs the contracts and is responsible for the activities  
(i.e. conservation or reforestation) agreed. Thus far, the national intermediary 
FONAFIFO has actively stayed out the process by which funds are distributed within 
the association, and will only intervene or sanction if the contract is breached. 
Contract compliance within the associations is managed following their own specific 
rules. Because an important proportion of the payments are channelled to social 
activities that benefit all, there is a strong interest in making sure that the contract 
is not breached (Arauz Montezuma 2002). At one stage in Costa Rica, FONAFIFO 
experimented using global contracts, under which a group of small farmers applied 
through one umbrella contract and distributed the payments internally. The system 
was not successful, as one individual could cause the breach of the contract even if 
the majority were complying. A new approach to reduce transaction costs is to use 
group technical support, but continuing with individual contracts for each farmer 
(Saenz, FONAFIFO, personal communication).
Some schemes apply sanctions in cases of contract violation. Where schemes involve 
periodic payments the most common sanction is to suspend payment temporarily or 
permanently. In Pimampiro, Ecuador, there are three potential sanctions for breaking 
the contract, depending on the infraction (Wunder and Albàn, 2008):
l Taking out secondary products: suspension of payments for one month.
l Selective felling without permission: suspension of payments for three months.
l Clear-cutting: permanent exclusion from the programme, plus legal procedure 
(clear-cutting is illegal in this area), but this has not happened yet.
In the case of in-kind benefits, sanctions are more difficult to apply as such benefits 
are usually one-off. In the only example of periodic in-kind benefits in Los Negros, 
Bolivia, the beehive payment is given at the beginning of the contract period to 
the landowner who in return undertakes to conserve the agreed area of forest for 
a year. In this scheme, infractions would in theory demand the return of beehives. 
However, in practice the facilitating agency, NATURA, considers this dangerous for 
political reasons. The main sanction applied therefore is to block participation in the 
scheme the following year.
It remains a debate how much emphasis should be placed on monitoring and other 
methods to ensure transparency. Some practitioners such as Luis Gamez of ESPH feel 
that it would be better to allocate these funds directly into payments and accept 
some natural degree of non-compliance, without having to measure everything 
(Luis Gamez, ESPH, personal communication).
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5  Socioeconomic impacts of the initiatives 
This chapter examines the evidence on the social and economic impact of the 
payments for watershed services initiatives. There are several constraints involved in 
making such an analysis:
l Most initiatives are still recent so there is little information yet on impacts. Much 
of the information available is about estimated or predicted costs and benefits to 
different groups, rather than observed ex-post impacts.
l The information on both ex-ante and ex-post costs and benefits is often 
incomplete, emphasising benefits rather than costs, and focusing attention 
mainly on providers. Impacts on users receive less attention whereas impacts on 
other groups have rarely been studied.
l Studies or statements about impacts are sometimes misleading, as they do not 
take into account confounding factors sufficiently.
l Relatively few initiatives have been the subject of rigorous evaluations based on 
a field survey with local communities upstream and downstream.
This analysis tries to focus on the evidence from ex-post independent assessments 
of impacts (or if not strictly independent, involving at least rigorous, replicable 
research methods). Table 13 sets out the assessments identified in the course of 
this review and the initiatives they have targeted in each of three regions. These 
initiatives represent only a small percentage of the total ongoing and this highlights 
a major gap of information.
In addition to this list, there are several self-evaluations or documenting of lessons 
learnt written by coordinators or facilitators of the initiatives. The quality of the 
information on impacts in such reports varies considerably and is not always 
reliable. This information is used where nothing else is available but needs to be 
treated with caution.
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Initiative Case study Type of impact Target groups Research methods
Central America and Mexico
Costa Rica
National PES 
scheme Virilla 
watershed
Miranda et al. 
2003
Livelihood impacts Participants 
providers
Random stratified sample of 35 
participants 
Small control group of 15 non-
participants
National PES 
scheme
Ortiz Malavasi et 
al. 2003 
Poverty impacts Providers: forest 
protection only 
100 telephone interviews: 
random sample not possible. 
Focus groups in four conservation 
regions. Collection and review of 
socioeconomic information
National PES 
scheme
Zbinden and Lee 
2005
Poverty impacts – 
factors affecting 
participation in 
PES
Providers with 
contracts for 
conservation, 
reforestation and 
sustainable forest 
management 
(SFM) and non-
participant
Personal interviews of 246 land- 
and forest-owning households in 
north lowlands where greatest 
intensity of PES contracts. 
Stratified sample of 71 
conservation, 26 SFM and 36 
reforestation plus 141 non-
participants chosen through 
randomised pairing with 
participants.
National PES 
scheme
Muñoz-Calvo 
2004
Poverty impacts Participants of 
forest conservation 
in Osa Peninsula
Personal interviews with a small 
number of farmers in the 
Peninsula de Osa, in an area of 
high poverty levels
Heredia Public 
Service Company
Kosoy et al. 
2005a
Kosoy et al. 
2005b
Economic impact 
and perceptions
Providers, potential 
providers, users
7 semi-structured interviews 111 
questionnaires (all 10 providers)
Monteverde Hope et al. 2005 Perceptions of PES Non-participants Structured interviews and focus 
groups
Guatemala
Cerro San Gil/Las 
Escobas river basin
Kosoy et al. 
2005a
Economic impact 
and perceptions
Providers, potential 
providers, 
intermediaries and 
users
15 interviews and 102 
questionnaires
Honduras
Jesus de Otoro Kosoy et al. 
2005a 
Kosoy et al. 
2005b
Economic impact 
and perceptions
Providers, potential 
providers, 
intermediaries and 
users
18 interviews (3 out of 4 
providers in total, 10 potential 
providers and 117 questionnaires)
Impact case studies of ongoing initiatives 
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Mexico
National payment 
for hydrological 
services scheme 
(PSAH)
González Guillen 
2004 
Evaluation of the 
PSAH – economic, 
social and 
environmental 
impacts
Providers – 
successful 
applicants and 
rejected applicants
Stratified sample of beneficiares 
(376) at three levels: region, land 
unit supported, and community 
members/landowners. Random 
sample of 39 rejected applicants.
For Oaxaca state, parallel 
interviews with wives/partners of 
18 beneficiaries in the main 
sample
Nicaragua
San Pedro del 
Norte/Paso de los 
Caballos River 
Basin
Corbera et al. 
2006
Economic and 
social impacts
Providers, potential 
providers, 
intermediaries and 
users
Eight semi-structured interviews 
and 65 questionnaires (inferred 
from total given for San Pedro 
and Cerro San Gil)
South America
Bolivia
Los Negros Robertson and 
Wunder 2005
Environmental and 
livelihood impacts
Primarily providers Semi-structured interviews with 
key informants: participants, 
donors, intermediaries, 
government officials
Colombia
Bolo River Basin – 
Cauca Valley 
Corporation and 
Asobolo Users 
Association
Kosoy et al. 
2005a
Economic impact 
and perceptions
Providers, potential 
providers, 
intermediaries 
users
Six semi-structured interviews,
100 questionnaires
Ecuador
Pimampiro Echavarría et al. 
2004
Livelihood impacts
Perceptions of 
water users
Providers and 
water users
Sample of 11 (out of 20) 
participants (providers).
Sample of 36 water users
Wunder and 
Albàn 2005
Community workshops with 
providers and water users
Asia
China
Sloping Land 
Conversion 
Programme, China
Xu et al. 2004 Economic impacts Participants and 
non-participants 
Household survey – stratified 
random sample of 358 
households in 3 provinces
Uchida et al. 
2004 
Economic impacts Participants Household survey of 144 
households in 2 provinces
Indonesia
HKM – Sumberjaya 
Social forest – 
land-management 
contracts
Kerr, et al. 
(2005)
Access to the 
scheme and 
impacts on 
participating 
groups
Participating 
groups at various 
stages of the 
contract application 
process 
Village level survey all 21 villages 
in Sumberjaya with protection 
forest group survey of all 29 
groups formed to apply for land-
management contracts 
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5.1 Key social and economic issues
In examining impacts, our concern is to address whether market mechanisms can 
both improve the delivery of environmental services, i.e. meet environmental 
objectives, and improve livelihoods, in particular for poor people. To address this 
question it is necessary to examine:
l The characteristics of the people involved in the scheme as sellers of 
environmental services. Are PWS schemes mainly confined to the rich or do they 
represent an opportunity for the rural poor?
l The impact on the livelihoods of the participants involved as sellers of 
environmental services. Are they better off as a result of the introduction of the 
PWS scheme in both financial and non-financial terms?
l The impact on the downstream water users that are supposed to be the 
beneficiaries of the improved environmental service provision – how do they 
benefit – and how do their contributions or payments match their benefits? Key to 
answering this question is assessing whether environmental services are actually 
improved as a result of the change in land management promoted upstream. 
However, it is also important to consider how the introduction of payments affects 
livelihoods of water users, particularly domestic users.
l The impact on other groups locally, nationally or at a global level. At a local 
level, people may be affected by changes in employment opportunities or 
restriction of access to formerly open-access natural resources. At a national 
level, second-round impacts on employment and prices may be significant 
particularly where market mechanisms are used on a large scale. These have 
rarely been studied, however. At the global level, the most significant impacts 
are environmental, given that watershed conservation often entails biodiversity 
conservation. These global environmental impacts are addressed in 6.2.
In examining the livelihood impacts of PWS it is important to consider the broader 
economic, social and political context. Whether PWS can help to alleviate poverty 
depends on the causes of poverty in any given situation. In many cases extreme 
poverty results from poor governance or structural inequities (for example as 
formerly under apartheid in South Africa, though the legacy lives on). Such poverty 
will not be substantially alleviated through PWS. In other cases, poverty is a result of 
more immediate circumstances, including limited opportunities to earn income and 
poor connectedness to markets. The development of PWS could have an impact in 
these cases (IIED 2005).
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5.2 Who gets paid for delivering hydrological services?
This section reviews the evidence on the type of people who participate in PWS 
schemes as paid providers of environmental/watershed services. There are two 
aspects to this issue:
l Are farmers in the area targeted for the scheme poor relative to farmers in other 
areas?
l Within the area targeted, are the poorer/smaller farmers as well represented in 
suppliers as richer/larger farmers in the same area? A further aspect of this is the 
extent to which women participate as sellers of environmental services.
There is a practical constraint to the inclusion of poor people in PES initiatives 
because to benefit directly from sale of ecosystem services, people have to own or 
hold land. The distribution and ownership patterns of land are therefore critical for 
the poverty impact of PES programmes (Pagiola et al. 2005). The landless do not 
benefit directly from payments unless there is an attempt to recognise their informal 
access to resources. The case of Sukhomajri in India, where the landless were 
assigned water rights, is an example of how a scheme can be designed to enable 
the very poor to sell environmental services, but this is considered a special case 
and has proved hard to replicate (Kerr 2002).
The nature (private or communal) and size of landholding is also key. Figure 4 in 4.3 
shows that most local and national payment initiatives involve private landowners. 
Groups that depend on communal land for their livelihoods (and most of whom are 
likely to be poorer than private landowners) are not well represented in the 
initiatives. Property sizes vary depending on the country, and the concept of small, 
medium or large land ownership is relative. For example, Central America is 
characterised by relatively small-sized properties.
Most of the schemes examined by the studies listed in Table 13 have not specifically 
targeted poor people. Rather, they have targeted the conservation of areas believed 
to be critical for water resources and hence most likely to deliver the service. In some 
cases, these areas are located closer to population centres, and are not necessarily 
inhabited by the poorer groups, who tend to be located in remote areas. Even if poor 
farmers live in these priority areas, they are usually scattered, and have significantly 
less access to information and capacity to administer a PWS project. As a result, there 
is variation between and within these schemes on the extent to which poor farmers 
are included in the schemes as suppliers. However, some of the newer schemes 
being developed such as the RUPES programme in Southeast Asia and Cuencas 
Andinas in South America are actively targeting poor farmers and communities living 
in uplands, although none of them is currently delivering payments.
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5.2.1 Criteria for eligibility: national and local schemes
It is important to distinguish between small, local-level schemes where design 
criteria are determined locally, and national-level schemes with centralised eligibility 
criteria and priorities:
a. Local schemes
In small, local-level schemes, the evidence indicates that target areas sometimes 
involve small, poor farmers:
l In Jesus de Otoro initiative of Honduras, Kosoy et al. (2005) report that the 
providers of environmental services in the scheme are relatively poor peasants 
who rely largely on their lands for their livelihoods and are mainly subsistence 
farmers with some cash crops (coffee). This scheme works with 18 farmers, 
covering almost 80 hectares in a 3180-hectare watershed.
l In three small pilot schemes in El Salvador (Yamabal, Tacuba and Esteli),  
working with the regional NGO PASOLAC, farmers have an average property  
size of 2.5 hectares.
There are also examples, however, of schemes where the farmers involved are 
relatively well-off:
l The project of Los Negros in Bolivia works with 13 private landholders, with areas 
contracted for conservation set aside ranging between 3–390 hectares, and so far 
covering 1,100 hectares of cloud forest. Average annual income in the upstream 
community was roughly US$1,000 in 2004 and it is fairly well-off compared with 
other rural areas in Bolivia (Robertson and Wunder 2005).
Within a target area it is not the poorest who are likely to benefit directly but the 
farmers with land, and particularly those with relatively large amounts of land. It 
is likely that those with small amounts of land and/or who depend solely on their 
farm for their livelihood are less able to set aside land for conservation. There is 
little empirical evidence but what is available appears to support this:
l In Pimampiro, Ecuador, the average property size in the scheme is 23 hectares: 
the eight non-participating families in the target area have less than 20 hectares. 
Wunder and Albàn (2008) therefore conclude that small properties are slightly 
under-represented in the scheme. They argue that the smallest farmers tend to 
work their properties more intensively and therefore have less possibility to set 
aside land.
l In San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua, Corbera et al. (2006) found that participants in 
the scheme have an average income including off-farm activities of US$2,000 per 
year, whereas other farmers in the same area have a lower average income of 
US$1,200 per year.
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Much depends on the environmental service commodity that farmers are selling. 
Introducing improved management practices for agriculture or agroforestry may 
be more feasible for small farmers than forest conservation. Agroforestry systems 
integrated in management of environmental services are a viable option for many 
small farmers (see Rosa et al. 2003), as they provide short-term benefits in the form 
of crops and payments for environmental services, and long-term on-site benefits 
such as improved soil quality and timber.
b. National schemes
For national schemes, Costa Rica and Mexico provide contrasting experiences, 
reflecting to some extent differences in land and forest tenure regimes. In Costa 
Rica, most forestland is held privately, although often without formal land title. 
Mexico is notable for the high proportion of its forestland which is held as common 
property by ejidos and indigenous communities. The nature of the tenure pattern 
in Mexico means that forests held by campesino farmers are well represented in 
the target areas of the national PSAH scheme even though the criteria for selecting 
priority areas are primarily biophysical. Even within the broad group of campesino 
forests it appears that the poorest of these are relatively well represented. Of the 
PSAH payments in 2003 and 2004, 72% and 83% respectively went to forests 
associated with marginalised11 population centres (Muñoz Piña et al. 2005). The 
authors conclude that PSAH is a scheme that benefits the poor, although targeting 
the poor was not an explicit criterion for the scheme.
For Costa Rica, the available evidence indicates that poor farmers are not well 
represented in the national scheme (at least until 2002, see Box 8). This applies to 
both the two issues mentioned above, i.e. the characteristics of the areas targeted 
and the relative participation of poor farmers within a targeted area. In Costa Rica 
until 2002, most of the PES contracted area was located in areas with a social 
development index of 40–70% – a relative index combining educational, health 
indicators with social indicators (number of single mother births) and electricity 
consumption where 0% is the poorest area and 100% the best in Costa Rica (Ortiz 
Malavasi et al. 2003). Several studies in different parts of the country have found 
that participants in the scheme are relatively well off. Ortiz Malavasi et al. (2003) 
conclude that of the participants opting for conservation contracts in the national 
PSA scheme only 15% are below the poverty line12. These findings are consistent 
with those of Miranda et al. (2003) who surveyed the Virilla watershed, and Zbinden 
and Lee (2005) who focused on the northern region. However, Ortiz Malavasi et al. 
(2003) show how efforts made to broaden the participation in PES have had effects 
in the case of indigenous reserves. These accounted for 1.22% of contracts in 1998 
but by 2001 had grown to 13.5%.
11. Based on an official indicator of marginalisation. 
12. This survey was conducted over the telephone, and as such automatically eliminates those 
farmers without access to one, potentially the poorest of the group.  
Natural Resource Issues No. 1176
B
ox
 8
Studies of participation in Costa Rica’s national PES scheme
Ortiz Malavasi et al. (2003) conclude that most of the participants opting for conservation 
contracts in the national PSA scheme are relatively well-off and only 15% are below the poverty 
line. Of those interviewed, 56% claimed to earn less than the poverty line but the authors of this 
study consider this statistic unreliable because of the tendency for interviewees to manipulate 
the answer. Based on other criteria, such as use of family labour, residence on the farm, size of 
farm, dependence on agriculture for income, and use of the PES for household expenses, they 
conclude that 15% of their sample could be considered near the poverty line (as their sample is 
of farmers with telephones it may not capture the poorest farmers in the national PES scheme). 
The results show that 81% of their sample had not lived on their farms in the past five years, 
demonstrating that the farm is only a minor source of income for them.
Zbinden and Lee (2005), based on a household survey conducted in 2002 among participants 
and non-participants in Costa Rica’s PES scheme, found that participants in all three programmes 
of the PES scheme (conservation, SFM and reforestation) were better educated, had considerably 
larger farms and higher household income than non-participants. A higher percentage of non-
participants (77%) lived on the farm than for the PES farms (21% in the case of conservation) 
and off-farm income was low relative to the PES participants. 
Miranda et al. (2003) – A survey of participants in the PES in the Virilla watershed found that 
most were relatively well-off with an average income in the sample of US$22,000 per year. 
They were also highly qualified, with more than half of the sample having their own profession, 
unconnected to the farm, as their main occupation.
Muñoz-Calvo  (2004) – A study in Osa looked at the effect of the PSA programme in very low-
income families in the Osa Province. The results indicate that farmers’ main asset in the area is 
forest, and payments for conservation have helped raise many of the participants from poverty.
Gender representation 
There has been very little attempt to assess the impact of PES initiatives on women 
or the extent to which they are represented as suppliers. Some analysis has been 
conducted for the national schemes in Costa Rica and Mexico:
l Over the first five years of the Costa Rican national scheme, women held only 
11.1% of the contracts and 7.3% of the area enrolled (men held 41% of the 
contracts and 28.3% of the area enrolled) but their participation began to 
increase after 2000 as a result of promotional measures associated with the 
Ecomarkets project (Ortiz Malavasi et al. 2003). 
l The rules of operation for the Mexican national scheme set out equality of 
opportunity to access the programme. However, only 16% of holders of land 
rights are women. Even in these cases, the rights may be exercised in practice by 
male members of their family so female participation in the national PWS scheme 
is very limited (Gonzàlez Guillen 2004). Women also have little involvement in 
community-governing institutions. A survey of successful and rejected applicants 
in ejidos and communities found that in 65% of cases there were no women 
community representatives. It was also found that only half of the women 
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landholders interviewed had knowledge of the payment scheme whereas nearly 
all of the men were aware of it.
In very local schemes, such as Pimampiro, Ecuador, an informal “social monitoring” 
can take place making sure that the payment is assigned to the person living and 
managing the property, regardless of the title. Using this system, project managers 
ensure that funds are allocated to the family household even in the case of divorce 
or separation (Robert Yaguache, CEDERENA, personal communication, 2001).
5.3 Impacts on livelihoods of service providers
A key question is whether service providers are better off as a result of the payment 
initiatives. Focusing the question on livelihoods recognises that financial benefits 
from the payments are only one aspect and that there are several non-financial 
aspects such as community empowerment that also need to be considered even if 
not readily quantifiable. It is also important to consider the various types of cost that 
payment schemes entail for participants.
Conclusions on the size or significance of costs and benefits depend heavily on the 
reference point of comparison, particularly where PWS is an alternative to other 
policy approaches for securing environmental services. Thus PWS schemes can be 
compared favourably with predecessor schemes that focused on land purchase or 
eviction. PWS provides a way of keeping people on their land and avoids some of 
the sensitivities associated with control of land by external interests. For example in 
the Cauca Valley, Colombia, the water users association started with land acquisition 
then moved to negotiating payments as an alternative. The local initiative, 
Fidecoagua in Coatepec, Mexico, followed a similar process. However, if the costs and 
benefits of these schemes are compared with the costs and benefits of the previous 
land-management practices, the conclusions are likely to be less favourable. Benefits 
may not be sufficient to compensate for opportunity and transaction costs.
5.3.1 Financial benefits
Three main approaches have been taken in the literature to assess financial benefits 
to service providers: 
l Comparison of financial benefits (cash and in-kind payments) with household 
income or expenditure: this can be misleadingly positive in not taking account of 
the costs to service providers;
l Comparison with costs of providing the service: the transaction costs of accessing 
the scheme; the opportunity costs of foregone land uses and the costs of any 
new activities or practices required. The difficulty here is that average opportunity 
costs for a region may not be representative of the land enrolled in a payment 
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scheme. Land with high gradient, poor soils, difficult access will give lower returns 
and may be, as a result, the first to be offered a payment scheme. Another 
complicating factor is that alternative land uses are often restricted by regulation 
but with little enforcement in practice. In this situation, opportunity costs could 
be zero if the regulation can be upheld, but considerably higher if there is little 
probability of sanctions.
l Asking people directly for their opinions of the payment level. Surveys have 
approached this in different ways with some asking whether the payments are 
significant, others whether they are sufficient and others asking whether  
payments are fair. All have the problem that strategic bias on the part of 
respondents is hard to avoid.
One or more of these approaches have been applied to assess local schemes in Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Honduras, and the national level schemes in China, Costa Rica 
and Mexico. There is considerable variation in results (summarised in Table 14), 
reflecting differences in socioeconomic contexts and land-use capability both within and 
between countries as well as the inherent drawbacks of the approaches. However, with 
one or two exceptions, the cash payments appear to be relatively insignificant and 
there is a view that they function more like supports or a bonus than a real incentive 
for land-use change (Ortiz Malavasi et al. 2003; Kosoy et al. 2005b). Box 9 highlights 
the variation in use and size of cash payment that can occur within a PWS scheme.
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Use and importance of cash payments in the Mexican PSAH scheme
A survey of the use of the payments made in 2003 (Alix-García, et al. 2005) found that 
payments varied from distributing 100% equally between all members, to the investing of 
all the money into public goods for the community, with many intermediate cases where the 
allocation included a combination of direct distribution of payments, payment for guarding 
the forest and fire prevention, and investment in local public goods. The survey shows 
that 18% of the ejidos decided to distribute all payments directly among ejido members, 
22% invested the entirety in forest activities related to conservation, 18% allocated the 
full amount to public goods not related to forestry, whereas the remaining 43% adopted a 
combination of the three strategies
An evaluation of the Mexican PSAH scheme (Gonzàlez Guillen 2004) found that 80% of the 
members of ejidos and communities and 73% of the small, private landowners in their 
sample considered that the payments received were important or very important for their 
annual income. Where payments were shared out between community members rather than 
used for collective expenditure, the average amount distributed per member was 6,624 pesos 
(US$596). In comparison, 60% of the ejido and community members indicated a monthly 
income less than US$225. These authors point out though that their sample was primarily of 
larger forestland properties and that payments were more likely to be distributed between 
community members rather than used for collective expenditure when they were fairly 
significant. They cite, as a contrasting case, that of the community Santa Maria de Ocotan and 
Xoconostle in Durango state, which received US$72,000 to share between 18,000 members, 
i.e.US$4 each. In this case the payment was not shared out.
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Approach Scheme Results Source
Comparison 
with 
household 
income or 
expenditure
Important positive impact
Pimampiro, 
Ecuador
30% on average of household income. Used 
for school fees and healthcare
Echavarría et 
al. 2004
PSAH Mexico 80% of members of ejidos and communities 
and 73% of small private landowners in the 
sample considered payments important for 
annual income
Gonzàlez 
Guillen et al.  
2004 
Unimportant
National 
scheme,  
Costa Rica
For 9% of the sample of conservation 
contracts the payments represented 
more than 10% of income, for 67% of the 
sample less than 10%, and 13% thought 
had no effect on their income. Focus group 
discussions emphasised that the payment is 
considered like a bonus or form of enforced 
saving. However, in the Osa Peninsula, the 
payments were the main or second most 
important source of income
Ortiz Malavasi 
et al.  2003 
National 
scheme,  
Costa Rica
In Virilla watershed, average payments to 
the sample were 16% of household income 
Miranda et al. 
2003
ESPH,  
Costa Rica
For 6 of the 10 providers, payments were 
less than 2% of gross income, for 3, less 
than 10%, and 21.8% for the remaining 
providers
Kosoy et al.  
2005b
Jesus de Otoro, 
Honduras
Payments were only 0.4, 0.6 and 1.2% of 
the 3 providers’ gross household income
Kosoy et al.  
2005b
San Pedro 
del Norte, 
Nicaragua
Payments to service providers are less than 
10% of their annual income
Corbera et al. 
2006
Comparison 
with 
opportunity 
costs
Low percentage of opportunity costs
Los Negros, 
Bolivia
Payments were 2–10% of opportunity costs Robertson and 
Wunder 2005
ESPH,  
Costa Rica
Payments cover less than 2% of opportunity 
costs
Kosoy et al. 
2005b
Jesus del 
Otoro, 
Honduras
Payments cover less than 12% of 
opportunity costs
Kosoy et al.. 
2005b
San Pedro 
del Norte, 
Nicaragua
Payments were 20% of average opportunity 
costs
Corbera et al. 
2006
Evidence on importance of cash payments
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Average fair payment level five times the actual payment level
Sloping Land 
Conversion 
Programme, 
China
Shortfall for 24% and 77% of sample 
households in Ningxia and Guizhou 
provinces
Uchida et al. 
2004
Shortfall for 7%, 40% and 22% of sample 
households in Shanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan 
provinces
Xu et al. 2004
Suppliers’ 
opinion of 
payment 
levels
Payments considered to be below the fair level
Pimampiro, 
Ecuador
9 out of 11 landowners interviewed thought 
the fair payment level was higher than the 
actual level
Echavarría et 
al. 2004
National 
scheme, 
Mexico
More than 50% of direct beneficiaries 
considered the payments to be low or 
insignificant. Average fair payment level 
over 50% higher for ejidos/communities and 
over 25% higher for small landowners than 
actual payment levels
Gonzàlez et al.  
2005
ESPH, Costa 
Rica
Fair payment level more than 3 times the 
average actual payment
Kosoy et al.  
2005b
Jesus del 
Otoro, 
Honduras
For 2 of the 4 providers, the fair level was 
more than double the actual amount. For 
another provider the fair level and the actual 
level were similar
Kosoy et al.  
2005b
San Pedro 
del Norte, 
Nicaragua
Average fair payment level 5 times the 
actual payment level
Corbera et al. 
2006
5.3.2 Transaction costs
Most analysis of the costs incurred by participants has focused on opportunity cost 
as in Table 14 above. Participants also incur transaction costs of applying to join a 
scheme and fulfilling the ongoing procedural requirements. There has been very 
little quantification of transactions costs for participants but in some cases it is 
possible to conclude that they are significant in qualitative terms:
l In Costa Rica transactions costs for applying to the PES scheme have been 
high.  Miranda et al. (2003) identified 11 separate requirements. More recently, 
requirements have been streamlined by linking FONAFIFO’s database with those 
of other government agencies Pagiola (2008). Still, the average transaction cost 
for the farmer can be estimated by the fee that facilitators charge (12–18% of the 
payment).
l In Mexico, Gonzàlez Guillen (2004) found an average cost for successful applicants 
of 2,885 pesos (US$260) for ejidos and communities and 2,345 pesos (US$211) 
for small landowners. Costs for rejected applicants were similar (2,361 for ejidos 
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and communities and 3,696 for small landowners). On the basis of their sample 
results they estimated a total cost for all successful applicants of just under 1 
million pesos (US$89,000), or 0.35% of the total payment allocated for five years. 
This appears to be considerably lower than for Costa Rica although it is not clear 
what is included in the estimates of costs and the extent to which applicants’ 
time is factored in.
5.3.3 Non-financial benefits
As financial payments are often considered to be insignificant, non-financial benefits 
must be part of the explanation why farmers participate and continue to participate in 
these schemes. Strengthening of property rights, capacity building, improvements in 
social organisation and in quality of life are the main benefits cited. For some of the 
initiatives, the impact assessment surveys have asked participants specifically about 
their perceptions of these non-financial benefits. In some cases, however, the main 
source of information is the observations of those running the scheme or involved as 
facilitators. In a few cases, the evidence is restricted to the observation that certain 
activities such as training and environmental education have accompanied the 
initiatives. Little is known about how participants and the local community perceive 
these. Non-financial costs for participants have rarely been documented.
Strengthening of property rights
A common theme of many case studies is the effect of PWS in strengthening 
property rights. This works in three different ways:
l Strengthened property rights as the main payment offered. This has been the 
approach in some schemes in Asia, in particular the HKm programme in Indonesia, 
which offers farmers long-term licences to use degraded protected state forest-
land for coffee production provided that they meet certain management conditions 
such as agroforestry, and soil and water conservation (Kerr et al. 2005). There has 
been little systematic analysis of the impact of this. Because this programme is 
recent, surveys have focused on farmers’ perceptions and expectations of benefit.
 In Sumberjaya, Kerr et al. (2005) found that applying for HKm land is believed 
to raise significantly the security of protection forestland compared with that 
of private land. Once the 25-year permit is in place, tenure on these lands will 
be considered almost as secure as private land. There are knock-on effects of 
the land permits, in particular reduction in forced bribes to local officials, but 
this cannot be attributed totally to the HKm programme: other local factors are 
also important. A high proportion of participants in group interviews expected 
the HKm to increase their income because of more intensive and diversified 
cultivation (fruit trees as well as coffee).
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l Strengthened property rights as a byproduct of the financial payment. In 
situations where land rights/possession is usually demonstrated by clearing the 
forest, the PWS scheme strengthens the idea that forested land is being used and 
provides some protection against invasion. This applies to some small local level 
schemes such as Los Negros in Bolivia where entering into contracts for protecting 
land13 is perceived as a benefit by landholders, who feel that this strengthens 
their ownership claims (Robertson and Wunder 2005). It also applies to the Costa 
Rica national scheme. In their study of the Virilla watershed, Miranda et al. (2003) 
found that the PES programme increases tenure security by preventing invasion of 
land under PES conservation contracts.
l Entering a PWS scheme guards against government expropriation. Kosoy et al. 
(2005a) looked at PWS schemes in sites bordering large protected areas. As the 
payments are low relative to opportunity cost, they suggest that the threat of 
extending the protected area may coerce landholders into joining the scheme and 
collaborating.14
Capacity building
Training, technical assistance and other forms of capacity building are often provided 
in addition to, or in some cases instead of, financial payments. For example, in 
Pimampiro, Ecuador, farmers have received assistance for soil conservation, organic 
farming and forest management, helping them to increase productivity (Echavarría 
et al. 2004). In Los Negros, Bolivia, the facilitating NGO provided training in 
beekeeping to accompany the in-kind payment of beehives (see Table 9 for further 
examples). In San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua, participants in the payment scheme 
acknowledged the benefits received in terms of technical assistance from PASOLAC, 
the facilitating NGO, for forest protection and regeneration activities and participation 
in other projects focused on improving agricultural production (Corbera et al. 2006).
Social organisation
Strengthening of social organisation may often be a specific component of a 
payment scheme, either because buyers need to deal with a small group of supplier 
representatives rather than numerous individuals to reduce transaction costs, or 
because promoters of payment schemes have understood the importance of this 
for community development and access to the schemes. These improvements in 
organisation can bring benefits for other aspects of community livelihoods, for 
example in marketing conventional cash crops.
13. Some participants in this scheme have asked for payments or compensations in the form of 
barbed wire, to fence off their properties and better enforce their tenure rights.  
14. It is not clear in this report whether this statement is based on hard evidence or is conjecture. 
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l In Brantas, Indonesia, the observation of the NGO facilitating payment is that 
the scheme has contributed to the empowerment of the community, which as a 
result was able to negotiate better terms in their agreements with both the State 
Forestry Company and the extension services (IIED, December 2005).
l In Los Negros, Bolivia, the PES initiative has had positive effects in creating 
a Communal Forum in the upstream community to address problems and in 
building better relations with the downstream community. However, it has also 
heightened social tensions over land. Those who do not own land feel threatened 
by the process of land tenure approach of the intermediary NGO, which is acting 
in the absence of formal land titles (Robertson and Wunder 2005).
Quality of life and social image
In Costa Rica, discussion from focus groups concluded that the PES system has 
contributed to improved quality of life in rural areas but more for emotional and 
non-material reasons. One benefit cited is that loggers are looked down on in 
society and with PES they have passed from being loggers to conservers of the 
forest (Ortiz Malavasi et al. 2003, p .32). Kosoy et al. (2005a) draw a similar 
conclusion from their case studies in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica. 
In these, they found that payments were perceived as “supports” or “tips” for the 
adoption of good practices that upstream landholders are more or less socially and 
morally obliged to adhere to (“supports that reinforce a logic of social cooperation 
and moral obligations to Nature”).
5.4 Impacts on downstream service users/buyers
An important issue in evaluating the impacts on downstream users of water, and 
watershed services more generally, is whether the payments have the desired 
effect on environmental service provision. This ultimately affects whether a scheme 
is equitable or efficient in terms of the contributions demanded from or made on 
behalf of water users. This is discussed in depth in section 6.2 on environmental 
impacts of payment schemes. 
Here we examine the evidence on the social and economic impacts of the payments 
on water users. The main questions are:
l Ability to pay. Imposing an additional charge on water may adversely affect the 
livelihoods of poor urban residents or of downstream small farmers as they may 
not be able to maintain their level of water use or may have to cut back on other 
necessities.
l Equity. Are some groups of water users not paying at all or not paying at a 
sufficiently high level?
l Are there ancillary benefits for downstream water users such as improvements in 
social capital?
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5.4.1 Ability to pay
Section 4.3.3 mentioned that 15 local PWS schemes derive funding from either a 
surcharge on the standard water-user fee or a designated share of a negotiated 
increase in the water-user fee. To our knowledge, for five of these cases there have 
been studies conducted of the impact of user fees on domestic water users. These 
have mostly found that the payments are considered acceptable and have little 
impact on water use or access to water. However, they have also found that there 
is very little awareness among users of the payment schemes and of the motive for 
the surcharge.
l In Jesus de Otoro, Honduras, the increase in the water fee was only 0.02% of 
users’ average income (Kosoy et al. 2005a). Only 43% of those interviewed were 
aware of the PWS scheme but once the scheme was explained to them, 72% 
agreed with the amount of the payment (Kosoy et al. 2005b).
l For Cerro San Gil, Guatemala, Kosoy et al. (2005a) found that the user fees of 
US$0.2 per household per month charged to raise money for PWS represented 
only 0.04% of average household income.
l In Heredia (ESPH), Costa Rica, Kosoy et al. (2005a) found that the user fee 
represented only 0.01% of average household income. Only 21% of those 
interviewed were aware of the scheme. However, once the scheme was 
explained, 92% of those interviewed agreed with the amount of the payment 
(Kosoy et al. 2005b).
l In San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua, 68% of water users surveyed were not aware 
of the PWS scheme and 78% responded that they had not been consulted about 
its implementation (Corbera et al. 2006).
l In Pimampiro, Ecuador, the municipality was able to introduce a surcharge of 20% 
to the water bill to cover the payments to forest owners without meeting any 
protest from water users. However, the introduction of the surcharge coincided 
with a major improvement in water distribution infrastructure and hence the 
regularity of supply (Echavarría et al. 2004). The municipality has not yet fully 
informed water users about the PWS and what the surcharge they are paying is 
used for (Wunder and Albàn 2008).
Kosoy et al. (2005b) suggest that part of the explanation for the limited adverse 
impact on domestic water users is that the user charges set tend to be very low 
compared with estimated willingness to pay. Estimates prepared for the ESPH in 
Costa Rica showed downstream WTP considerably higher (more than three times) 
than the environmental charge added on to the water bill. A similar disparity applies 
to the Jesus de Otoro scheme in Honduras.
All that glitters 85
In four other cases, there are built-in mechanisms to deal with the poorest water 
users. For example, the water utility in Cuenca levies a surcharge to cover watershed 
protection activities but this has little effect on the poorest users, as all customers 
receive a minimum, lifeline amount of water for free (Echavarría et al. 2004). 
Another approach used by two local schemes in Mexico, Fidecoagua and Zapaliname, 
is to make contributions voluntary so that poorer households are not forced to 
contribute.  In the fourth of these cases, Estelí in Nicaragua, it was agreed that those 
who could not afford to pay could contribute their labour to watershed conservation 
activities (Ardón-Mejía and Barrantes 2003a).
Family living from a managed forest in Costa Rica
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The experience from these nine cases indicates that PWS schemes can be 
implemented without adverse impacts on the livelihoods of poor domestic water 
users. However, some of these schemes are also associated with low payments to 
providers, which do not fully compensate for opportunity cost and so may not be 
sustainable or effective in the longer term. In addition, concerns about ability to pay 
of domestic water users are a key constraint for the development and expansion of 
several schemes, for example Campamento, Honduras, and Tarija, Bolivia. 
5.4.3 Equity
There are some cases, such as the Cauca Valley in Colombia, and some of the 
schemes involving private companies in Costa Rica, where a textbook model applies 
– that is to say, poor environmental service providers reside in the upper watershed 
and better-off buyers or users of services live in the lower part of the watershed. 
In such cases there would appear to be equity as well as efficiency grounds for a 
payment scheme.
In several cases, though, downstream water users are poorer than the upstream 
service providers. This raises the question whether it is fair to expect these users 
to make payments for environmental services and whether this could be a source 
of conflict. The answer to this is quite context-specific. In the ESPH case in Heredia, 
Costa Rica, the users surveyed have on average an annual income of US$11,424 
and the providers on average a gross income (on-farm and off-farm) of US$59,000 
(Kosoy et al. 2005b). However, as shown above, the same study finds that the 
impact of the payment on the users is minimal. Another case, El Imposible in  
El Salvador, where domestic water users are contributing through their water  
charge to the costs of management of a National Park, has been criticised for  
being inequitable. Poor rural communities are paying for environmental services 
generated in a national park and are unaware that part of their water charges are 
being used for this purpose (Rosa et al. 2003).
Even where the textbook model applies, the equity issues are not always 
straightforward. Kosoy et al. (2005a) argue that in the case of the Cauca Valley, 
Colombia, the introduction of PWS has served to change property rights and in effect 
has legitimised the abundant use of water by the sugar cane industry. Although the 
lowland sugar industries are making payments in kind to an indigenous community, 
they are legitimising their own water use rather than recognising the community’s 
rights. This may be rather a criticism of water use pricing policy and the level of the 
PWS charge, particularly if it is well below willingness to pay and the opportunity 
cost for the providers. The payment may be enabling the industrial water users 
to continue to use water at a low price but this situation need not necessarily be 
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permanent. Kosoy et al. (2005a) apply the same argument to a bottled water 
company in Heredia, Costa Rica (presumably La Florida). However, it was the 
agreements with private companies on PWS which showed the potential willingness 
to pay for water and led the Costa Rican government to make substantial increases 
to water use charges through the Canon del Agua. The PES may have legitimised 
water use at low rates for the companies concerned in the short term, but in the 
longer term has precipitated a move to higher water-use charges.
Another problem that has been noted in some cases is that some users or groups 
of users, often the heaviest users of water, are not prepared to pay. This applies to 
Pimampiro, Ecuador, where the irrigation association is not contributing (Echavarría 
et al. 2004).
Ancillary benefits
Practitioners involved in operating the schemes have highlighted a range of 
spin-off benefits for the downstream communities such as raised environmental 
awareness and strengthening of social capital through creation of users associations, 
and resolution of conflicts with upstream users through creation of watershed 
institutions, but there is little independent assessment of this. 
l Cauca valley, Colombia: the users association has promoted community training in 
income generating activities and environmental education.
l Cuenca, Ecuador: the creation of a multi-stakeholder committee that involves 
both users and “providers” encourages the feeling of ownership and provides a 
useful platform for discussing water issues (Echavarría et al. 2004).
l Jesus del Otoro, Honduras: the introduction of the PWS scheme helped to reduce 
upstream and downstream conflicts (Kosoy et al. 2005b).
l As part of the PWS scheme in San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua, a local water 
committee was set up. According to Corbera et al. (2006), this has increased 
user awareness of their daily water restrictions and induced them to take a more 
active role in defining water quotas in each community sector. Even though 
there is limited user awareness of the PWS scheme, indirectly the scheme has 
empowered the local community to take control of the public water service, 
increasing its transparency and local participation (ibid.).
l In Kuhan, India, the downstream village development committee has undertaken 
spin-off activities such as a small micro-credit operation to supply agricultural 
and consumption credit to members (three so far), and a concerted attempt to 
expand irrigation water use (IIED 2005).
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5.5 Costs and benefits for non-participants/other stakeholders
There is very little evidence on the nature and magnitude of socioeconomic impacts 
on non-participants in the payment schemes. Most studies have focused on impacts 
on participants or on the constraints to participation. The most cited impacts on non-
participants relate to employment and access to natural resources.
5.5.1 Employment
At the local level
The available evidence at the local level in Costa Rica indicates a neutral or slightly 
positive effect of payment schemes. According to Ortiz Malavasi et al. (2003), 
payments for conservation are mostly neutral in terms of job creation but are likely 
to reduce jobs where land has agricultural potential. Eighty-one per cent of those 
interviewed indicated that they hire labour to carry out conservation-related work 
and 79% indicated that they use the PES primarily to maintain the farm and to pay 
labour. These results are consistent with the survey by Miranda et al. (2003) of the 
Virilla watershed in Costa Rica, which found that half of the respondents now hire 
additional occasional workers once a year for two to four weeks, as many as seven 
workers for some of the larger properties.
Other evidence is more anecdotal. For the Los Negros PES scheme in Bolivia, there 
are reports that several farmers have had to hire additional labour to help them 
manage their beehives, or enter into honey crop-sharing arrangements with landless 
people (IIED 2005).
At the national level
The Working for Water scheme in South Africa, which was set up with the dual 
purpose of protection water resources through controlling invasive alien plants 
and job creation, has had a positive effect on employment. In Costa Rica, Miranda 
et al. (2003) highlight, but without any attempt at quantification, the substantial 
creation of employment for forest professionals and technicians associated with the 
administration of the national PES scheme.
5.5.2 Access to natural resources
Spin-off benefits from payment mechanisms may create positive benefits for some 
people from among the poorest sections of a community. For example, poor people 
are now involved in increased non-timber forest products (NTFP) collection in 
arrangements struck with the forest service linked to farmers’ conservation of water 
springs at the Brantas site in Indonesia (IIED 2005).
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6  Environmental impacts of payments for 
watershed services  
In this chapter, we examine the evidence on the environmental impact of PWS 
schemes. This covers their specific effects on watershed services downstream as well 
as other environmental impacts both downstream and upstream. To some extent, 
the downstream impacts on watershed services are a reflection of environmental 
impacts upstream as payments are directed at land-use changes. However, 
sometimes positive or desired environmental impacts upstream do not translate into 
positive or discernible impacts on watershed services. A report from an electronic 
workshop on PWS in watersheds in Latin America points out that the impact on 
water resources is uncertain and that the most noteworthy environmental impacts 
of PWS schemes have usually been in terms of forest conservation (illegal logging, 
conversion to agricultural and grazing lands, decrease of forest fires) and recovery 
of forest cover (FAO and REDLACH 2004). However, as we discuss towards the end of 
this chapter, sometimes the evidence of positive environmental impacts upstream is 
not clear either.
6.1 Challenges in assessing impact on watershed services
Before examining the evidence on the delivery of watershed services and other 
environmental impacts, it is important to set out some of the challenges involved. It 
is necessary to establish credible biophysical relationships between changes in land 
use and impacts on watershed services/water quality and quantity. This requires 
modelling of relationships, measurement of the baseline against which to examine 
impacts and subsequent monitoring of impact over a timeframe long enough and 
at a scale large enough for impacts to be discernible. It is also necessary to model 
the relationship between payments and changes in land use, i.e. to understand how 
payments affect landholder decision making. This means that other factors, mostly 
socioeconomic, that affect land-use patterns, need to be taken into account. It may 
be that the changes in land use observed owe more to the influence of other factors 
such as changing commodity prices than the introduction of a payment scheme.
During this review it was difficult, and many times impossible, to find strong 
scientific evidence of the impacts. There are few examples, if any, of PWS schemes 
that actually consistently measure and monitor the delivery of the watershed 
service. In most cases, the impacts reported are based on perceptions of local 
populations and those operating the schemes and/or quick measurements of what 
the impacts should be, rather than in-depth scientific evidence drawing from site 
measurements and modelling of relationships.
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6.1.1 The scientific debate on land use and water linkages
Linkages between land use and water quality are well documented and there is 
some consensus in the literature (see Calder 2005). Water pollution could result 
from erosion (sheet, rill, gully and channel bank), industry and mining activities 
(especially where mercury or cyanide are used), domestic sources (including houses 
and farms), and agriculture (agrochemicals). Deforestation leads to higher erosion 
and sedimentation rates compared with natural intact forests, but well-managed 
land units can keep the production of sediments under relatively good control. For 
some types of pollution, like sediments, vegetation around streams and rivers in the 
riparian area can help as a filter, reducing the river load.
The links between land use and water quantity, in particular the impact of changes 
in forest cover, are more difficult to demonstrate (Bruinjzeel 2005; Calder 2005). 
There is little evidence that precipitation is affected significantly by the existence of 
forests, except in very large basins like the Amazon. Even the effect of cloud forests 
on capturing horizontal precipitation might be smaller than initially thought. Because 
of their higher evaporation and transpiration rates, forests require more water, 
reducing the run-off (compared with shorter vegetation). An increase in forest cover 
is also more likely to decrease dry season flows. The effect of forests on regulation 
of flows is positive, but only for normal intensity storm events. For high-intensity 
storm events, forests have little regulating effect.
The impact of forest clearing on streamflow depends on the site characteristics 
(rainfall, etc.) and the degree of surface disturbance. If soil infiltration capacity 
after deforestation is maintained, most of the water yield will increase as baseflow 
(lowflows). However, if infiltration capacity is reduced by compaction, the longer-term 
effects could be insufficient for the replenishment of groundwater reserves during the 
rainy season and hence there will be a decline of dry season flows (Bruijnzeel 2004).
The impact of reforestation is also site-specific and not always positive, particularly 
for water quantity. According to Van Noordwijk (2005), the land-use changes that 
would result in reductions of evapotranspiration (and thus increase total water 
yield) would be to stop planting evergreen trees (especially fast-growing ones). 
Planting fast-growing species that use large amounts of water could actually reduce 
the water flows. Hence plant removal instead of reforestation might actually be 
needed (as happens in South Africa). However, it is also argued that in degraded 
tropical areas, planting trees may improve soil biodiversity and in turn the structural 
properties of the soil, leading to reduced overland flow, particularly on steep slopes 
(Chappell and Bonell 2005). 
The main issues related to forest and water linkages are set out in Box 10.
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B
ox
 1
0 Forests and water linkages
Forests reduce annual flows of water. This result is obtained through the use of experiments 
based on observations15 and from theoretical reasons for increased evapotranspiration from 
forests (Calder 1999). In wet conditions, experiments show that forests, being aerodynamically 
rough, loose more water through evaporation than other short crops. In the uplands of the 
UK, experiments show that evaporation from mature conifer forest is two times higher than 
the evaporation from short crop (grassland). Additionally, because they have deeper roots, 
forests have greater access to soil water in dry conditions. Therefore, water losses from forests 
are higher in dry climates than other shorter crops. Experiments show that in Southern India, 
evaporation from eucalyptus forests is twice as much than from short crops (finger millet).
The regulation impact of forests on flows is unclear. The view that forests act as “sponges” 
soaking up water and releasing it gradually over dryer periods is widespread, although not 
supported by extensive evidence. In theory, forests have two opposing impacts on base-level 
flows: (1) natural forests tend to have higher infiltration, which will lead to higher soil water 
recharge and increased dry season flows; and (2) increased interception and increased dry 
period transpiration will increase soil moisture deficits and reduce dry season flows. However, 
instances of deforestation reducing water supplies also exist (Hamilton and King; 1983; Bosch 
and Hewlett 1982), although effects tend to be highly specific, and further research is needed.
Key factors that appear to influence the outcome are the type of tree species, the form of 
new land use and its associated management practices. In the case of cloud forests, evidence 
suggests that increased water yields from cloud interception (fog deposition on vegetation) 
offset higher rates of evapotranspiration, resulting in increased dry season flows (Bruijnzeel 
2001). However, new research from Monteverde, Costa Rica, indicates that the added capture 
is relatively small compared with rough pastures (Bruijnzeel 2005). Where deforestation is 
associated with high soil compaction (for example roads, paths or grazing land), then runoff 
may rise by more than evapotranspiration falls, leading to lower water tables.
Forest might help reduce flood risks in regular-intensity events. The public perception of 
forests is that they have significant benefits in terms of reducing floods. In theory, through 
increased evapotranspiration and rainfall interception, forests may help to reduce flooding 
by removing a proportion of the storm rainfall and by allowing the build-up of soil moisture 
deficits. These effects would be expected to be most significant for small storms and least 
significant for the largest storms. On the other hand, forest management activities may increase 
floods through high impact harvesting, drainage practices, and road construction, resulting in 
increasing stream density and soil compaction during logging.
Some early hydrological studies – in the USA: Hewlett and Helvey (1970); in South Africa: 
Hewlett and Bosch (1984); in the UK: Kirby et al. (1991); Johnson (1995); and in New Zealand: 
Taylor and Pearce (1982) show little linkage between land use and storm flow. The recent 
evidence supporting a positive relationship suggests that this might only exist in smaller 
catchments and during small events – in the USA: La Marche and Lettenmair (2001); in the UK: 
Robinson and Dupeyrat (2003); and in India: Sikka et al. (2003). Even in smaller catchments, 
the extent to which forests soak up excess water during rainy periods depends on the forest 
type and management.
In larger catchments, flooding occurs sequentially in basins as the storm passes over, allowing 
for averaging out of flood waters. In prolonged and heavy storms even large catchments will 
15. Including “natural lysimeters” transpiration studies looking at neutron probe soil moisture, 
micromet, plant physiology, tracing methods, interception studies, interception gauges, gamma ray 
attenuation, “wet” lysimeters and rainfall simulators.
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generate floods, but this is likely to occur even where catchments are forested (Bruijnzeel and 
Bremmer 1989). Experiments conducted in the Himalayas (Hofer 1998, cited in Calder 2004) show 
no measurable effects (Ganga-Brahmaputra-Megha), presenting no increase in frequency or the 
magnitude of flooding over the last few decades.
Relation of forest and reduced erosion is not straightforward. Establishing clear relationships 
between forest cover and erosion is extremely difficult. It is generally believed that high infiltration 
rates associated with natural and mixed forests will reduce surface runoff and thus erosion. 
Moreover, by binding soils, tree roots reduce the susceptibility of soils to erosion, especially on 
steep slopes. Trees also help to reduce the impact of rain on soils, and thus the level of particle 
dislodgement. Plantation forests do not necessarily demonstrate these benefits, as roads, logging, 
drainage ditches can have effects on wind-throw and splash erosion (Calder 1999).
Evidence suggests that forests are less important than other factors, such as ground cover, soil 
composition, climate, raindrop size, terrain and slope steepness, in determining erosion rates. 
Forest use is also critical, with studies showing that different logging regimes and roading systems 
will produce varying levels of sheet erosion and that in Malaysia, for instance, selective logging 
may lead to more erosion vis-à-vis cocoa and oil palm production (Douglas et al. 1992). Forest 
plantations of certain species, such as Tectona grandis may cause severe erosion.
Less is known about gully erosion and landslides. In a study of erosion in Chiang Mai Province, 
Thailand, Forsyth (1998) suggested that gully erosion may be more important that sheet erosion 
in forested areas owing to the way tree trunks and roots shape water flows. Where this is true, 
deforestation may reduce erosion. Landslides tend to be associated with steep slopes, saturated 
soils and tectonic movements, and are made more likely by human activities, for example road 
building. Although shallow landslide may be prevented by deep root systems provided by trees, 
this is not the case with larger landslides (Bruijnzeel 1990).
Forests help reduce sedimentation, in some circumstances. Sediment delivery ratios depend 
on a range of site-specific factors, including: the size of catchments (larger basins having lower 
ratios because they have more obstacles for catching sediment), local geology, topology, stability 
of river banks, and the state of land use and the road network (Chomitz and Kumari 1998). 
Although changes in land use may have significant impacts on sediment delivery, this needs to be 
carefully compared with existing levels before land-use change. Very few empirical studies have 
taken account of all the relevant variables. Although it is believed that the more extensive root 
systems of forest help hold the soil more firmly in place and resist landslides better than clear-cut 
or heavily disturbed watersheds (Conservation Finance Guide), this tends to hold true mostly for 
shallow landslides. Large landslides are not necessarily correlated to previous existence of forest 
in the area.
Natural healthy ecosystems help in maintenance of aquatic habitats. The positive impact of 
forests on the health of aquatic populations in rivers, lakes and along coasts through controlling 
sedimentation, nutrient loading, water temperature and water turbidity is often highlighted 
(Calder, 2005). High sediment and nutrient loads are particularly damaging, causing eutrophication 
and the development of algae blooms that starve aquatic life of oxygen and sunlight. In the case of 
riverine aquatic life, riparian forests are thought to provide cover to maintain water temperatures, 
oxygen concentration, food and pools for spawning and juvenile development (Calder 2005).
Time lags can be considerable. Because of their nature, there can be significant time lags 
between changes in land practices and their impact on service delivery downstream. Changes in 
global climate can also affect delivery of the watershed service, limiting (or strengthening) the 
impact achieved from local land practices.
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6.1.2 Predicting the impacts: understanding the environmental baseline
To assess environmental impacts it is necessary to understand the biophysical 
baseline. This involves a hypothetical evaluation of what would have happened 
without the PES scheme. It requires conducting or reviewing previous field 
experiments in the sites where the scheme will take place, and understanding 
which are the main biophysical processes pursued (i.e. the relationships between 
biophysical variables such as precipitation, soil compaction and infiltration). Very 
few schemes have actually developed their own hydrological baseline studies (the 
Bhoj scheme proposed in India is one of the exceptions) (Agarwal et al. 2007).
The generation of environmental benefits may not be significant if payments are 
directed to good practices (i.e. conservation) that would have happened anyway 
(lack of additionality) or if the project results in displacement of harmful activities to 
other places not receiving payments (leakage).
Hydrological baseline studies require information referring to rainfall from different 
gauge stations, climate, evaporation, soil moisture, unsaturated zone and recharge, 
streamflow, water quality, geomorphology and sediments. Hydrogeological baseline 
studies include one-off data sets (geology, digital terrain model, river-bed levels, 
borehole datum levels and locations, Ordnance Survey coverage and aquifer 
parameters) and time series monitoring requirements, such as groundwater levels 
and groundwater quality.
The WfW programme in South Africa is one of the very few schemes with strong 
hydrological evidence supporting its impacts. Conducting in-depth hydrological 
studies can be very expensive, and in many places long-term data do not exist 
or are not available to the public. Not surprisingly, many of the early ongoing 
payment schemes have gone ahead with relatively little scientific information about 
the hydrological baseline and the likely impacts of changing land use. Instead, 
they have relied heavily on perceptions of different stakeholders. In many cases, 
perceptions may only be weakly related to scientific evidence (Porras and Miranda 
2005), but they can become the basis for policy making (Jeanes et al. 2006; and 
see Box 11).
In Bolivia there are contrasting experiences in an ongoing scheme and a proposed 
scheme. The Los Negros scheme in Bolivia, where the downstream community 
blamed decreasing water levels on the clearing of cloud forest by the upstream 
farmers, went ahead with payments without in-depth examination of local data 
on forest-hydrology links (Robertson and Wunder 2005). However, the scheme 
administrators have since conducted a study to look at these relationships in more 
detail. For the proposed scheme in Tarija (one of eight advanced proposals in our 
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sample), hydrological modelling studies were conducted which concluded that 
deforestation (especially through uncontrolled burning) would have substantially 
negative effects on dry-season flows and would increase sediment run-off. This 
scheme, however, has not proceeded further with payments and is moving to a 
project-based strategy for watershed management (Robertson and Wunder 2005).
In some of the more recent initiatives, efforts are being made to conduct 
hydrological background studies. In the Valle de Bravo case in Mexico, a series of 
studies was commissioned to look in detail at water quality and quantity in rivers 
and dams. Moreover, the scheme provides equipment and training for local groups 
to carry out monitoring. The Cuencas Andinas programme of schemes in Colombia, 
Peru and Ecuador is developing a series of methodological steps, with emphasis on 
the use of optimisation models (like the Soil and Water Assessment Tool: SWAT) to 
analyse the biophysical variables, and estimate the potential environmental and 
economic impacts of the externalities (Estrada and Quintero 2004). In Fuquene, 
Colombia, for example, hydrological studies are being performed in the field to 
understand how different types of soil influence waterflow and sediment loads.
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1 Rapid hydrological appraisal tool from RUPES
The Rapid Hydrological Appraisal tool (Jeanes et al. 2006) tries to bring together knowledge 
of land linkages from computer-based landscape-hydrological simulation models with 
stakeholder perceptions of watershed functions. Using participatory rural appraisal techniques 
the tool explores stakeholders’ perceptions on:
l the severity of the watershed problem in relation to land use;
l the positive contributions made by specific land-use practices that help reduce the 
problems; and
l the potential of payments or rewards for supporting positive actions upstream.
The appraisal is developed over a six month period, and has five steps:
l month 1: inception and reconnaissance of stakeholders and issues;
l months 2–4: baseline (desktop) data collection of existing literature and reports;
l months 3–4: baseline (fieldwork) data collection: spatial analysis, participatory landscape 
analysis, locals’ and policy makers’ ecological knowledge surveys;
l months 3–5: data processing into modelling and preparation of scenarios;
l month 6: communications and refinement of the findings.
This tool has been used in the proposal for payments for environmental services in Singkarak 
Lake Basin, Indonesia. The tool is, however, relatively new and there is no information about 
impacts to compare with initial baseline.
6.1.3 Achieving threshold levels for delivery of the service
Most local schemes are still at a pilot stage, with limited funds and only able to 
work with a few farmers or watershed providers. In these cases, it is not possible to 
achieve the significant threshold required for the sustained delivery of the watershed 
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services. Although these schemes are usually located in areas considered critical by 
the water user, their very small scale means that they are unlikely to generate any 
significant impact on the hydrological service. The main environmental benefit of 
these schemes will be indirect in terms of the learning experience they provide.
Examples of schemes having small scales include:
l Mount Kanla-on in the Philippines, which concentrates on reforesting 20 hectares 
and rehabilitating 80 hectares of forestland. The total area of the park is 24,557 
hectares.
l  The ESPH in Costa Rica covers 1,900 hectares and 21 farmers. The target area is 
approximately double that size.
l San Pedro Norte, Nicaragua. Target area for the scheme is 600 hectares. At the 
moment, the scheme covers only five farmers in 13 hectares.
l Jesus de Otoro, Honduras. Total upstream catchment area 3,180 hectares (some 
of it already protected, and almost half under forest cover). Current PES coverage 
approximately 75 hectares and 23 coffee producers located along the river.
An exception to this is where the agreed actions include measures to address point 
sources of pollution or construction of small check dams to retain soil. In Tacuba,  
El Salvador, one of the measures agreed with the local community was the 
relocation of a few houses to reduce the threat of domestic pollution to the 
headwaters (Marin 2006).
6.2 Reported impacts on watershed services
For only a few of the PWS schemes is there any indication that measurements are 
being made of changes in watershed services, i.e. water flows or quality. However, in 
most of these cases, either the period for data collection is very short or no thorough 
hydrological study exists to enable attribution of the observed changes to changes in 
land-use practices rather than other factors such as improvement of infrastructure.
It appears that in many of the cases measurement does not go beyond changes in 
land use. This applies not just to local schemes but also to national programmes. For 
example, in an evaluation of the Mexico PSAH, Gonzàlez Guillen (2004) points to the 
difficulty of determining whether the scheme is effectively protecting the capacity 
to provide hydrological environmental services, given the lack of monitoring in the 
priority watersheds. Local schemes in Costa Rica such as Energia Global, CNFL and 
Platanar confine their monitoring activities to examining land-management practices.
Some schemes report perceptions of participants or water users as evidence of 
impacts. Again, this raises issues of attribution as the changes observed may be real 
but may be due to other factors. Inferences about the impact on watershed services 
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have also been made from analysis of the types of land targeted and included in 
the schemes.
6.2.1 Evidence based on measurements of water quantity and quality
The most credible measurements of impacts on water quantity are from the South 
African Working for Water programme, which has taken a different approach to 
the popular one of “trees for water”. Ongoing for over a decade, the programme 
focuses on the removal of alien invasive plants that consume large quantities of 
water. The growth and rapid spreading of these trees and bushes has been shown 
to be responsible for stream flow reduction and other adverse impacts on aquatic 
ecosystems. The impacts of this programme on water flow have been estimated at 
48–56 million cubic metres of additional water per annum (DWAF 2006). 
Other schemes report changes in watershed services based on measurement but 
without sufficient consideration of other factors to enable credible attribution. 
Echavarría (2002) notes that in the Valle del Cauca scheme, Colombia, between 
1988 and 1998 levels of the Desbaratado River did not present the extreme flooding 
incidents that occurred previously. There were also improvements in dry-season 
flows for the Nima and Amaime watersheds. But she acknowledges the limitations 
of these data, stating “without concrete figures, it is difficult to assess the actual 
hydrological impacts of the interventions to date” (Echavarría 2002).
In the San Pedro del Norte scheme in Nicaragua, it is reported that through the 
use of natural dikes, living fences and some rehabilitation of degraded forests, 
several seasonal water sources have become permanent in the past two years, and 
average water flows during the dry season have increased from 6 to over 12 cubic 
metres per day (Obando 2006; and see Figure 10), although the timeframe for data 
collection is relatively limited.
Changes in water quality have been measured in some cases. In Jesus de Otoro, 
Honduras, the water authority has been monitoring water quality since 1999 and 
has observed some improvement. However, the small scale of the pilot PWS scheme 
here makes it unlikely that it is the main reason for this improvement.
The Chinese Sloping Land Conversion Programme provides a contrasting experience. 
The sheer scale of the project, and the fact that is not entirely voluntary, has 
resulted in the conversion of 9 million hectares of sloping land to forestland or 
tree plantations (the ultimate objective is the conversion of 17 million hectares). 
According to observations made by Sichuan Agricultural University in Tianquan 
County, cited in Changjin and Chen (2005), silt run-off from converted lands is 
already 22–24% less than from comparable farming lands.
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6.2.2 Local perceptions of impacts
In many cases, the only information on the environmental impacts of the PWS 
schemes is based on local perceptions. These are mostly positive, as indicated by 
the examples in Box 12. Only one project has reported possible negative effects of 
forests on water flows. Salas (2004) describes how three years after tree planting 
in the Maasin watershed (the Philippines), there was a severe reduction in the 
water volume flowing from the main dam, leading to further discussions about the 
possible causes.
B
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2 Perceptions of impacts
“Where we have trees by the river, we see more and cleaner water,” states Carbajal. “Many 
springs in the area had dried up a lot as farmers cut the forest around them. Now they are 
planting again and noticing that the springs give more water.” Participants in the Silvopastoral 
Project, cited in Sheck (2006). 
“When we organize group reforestation activities, more than 200 people show up, our only 
problem is providing transportation for everybody. They are aware that they are not going to 
plant trees, but to ‘sow’ water for the area.” Staff of the Pedro Moncayo initiative (Ecuador), 
cited in Ecuador Virtual website (2005).
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Some studies ask users whether they perceive changes in water service since a 
PWS scheme was introduced. Kosoy et al. (2005a) found that 64% of 100 users 
interviewed in Jesus de Otoro, Honduras, thought that water availability had 
improved during the two previous years, and 39% of 100 interviewed in Heredia, 
Costa Rica. However, in both cases, it is hard to see that any change could be 
attributed to the PWS schemes as there were so few landholders at the time 
receiving payments (four and ten, respectively).
This difficulty of attribution to PWS applies to other cases as well. In Campamento, 
Honduras, there was a perceived reduction in pollution from coffee-processing 
wastes. However, it was suggested that this had more to do with coffee prices and 
levels of activity, and that pollution would increase again as coffee prices recovered 
(Ardón-Mejía and Barrantes 2003b). 
In Costa Rica, several hydropower companies involved in local schemes linked to 
the national programme (CNFL, Energia Global, Platanar) renewed their contracts 
after the first five years. This suggests that the hydroelectric companies perceive a 
positive impact from the actions taken even if they are not actively measuring water 
regimes. They are, however, changing their focus in the face of limited evidence 
on impact. CNFL stopped issuing new contracts for forest conservation in 2004 
because of the lack of evidence and is now concentrating on investments in agro-
conservation measures (A Saenz, FONAFIFO, personal communication, 2007). Energia 
Global has shifted its focus from water quantity to water quality (Ortiz Malavasi, 
personal communication, 2005). It is also possible that contract renewal has more to 
do with the impact on company reputation than reduction of erosion.
The case of Meijiang (China) illustrates the difficulties in drawing conclusions on the 
impact of land-management practices introduced by PWS when farmer perceptions 
vary and other factors such as extraction of river sand may be contributing to 
reduced sedimentation. According to Jin et al. (2005), farmers’ perceptions of the 
programme are:
l Soil erosion increased in the first three years of orchard development (for building 
terraced strip, level ditch, bamboo ditch, and planting), but was expected to ease 
off afterwards.
l Environmental pollution is not perceived to be a problem, although developers 
have applied fertilisers and plenty of pesticides in orchards.
l There is no consensus on the impact of orchard development on water flow. 
Perceptions were almost equally divided among interviewees, half saying that 
water flow had increased and half that it had decreased.
l Lowering of riverbeds might be the result of increasing extraction of river sand 
rather than any reduction in soil erosion.
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l Most farmer respondents believed that orchard development mitigated soil 
erosion and caused little pollution. Some of the quotes included: “There is no 
source of pollution”; “no pollution is visible”; “pesticide goes to the river and runs 
away, and so it does not pollute local drinking water”; “drinking water is taken 
from the local well, which is not polluted”.
6.2.3 Evidence based on characteristics of targeted land
Some evidence on the impact or rather lack of impact of PWS schemes comes 
from analysis of the characteristics of the land included in the scheme. These 
studies examine the extent to which the land in the scheme has the following 
characteristics:
l Located in watersheds important for human use of watershed services.
l Likely to affect watershed services for biophysical reasons: for example high 
slope.
l At risk of a change in land use, through, for example, forest clearing for 
agriculture.
Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica have allowed farmers to forgo intensive 
agriculture and move towards a more holistic approach involving conservation, reforestation, 
and agroforestry
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The first characteristic has in many cases been a design feature of the schemes. 
Several the local schemes such as Pimampiro in Ecuador and Tacuba in El Salvador 
have targeted land surrounding the headwaters of the main source of water 
supply. The national programme in Mexico has proximity to an urban centre as one 
of its criteria for selection. The second and third characteristics have proved to be 
more problematic.
In the Sloping Land Conversion Programme in China there is evidence relating to the 
second characteristic. Xu et al. (2004), in a study of areas converted from agriculture 
to forestry in three provinces, found that 38% of the area converted in Gansu 
Province (and 10% in Shanxi and 11% in Sichuan) was low slope area and hence 
at little risk of causing erosion. Changes in forest cover in these areas are not likely 
to have had much impact on watershed downstream but may have had upstream 
environmental impacts on biodiversity and landscape.
There is more evidence relating to the third characteristic. It appears that in some 
schemes the land that has been entered into the PWS schemes was not at high risk 
of deforestation. In the case of national programmes, research in Costa Rica and 
Mexico calls into question the additionality they achieve. In the isolated Peninsula 
of Osa (Costa Rica), land under protection contracts corresponds mainly to forestland 
that may not be in direct danger of being converted because of its isolation and 
difficult access (Sierra and Russman 2006). Analysis by Sànchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) 
found that there was no significant difference in the rate of deforestation in 1997–
2000 between areas in the national PSA scheme and areas that were not. Likewise, 
in the Mexican national scheme (PSAH), much of the land being put under PSAH 
payments was not really at risk of being converted because of its low opportunity 
costs. A spatial model was used to identify areas at high, medium and low risk of 
further deforestation. In 2003, only 11% of the participating hectares in the scheme 
were classified as having high or very high deforestation risk but this increased to 
28% in 2004 (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2005).
There is some evidence also from local schemes. In Los Negros, Bolivia, 
compensation covers only 2–10% of the opportunity costs for setting aside 
agricultural land. Farmers in the first year of the scheme were allowed to choose the 
areas they put into payments, usually located in steep slopes with less potential for 
agriculture and therefore in less risk of conversion (Robertson and Wunder 2005).
In these cases where there is limited additionality, the PWS schemes not only have 
little effect on watershed services but do not have much environmental effect 
upstream in terms of forest conservation.
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7  Conclusions
In this review, we have surveyed the status of payments for watershed services 
in developing countries, highlighting the main trends in their evolution, and 
synthesising the available evidence on their environmental and social impacts. The 
ultimate aim has been to draw lessons from existing experience on how and to 
what extent PWS initiatives can be designed to be efficient, effective and equitable.
Our task has been complicated by the continuing diversity in the conceptualisation of 
payments for environmental services. Although our criteria for PWS are not as strict 
as others offered in the literature (see, for example, Wunder 2005), some schemes 
classified as such in earlier reviews did not meet our criteria and therefore have not 
been included in our review. Nevertheless, our sample of PWS is still rather diverse. 
In addition, notable adaptations made in the early schemes and the emergence of 
a new generation of PWS which set out to address some of the concerns about the 
earlier schemes also complicate the drawing of general conclusions.
7.1 The current state of the art of PWS schemes
There is considerable difference between the theory of payments for environmental 
services and the practice in the context of watershed services. Political realities and 
cultural resistance preventing increases in water charges and the need to keep down 
transaction costs have had a major influence on the design of the schemes. There 
is widespread use of administrative pricing, simple pricing structures that do not 
differentiate according to the characteristics of land, and allocation by first come first 
served. Only a few of the early ongoing schemes have been preceded by valuation 
studies to make the case for the efficiency of land-based approaches to provision of 
environmental services or to determine willingness to pay. In the few cases where a 
valuation has been done, the results have often not been used in that payment and 
levels for users have been set considerably lower.
There is also heavy reliance on government and donor funds, and only limited 
contribution from the water users and other downstream beneficiaries. In particular, 
the private sector has been slow to get involved. Many schemes involve reallocation 
or closer earmarking of government tax revenue rather than direct contributions 
from beneficiaries. Payments are being made on behalf of beneficiaries who are 
often unaware of the fact. The limited contribution from the private sector and  
the heavy dependence on donor funding raises concerns about the sustainability of 
the initiatives.
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7.2 Impacts of PWS schemes: effectiveness, efficiency and equity
Demonstrating effective delivery of watershed services through PWS has proved 
elusive. This reflects the complex nature of the relationship between land use 
and water and the need to take into account factors such as type of species, land-
management, topography and climate. For this reason, there is little firm evidence 
from ongoing schemes about the effectiveness of PWS in improving delivery 
of watershed services. The lack of targeting in some of the schemes also raises 
questions about their effectiveness in delivering improvements in land use that are 
truly additional. 
Looking at the efficiency of PWS schemes requires, as a minimum, evidence that 
the net costs of land-based approaches including opportunity costs are lower than 
the costs of the conventional downstream measures needed to secure an equivalent 
increase in water flow, quality, flood control, etc. As there has been little reliable 
quantification of the effects of land-based measures on delivery of watershed 
services and only few ex-ante studies of costs, this evidence is lacking. The only 
indication that water users perceive some efficiency from the use of PWS is that 
some of the hydroelectric companies in Costa Rica renewed their five-year contracts. 
However, this could have more to do with public relations benefits than water-
related benefits.
For the social impacts of PWS, the evidence so far does not indicate adverse impacts 
for those participating. However, the cash payments when used do not seem to 
be playing the intended role of providing a viable alternative to current land-use 
practices but instead more a partial support. This may reflect the difficulty the PWS 
schemes face in focusing payments on land with high opportunity cost or at high 
risk of conversion (or unsustainable practice). Conclusions on the size or significance 
of costs and benefits also depend heavily on the reference point of comparison as 
PWS schemes can be compared favourably with predecessor schemes that focused 
on land purchase or eviction. PWS provides a way of working with landholders and 
avoids some of the sensitivities associated with control of land by external interests. 
A key question though is who participates as providers of watershed services. The 
evidence is that PWS schemes sometimes involve the participation of poor, small 
farmers but more by accident than design, at least for the earlier schemes. The 
second generation schemes are actively targeting the poorest groups but it is too 
early to judge their success.
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On the demand side, there is little sign that schemes are adversely affecting access 
to water for the urban poor. However, it is not clear that those paying through water 
use fees for PWS are getting value for money.
Overall, although there is considerable enthusiasm among donors, governments, 
NGOs and researchers for payments for watershed services, there is little evidence 
yet that the schemes are matching up to the high expectations placed on them. 
There is still a lack of evidence from developing country PWS schemes that investing 
in land-management measures upstream has advantages over other measures to 
address downstream water-related problems. There is also insufficient evidence that 
payments to landholders will be effective in changing their behaviour or will make 
significant improvements to their livelihoods.
Protection of cloud forests in the upper parts of the watershed improves the availability of 
water by trapping fog from passing clouds. This is a particularly useful service in the dry season 
when rainfall is scarce, and the value of hydroelectricity is higher
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7.3 Signs of change in PWS schemes
Since the previous IIED review of PWS schemes (Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?) in 
2002, there have been notable developments. Not only has there been a remarkable 
growth in the number of schemes and proposals, particularly in Latin America and 
Asia, but there have also been some changes in their characteristics. A second 
generation of schemes have emerged which have actively tried to incorporate lessons 
from the early schemes and to address concerns raised by the early reviews.
Programmes such as RUPES in Asia and Cuencas Andinas in South America have been 
set up with specific poverty reduction and livelihood improvement objectives. The 
newer schemes are also giving more attention to hydrological measurements and 
valuation studies. At the same time, some of the early schemes such as the national 
programme in Costa Rica have made a series of modifications to promote participation 
of small farmers and indigenous peoples and to respond to stakeholder concerns, or to 
improve analysis of hydrological linkages, as in the case of Los Negros, Bolivia.
There is now greater recognition of the complexities of the land use and water 
linkages, and hence the need for site-level measurement. There is also greater 
interest in the contribution of other types of land-use change such as agroforestry and 
organic agriculture. This is bringing other players into PWS on the supply side: farmers 
as opposed to owners of forestland, and broadening the range of the intermediaries 
and facilitating organisations – forest and conservation organisations have been joined 
by organisations promoting sustainable agriculture, agroforestry and community 
development. Some long-standing schemes in Costa Rica have shifted their focus from 
water quantity to water quality in the face of lack of evidence of the impact of forest 
conservation, and have increased the emphasis on agro-conservation measures.
The key question is whether this second generation of new schemes and adapted 
early schemes will be able to demonstrate better than the first generation that they 
can deliver improvements in watershed services efficiently and equitably.
7.4 Where next?
Payment schemes, if they are to be financially self-sustaining, whether through 
private or public money, need to be driven more by the water users and become an 
integral part of water resource management and allocation policy. For this to happen, 
better evidence is needed of the beneficial impacts of sustainable land-management 
practices on water flow and quality, and on the ability of payments to influence 
the behaviour of landholders. This can pave the way for enabling legislation that 
acknowledges and promotes land-based activities as means to provide watershed 
environmental services.
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Better evidence of land management and delivery of watershed services, coupled 
with enabling legislation, may be effective in bringing in more private companies 
as buyers. However, judging by the current experience, PWS schemes are unlikely to 
be the route to major sources of new private money. It is necessary to understand 
why private water users have been reluctant to commit funds. It has sometimes 
stemmed from a view that they currently contribute funds through taxation or 
through water charges to finance, among other things, watershed management.  
This reluctance is likely to intensify as raw water charges are introduced more 
widely. Proponents of PWS therefore will increasingly need to make the case for 
earmarking tax revenue or water revenue rather than, or as well as, tapping private 
willingness to pay.
If dependence on public money is to continue, there needs to be a better case made 
that PWS has advantages in meeting public objectives over other approaches. There 
are increasing calls for better targeting in PWS schemes so that the areas with the 
highest potential impacts on delivery of watershed services participate. This means 
differentiated payments that reflect: (1) the risk of loss of watershed services;  
(2) the geographical location of the provider (i.e. riparian areas are more sensitive to 
sediment discharge); (3) the opportunity cost involved in switching activities. Explicit 
grading systems can be incorporated in evaluation of proposals, to help identify 
areas more valuable for environmental benefits, and where true modification of 
conduct would be achieved by the economic instrument. Hydrological maps can 
be overlapped with risk-prone areas, and socioeconomic studies can group farmers 
according to their location, willingness to engage and required compensation levels. 
Targeting can also be used to achieve social objectives such as promoting the 
participation of certain vulnerable groups and preventing adverse social impacts. 
Some PWS schemes are adopting these approaches, often in response to donor 
concerns, to address poverty and contribute to the millennium development goals. 
Better understanding is needed of the effectiveness of such approaches and of the 
tradeoffs involved with the achievement of watershed service delivery and other 
environmental objectives. 
It is also necessary to be realistic about what PWS can achieve in contexts where 
there are serious deficiencies in water infrastructure, or where water is provided free 
or at subsidised rates to certain groups, or where commercial agriculture is heavily 
subsidised. This underlines the importance of deploying PWS as one element in a 
water-resource management policy. PWS is likely to work best when it is coherent 
with water resource allocation and pricing policy.
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Appendix 1
Case Profile
Summary
Maturity of the 
initiative
Proposal or ongoing scheme, dates, status with respect to Silver 
Bullet or Fools’ Gold?
Driver Unclear, government regulation, supply side, demand side
Supply Categories: public government land, public communal land, private 
landowners, private reserves, local NGOs and trusts. Are small 
farmers involved? (Put information on the size of properties, etc.)
Demand/
Intermediary/
Facilitator
Categories include Government (national, local), corporate business, 
user associations, NGOs (national/local/international), trusts, 
research groups, universities. What role? (i.e. Independent donor, 
percentage charged over the payment, etc.). Is it a participant or a 
stakeholder?
Service Water flow regulation, water quality maintenance, erosion and 
sedimentation control, land salinisation reduction/water table 
regulation, maintenance of aquatic habitats
Commodity Improved management practices, reforestation for commercial 
plantations, conservation and protection of existing ecosystems, 
rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems for protection
Payment mechanism What are the eligibility criteria/requirements for participating in 
the scheme, e.g. formal land title, minimum size of landholding, 
etc. Is it voluntary or compulsory? How do they avoid free-riding? 
What exit strategy can buyers use if they wish to stop buying the 
environmental service? Are its incentives aligned for a successful 
system, better environment, happy people, low transactions costs, 
etc.? Categories include direct negotiation, intermediary-based 
transactions (trust, government agency, NGO), pooled transaction, 
over-the-counter, clearing house transaction, auctions, internal 
trading retail-based market, (environmental) user fees
Type of payment In-kind (describe, for example training; support to access loans, 
markets; beehives), cash, one-off, cash instalments (describe period 
and conditions)
Funds involved Monetary values if available
Impacts (costs and 
benefits)
Are costs and benefits verified and perceived/expected? Try to relate 
the costs and benefits to the different stakeholder groups
Economic costs and benefits (C&B): Includes the costs of institution 
building (for example, transaction costs). This should be a focus of 
this new review. How much (roughly) are they? It might be worth 
trying to obtain indicator (number of people involved, since when 
did the proposal begin, etc.). Who is paying for setting-up costs? For 
how long? Who will pay for them after? Is the initiative likely to be 
self-sustainable?
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Environmental C&B. Describe the physical characteristics of the 
upstream area and why is it important to protect (this is already 
on the demand point of view); environmental impacts other than 
on the environmental service being considered, proportion of the 
whole watershed under the scheme? Scientific evidence? Has each 
case made studies? Have trade-offs been considered? What types of 
land-use activities were taking place there before the system? Have 
these activities stopped or are they taking place somewhere else? 
(leakages) (see also monitoring)
Social C&B. Describe the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
upstream area – main land uses, livelihood strategies, stakeholder 
groups, size and distribution of landholdings, income groupings, 
etc.; impact of the payments on the family’s income. Impacts on 
vulnerable groups: impacts for current welfare flows (economic, 
social, environmental), impacts on assets (physical, financial, human, 
social, environmental capitals), impacts on security (for example 
property rights), livelihood, financial, etc.), impacts for empowerment
Legislation issues Preconditions for market establishment (and operation), for example 
legislation, institutional capacity, mechanisms for ensuring local 
participation, the development of partnerships, government support, 
educational programmes, finance, etc. Country-wide regulations? 
Local initiative? Existing laws for water and land use? Overlapping 
and contradicting laws. How is the initiative dealing with this? There 
might not be much information about this, but it will provide useful 
insights for ongoing initiatives that have to deal with water being 
controlled by many authorities
Monitoring What has been the degree of/likelihood of compliance so far, 
and what factors have influenced it? What is the mechanism for 
monitoring and performance assessment? Are the payments directly 
contingent on ES provision (for example, on water quality) or rather 
on the land use that is supposed to produce the ES (for example, on 
conservation of native vegetation)? Time/frequency of monitoring. 
Monitor: external or internal? Certification schemes? Establishment 
of baseline. Biophysical monitoring? Leakages? How are different 
fluctuations and risks, which ES providers traditionally have little/no 
control over, being dealt with (for example, drought, fire, external 
intruders’ actions)?
Main constraints 
(problems)
Main obstacles faced in market establishment and how these have 
been overcome. Obstacles to market development can be split 
between demand side (for example, low willingness to pay, lack of 
information) and supply-side factors (for example, insecure property 
rights, lack of finance, political risk, inadequate legal framework)
Main policy lessons Is sustainable joint production with other forest goods and services 
possible? Impacts for current welfare flows (economic, social, 
environmental), impacts on assets (physical, financial, human, social, 
environmental capitals), impacts on security (for example, property 
rights, livelihood, financial, etc.), impacts for empowerment
Other information Contracts, references, links
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Appendix 2  
List and status of cases reviewed
Number Country Name of initiative Status (2006)
Africa   
1 Kenya Western Kenya Integrated Ecosystem Project Proposal
2 Malawi Electricity company watershed protection contracts Uncertain
3 Malawi Water boards–watershed protection contracts Uncertain
4 Malawi Water boards–protected area contracts Uncertain
5 South Africa Stream-flow reduction licences (PES component) Abandoned proposal
6 South Africa Maluti Drakensburgh Proposal
7 South Africa Sabie-Sand catchment Proposal
8 South Africa Selati River Proposal
9 South Africa Working for water Ongoing
10 South Africa Working for wetlands Borderline
11 Tanzania Uluguru Mountains (WWF/CARE/IIED) Proposal
12 Uganda Brewery and wetlands in Lake Victoria Borderline
13 Zimbabwe Integrated catchment management in dryland areas Abandoned proposal
Asia   
14 China Meijiang Ongoing
15 China Forest Ecological Compensation programme Ongoing
16 China Sloping Land Conversion programme Ongoing
17 China Guangdong Province  Uncertain
18 China Jiangxi Province  Uncertain
19 China Shiangxi Province Uncertain
20 China Hebei Province Uncertain
21 China Northwest Uncertain
22 India Sukhomajri Ongoing
23 India Bhodi Proposal (advanced)
24 India Bhoj wetlands Proposal (advanced)
25 India Arvari Borderline
26 India Myrada Borderline
27 India Kuhan Ongoing
28 India HM (Inter-state watershed protection contracts) Uncertain
29 Indonesia Setulang (RUPES/CIFOR) Proposal
30 Indonesia  Segara, West Lombok IIED) Abandoned
31 Indonesia  Singkarak Lake (RUPES) Proposal (advanced)
32 Indonesia  Lake Toba Ongoing
33 Indonesia  Sumberjaya (with RUPES) Ongoing
34 Indonesia  Brantas  Ongoing
35 Indonesia  Cidanau Ongoing
36 Indonesia  Ranget Spring, West Lombok (WWF) Proposal
37 Indonesia  Halimun (WWF/RUPES) Proposal
38 Indonesia  Kapuas Basin, West Kalimantan (WWF/CARE/IIED) Proposal
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39 Nepal Kulekhani Ongoing
40 Pakistan  Mangla-Dam (national programme) Ongoing
41 The Philippines  Makiling Proposal (advanced)
42 The Philippines  Bakun (RUPES) Proposal
43 The Philippines  Kalahan (RUPES) Proposal
44 The Philippines  Sibuyan island (RUPES/WWF/CARE/IIED) Proposal
45 The Philippines  Maasin  Ongoing
46 The Philippines  Mount Kanla-on Ongoing
47 The Philippines  Watershed Rehabilitation Fund Ongoing
48 The Philippines  Mount Isarog (WWF/CARE/IIED) Proposal
49 The Philippines  North Sierra Madre (WWF/RUPES) Proposal
50 Vietnam Government watershed management contracts Uncertain
Central America and Caribbean 
51 Costa Rica  ICE-Arenal Watershed Fund Abandoned proposal
52 Costa Rica  San Jose Watershed Fund Abandoned proposal
53 Costa Rica  Del Oro Abandoned 
54 Costa Rica  La Esperanza Ongoing
55 Costa Rica  Platanar Ongoing
56 Costa Rica  Energia Global Ongoing
57 Costa Rica  ESPH Ongoing
58 Costa Rica  CNFL Ongoing
59 Costa Rica  ICE Ongoing
60 Costa Rica  La Florida Ongoing
61 Costa Rica  Silvopastoral/ RISEMP  Ongoing
62 Costa Rica  PSA national Ongoing
63 Dominican Republic Procaryn Proposal
64 El Salvador El Imposible Ongoing
65 El Salvador Pasolac (Morazan) Ongoing
66 El Salvador Pasolac (Tacuba) Ongoing
67 El Salvador Ecoservicios (national programme). Includes two  
  pilot sites in Jaltepeque-Jiquilisco and Coatepeque Ongoing
68 Guatemala Sierra de las Minas  Proposal (advanced)
69 Guatemala Cerro San Gil Ongoing
70 Guatemala MAGA National Ongoing
71 Guatemala San Jerónimo (GTZ) Ongoing
72 Honduras Campamento (Pasolac) Ongoing
73 Honduras Jesus de Otoro (Pasolac) Ongoing
74 Honduras El Escondido Proposal
75 Honduras Rio Platano (GTZ) Proposal
76 Jamaica Buff Bay  Proposal
77 Jamaica Watershed protection contracts and fees Uncertain
78 Mexico Fidecoagua Ongoing
79 Mexico Valle de Bravo Ongoing
80 Mexico Zapalinamé Ongoing
81 Mexico National PSAH Ongoing
82 Nicaragua Estelí (El Regadio) Pasolac Ongoing
83 Nicaragua San Pedro Norte (Pasolac) Ongoing
84 Nicaragua Silvopastoril/ RISEMP Ongoing
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85 Panama Chagres (Panama Watershed Canal) Abandoned proposal
86 Panama Filo del tallo Uncertain
87 St Lucia Talvern Watershed Proposal
South America  
88 Bolivia Bermejo (international with Argentina) Abandoned proposal
89 Bolivia ICO Borderline
90 Bolivia Los Negros Ongoing
91 Bolivia Tarija Proposal (advanced)
92 Bolivia San Pedro (GTZ) Proposal
93 Bolivia Sucre (GTZ) Proposal
94 Bolivia Watershed management programme (GTZ) Proposal
95 Bolivia Comarapa Municipality Proposal
96 Bolivia Prometa (HEP) Proposal
97 Bolivia Vallegrande municipality Proposal
98 Brazil  Proambiente (GTZ) Proposal
99 Brazil  PCJ Ongoing
100 Brazil  São João Watershed (WWF) Proposal
101 Chile Water share trading and PES Abandoned proposal
102 Colombia  Afluentes del Cauca Proposal
103 Colombia  La Miel Proposal
104 Colombia  Campoalegre Borderline
105 Colombia  Valle del Cauca Ongoing
106 Colombia  Fuquene (C Andinas) Ongoing
107 Colombia  Silvopastoril/ RISEMP Ongoing
108 Colombia  Plan Verde Ongoing
109 Ecuador EcoFondo Podocarpus National Park Proposal
110 Ecuador Rio el Angel (Cuencas Andinas) Proposal
111 Ecuador Ambato (C Andinas) Proposal (advanced)
112 Ecuador Shutan Bajo  Borderline
113 Ecuador Cuenca Ongoing
114 Ecuador FONAG Ongoing
115 Ecuador Pedro Moncayo Ongoing
116 Ecuador Pimampiro Ongoing
117 Ecuador Arenillas Proposal
118 Ecuador Cotacachi, Imbabura Proposal
119 Peru Alto Mayo (Cuencas Andinas) Proposal (advanced)
120 Peru Arequipa (Cuencas Andinas/GTZ) Proposal
121 Peru Jequetepeque (Cuencas Andinas/WWF/CARE/IIED) Proposal
122 Peru Piura (Cuencas Andinas) Proposal
123 Venezuela Partnerships for National Parks Proposal
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Appendix 3  
Glossary of terms 
“First generation” 
schemes 
Initial round of market for watershed services schemes. Most of them 
are local and relatively isolated pilot schemes characterised by a 
“learning by doing” approach”. Most of the schemes reported in the 
initial Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? publication fall in this category
“Second generation” 
schemes
Schemes are slowly beginning to take into account existing experiences 
and lessons from other projects. Stronger emphasis is placed on the 
design of baseline studies, monitoring and information sharing. Many 
of these schemes are subsidised by donors and tend to be part of larger 
regional projects such as Cuencas Andinas or the Silvopastoral Project
Abandoned schemes These schemes have been abandoned, either as a whole, or  the  
payment for environmental service component has been dropped for 
lack of support or leadership
Administratively 
determined pricing 
mechanisms
An authority can determine payment levels externally. In these cases, 
bargaining power by landowners is limited, although they can still voice 
their willingness to accept by choosing not to join. This potentially can 
send signals back to the authority to adjust their payment levels. This 
type of payments is mostly used in national-level strategies
Advanced proposal Proposed schemes for which baseline studies have been conducted, 
stakeholder negotiation meetings have been held but no payments are 
actually taking place yet
Direct negotiation 
between sellers and 
buyers
These mechanisms involve detailed contracts outlining best 
management practices, land purchase agreements and conservation 
easements. Direct negotiations are mostly used in situations when 
there are few stakeholders involved and/or capable watershed 
programme already exists; direct negotiation will be easier and faster. 
It usually involves detailed contracts setting out best management 
practices, or land purchase agreements. However, payments are 
generally part of larger projects, and they are the result of (usually) a 
long bargaining process
Ecosystem or 
environmental 
services
The benefits that people derive from natural ecosysems, in contrast 
with man-made structures that could be substitutes
Benefits can be direct as provisioning services (i.e. food and water) or 
regulating services (i.e. control of floods and erosion, water purification, 
land degradation, desiccation, soil salinisation, etc.); ; or indirect 
through providing supporting services for the functioning of ecosystem 
processes (i.e. nutrient cycling; soil creation)
Ecosystems also provide people with non-material benefits such as 
aesthetic pleasure, recreational opportunities, and spiritual and cultural 
sustenance (MEA 2005)
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Internal trading Transactions within an organisation, for example intra-governmental 
payments
Market Markets are defined as voluntary transactions between buyers and 
sellers, where the price is set on the basis of supply and demand
Maturity of the 
scheme
The maturity of the scheme refers to its status. They could be 
“ongoing”, proposals, borderline schemes, abandoned, or uncertain
National or local 
government budget 
allocations. 
National level projects, like the PSA in Costa Rica or the PSAH in 
Mexico, have annual government budgets allocated for payments 
for environmental services. In Costa Rica the main source is the 3.5% 
of collections from a 15% tax on fuels. In Mexico it is approximately 
US$20–30 million per year
Negotiations through 
intermediary.
As the number and distribution of stakeholders increase, so does the 
need for an intermediary. They are used to control transaction costs 
and risks, and are most frequently set up and run by NGOs, community 
organisations and government agencies. In some cases, independent 
trust funds are created. Intermediaries are vital in national schemes 
such as the PSA in Costa Rica and the PSAH in Mexico, and the final 
contribution from downstream users will reflect their capacity to 
negotiate on behalf of upstream farmers
Ongoing schemes/
initiatives 
These are initiatives in which payments are being made from the users 
(direct and indirect), or to the suppliers, or both
Pooled transactions Pooled transactions control transaction costs by spreading risks 
among several buyers. They are also used to share the costs of a large 
transaction as often required in the watershed markets
Preliminary proposals Proposals for payment schemes which have been announced but for 
which there is limited information available or little background work 
completed
Regulatory 
mechanisms
Some markets for watershed services are based on externally imposed 
requirements, especially in developed countries where environmental 
regulations are stricter. Market-based strategies are used to help 
companies reach environmental targets while reducing costs of 
compliance
Retail-based trades Where payments for watershed protection are attached to existing 
consumer purchases, for example Salmon-Safe agricultural produce. 
Normally associated with certification and labelling schemes that 
generate consumer recognition and willingness to pay
Uncertain schemes It was not possible to obtain sufficient information proving that the 
scheme had been abandoned or was still ongoing. Some schemes may 
have evolved into another local or national programme (such as the 
Chinese regional schemes reported in 2002), but we have not been able 
to confirm this
User fees Funding of payments for watershed services through a special fee 
charged to domestic or agricultural water users
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Watershed The term watershed refers to the geographic boundaries of a particular 
water body, its ecosystem and the land that drains to it. It also includes 
groundwater aquifers that discharge to and receive discharge from 
streams, wetlands, ponds and lakes. Large watersheds are sometimes 
referred to as river basins. It is sometimes referred to as “catchment” 
Watershed ecosystem 
services
These are the ecosystem services provided by fresh water and the 
hydrologic cycle (MEA 2005). Services include:
Provisioning: water (quantity and quality) for consumptive user, 
water for non-consumptive user (hydroelectricity, transport), aquatic 
organisms for food and medicines
Regulating: maintenance of water quality (natural filtration and water 
treatment), buffering of flood flows, erosion control through water/land 
interactions and flood control infrastructure
Cultural: recreation, tourism, existence values
Supporting: role in nutrient cycling (floodplain fertility), primary 
production, predator/prey relationships and ecosystems resilience
These services can be tracked geographically using a watershed as an 
analysis unit
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Figure 2 supporting information Summary of watershed services demanded
Scheme Water quantity Water quality Bundled services
Ongoing 
national
South Africa – Working for Water  
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation and Sloping Land 
Conversion programmes  
Philippines – Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund  
Mexico – PSAH  
Costa Rica – PSA  
El Salvador – Ecoservicios
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation and Sloping Land 
Conversion programmes 
Philippines – Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund  
Mexico – PSAH  
Costa Rica – PSA  
El Salvador – Ecoservicios
Costa Rica – PSA  
El Salvador – 
Ecoservicios  
Guatemala – MAGA  
Colombia – Plan Verde  
Mexico – PSAH
Ongoing 
local
India – Kuhan  
India – Sukhomajri  
Indonesia – Sumberjaya  
(with RUPES)  
Nepal – Kulekhani  
Philippines – Maasin  
Costa Rica – CNFL  
Costa Rica – Energia Global  
Costa Rica – ESPH  
Costa Rica – La Esperanza  
Costa Rica – Platanar  
El Salvador – El Imposible  
El Salvador – Morazan  
Guatemala – San Jerónimo (GTZ)  
Honduras –  
Campamento (Pasolac)  
Honduras –  
Jesus de Otora (Pasolac)  
Nicaragua – Estelí  
Bolivia – Los Negros  
Colombia – Valle del Cauca  
Ecuador – Cuenca  
Ecuador – FONAG  
Ecuador – Pimampiro
India – Sukhomajri
Indonesia – Brantas
Indonesia – Cidanau
Indonesia – Lake Toba
Indonesia – Sumberjaya
Nepal – Kulekhani
Pakistan – Mangla dam  
(national programme)
Philippines – Maasin
Philippines – Mt Kanla-on
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Mexico – Valle de Bravo
Costa Rica – CNFL
Costa Rica – Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica – La Esperanza
Costa Rica – La Florida 
Costa Rica – Platanar
Costa Rica – Silvopastoral RISEMP 
El Salvador – El Imposible
El Salvador – Pasolac (Tacuba)
Guatemala – San Jerónimo (GTZ)
Honduras –  
Campamento (Pasolac)
Honduras –  
Jesus de Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua – Silvopastoral RISEMP
Bolivia – Los Negros
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia – Fuquene (C Andinas)
Colombia – Silvopastoral RISEMP
Ecuador – FONAG
China – Meijiang
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
Costa Rica –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP 
El Salvador –  
El Imposible
Guatemala –  
Cerro San Gil
Nicaragua – San Pedro 
Norte (Pasolac)
Nicaragua –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia –  
Silvopastoril/ Regional 
Integrated 
Silvopastoral 
Ecosystem 
Management Project 
RISEMP
Ecuador –  
Pedro Moncayo
Advanced 
proposals
India – Bhodi
Indonesia – Singkarak Lake 
(RUPES)
Philippines – Makiling
Guatemala – Sierra de las Minas 
Bolivia – Tarija
Ecuador – Ambato (C Andinas)
Peru – Alto Mayo  
(Cuencas Andinas)
India – Bhodi
India – Bhoj wetlands
Philippines – Makiling
Guatemala – Sierra de las Minas 
Bolivia – Tarija
Peru – Alto Mayo  
(Cuencas Andinas)
Indonesia – 
Singkarak Lake (RUPES)
Appendix 4
Supporting information for Figures 2 to 9
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Scheme Management Reforestation Conservation Restoration
Ongoing 
national
South Africa – Working for Water
Philippines – Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund
El Salvador – Ecoservicios 
(national programme)
Colombia – Plan Verde
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation and 
Sloping Land Conversion 
programmes
Mexico – National PSAH
Costa Rica –  
PSA National
Guatemala –  
MAGA National
Colombia – Plan Verde
Mexico –  
National PSAH
Costa Rica –  
PSA National
Guatemala –  
MAGA National
China – Forest 
Ecological 
Compensation and 
Sloping Land 
Conversion 
programmes
El Salvador –
Ecoservicios (national 
programme)
Colombia –  
Plan Verde
Ongoing 
local
China – Meijiang
India – Sukhomajri
Indonesia – Brantas
Indonesia – Cidaneu
Indonesia –  
Sumberjaya (with RUPES)
Pakistan – Mangla dam  
(national programme)
Philippines – Maasin
Philippines – Mt Kanla-on
Mexico – Valle de Bravo
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP 
El Salvador – Morazan
El Salvador – Pasolac (Tacuba)
Guatemala – Cerro San Gil
Guatemala – San Jerónimo (GTZ)
Honduras –  
Campamento (Pasolac)
Honduras –  
Jesus de Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua – Estelí
Nicaragua –  
San Pedro Norte (Pasolac)
Nicaragua –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Colombia – Fuquene (C Andinas)
Colombia – Silvopastoral RISEMP
Colombia – Valle del Cauca
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador – Pedro Moncayo
Ecuador – Pimampiro
Philippines – Maasin
Costa Rica – CNFL
Costa Rica –  
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica – Platanar
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Guatemala –  
San Jerónimo (GTZ)
Honduras – Jesus de 
Otoro (Pasolac)
Colombia –  
Valle del Cauca
Ecuador – 
Pedro Moncayo
India – Kuhan
India – Sukhomajri
Indonesia – Brantas
Indonesia – Cidanau
Nepal – Kulekhani
Philippines –  
Mt Kanla-on
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Mexico –  
Valle de Bravo
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
Costa Rica –  
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica –  
La Esperanza
Costa Rica –  
La Florida 
Costa Rica – Platanar
El Salvador –  
El Imposible
Guatemala –  
Cerro San Gil
Guatemala –  
San Jerónimo (GTZ)
Bolivia – Los Negros
Colombia –  
Valle del Cauca
Ecuador – Cuenca
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador – Pimampiro
Indonesia – Lake 
Toba
Philippines – Maasin
Brazil – PCJ
Advanced 
proposals
India – Bhodi
India – Bhoj wetlands
Indonesia –  
Singkarak Lake (RUPES)
Philippines – Makiling
Guatemala – Sierra de las Minas 
Ecuador – Ambato (C Andinas)
Peru – Alto Mayo  
(Cuencas Andinas)
Bolivia – Tarija Bolivia – Tarija Indonesia –  
Singkarak Lake 
(RUPES)
Figure 3 supporting information  
Land-based proxy commodities for watershed services
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Figure 4 supporting information  
Participants in markets for watershed services: payment recipients
Scheme Private landowners
Private 
reserves
Informal occupiers 
of public land
Communal 
land
Park 
administration
Ongoing 
national
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation and 
Sloping Land Conversion 
programmes
Philippines – Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund
Mexico – PSAH
Costa Rica – PSA
El Salvador – Ecoservicios
Guatemala – MAGA
Colombia – Plan Verde
Costa Rica – 
PSA
Mexico –  
National PSAH
Costa Rica –  
PSA National
Guatemala –  
MAGA National
Mexico PSAH
Costa Rica – 
PSA
Ongoing 
local
China – Meijiang
India – Sukhomajri
India – Kuhan
Indonesia – Brantas
Indonesia – Cidanau
Pakistan – Mangla dam
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Mexico – Valle de Bravo
Mexico – Zapalinamé
Costa Rica – CNFL
Costa Rica –  
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica – La Florida 
Costa Rica – Platanar
Costa Rica –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP 
Honduras –  
Campamento (Pasolac)
Honduras –  
Jesus de Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua Esteli (Pasolac)
Nicaragua – San Pedro 
Norte (Pasolac)
Nicaragua –  
Silvopastoral  RISEMP
Bolivia – Los Negros
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia –  
Fuquene (C Andinas)
Colombia –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Colombia – Valle del 
Cauca
Ecuador – Cuenca
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador – Pedro Moncayo
Ecuador – Pimampiro
Costa Rica – 
La Esperanza
Indonesia –
Sumberjaya (with 
RUPES)
Philippines – 
Maasin 
Philippines –  
Mt Kanla-on
India – 
Sukhomajri
India – Kuhan
Nepal – 
Kulekhani
Mexico – 
Zapaliname
El Salvador – 
Tacuba
Ecuador - 
FONAG
El Salvador –  
El Imposible
Guatemala – 
Cerro San Gil
Ecuador – 
Cuenca
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Figure 5 supporting information Sources of funding for national and local schemes  
Scheme
Domestic water 
fees: reallocation or 
surcharge
Agricultural 
water user 
fees
Reallocation 
of municipal 
budget
Reallocation 
of company 
budgets/
statutory 
industry 
contributions
Reallocation 
of national 
budgets
Donors
Ongoing 
national
Colombia – 
Plan Verde
South Africa –
Working for 
Water
Philippines – 
Watershed 
Rehabilitation 
Fund
Costa Rica – 
PSA
Colombia –  
Plan Verde
South Africa –
Working for 
Water
China – Forest 
Ecological 
Compensation 
and Sloping 
Land Conversion 
programmes
Mexico – PSAH
Costa Rica – PSA
El Salvador – 
Ecoservicios
Guatemala – 
MAGA
Colombia –  
Plan Verde
South Africa –
Working for Water
Mexico – PSAH
Costa Rica – PSA
El Salvador – 
Ecoservicios
Colombia –  
Plan Verde
Ongoing 
local
Philippines – Maasin
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
Costa Rica – ESPH
El Salvador –  
El Imposible
El Salvador –  
Pasolac (Morazan)
El Salvador –  
Pasolac (Tacuba)
Guatemala –  
Cerro San Gil
Guatemala –  
San Jeronimo
Honduras – Jesus de 
Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua –  
Estelí (Pasolac)
Nicaragua –  
San Pedro Norte 
(Pasolac)
Brazil – PCJ
Ecuador – Cuenca
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador –  
Pedro Moncayo
Ecuador – Pimampiro
India – Kuhan
India – 
Sukhomajri
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia – 
Valle del 
Cauca
Ecuador – 
FONAG
Nepal – 
Kulekhani
Mexico – 
Fidecoagua
Mexico –  
Valle de Bravo
Honduras – 
Campamento 
(Pasolac)
Nicaragua – 
San Pedro 
Norte 
(Pasolac)
Bolivia –  
Los Negros
Indonesia – 
Brantas
Indonesia – 
Cidanau
Indonesia – 
Lake Toba
Philippines –  
Mt Kanla-on
Costa Rica – 
CNFL
Costa Rica – 
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica –  
La Esperanza
Costa Rica –  
La Florida 
Costa Rica – 
Platanar
Brazil – PCJ
Ecuador – 
Cuenca
Ecuador – 
FONAG
China – Meijiang
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya 
(with RUPES)
Pakistan – 
Mangla dam 
(national 
programme)
Philippines – 
Maasin
Mexico – 
Fidecoagua
Mexico – 
Zapalinamé 
India – Sukhomajri
Philippines – Maasin
Mexico –  
Valle de Bravo
Costa Rica – 
Silvopastoral RISEMP 
El Salvador –  
Pasolac (Morazan)
El Salvador –  
Pasolac (Tacuba)
Guatemala –  
San Jerónimo (GTZ)
Honduras – 
Campamento 
(Pasolac)
Honduras – Jesus de 
Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua –  
San Pedro Norte 
(Pasolac)
Nicaragua – 
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Bolivia – Los Negros
Colombia – Fuquene 
(C Andinas)
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Ecuador – FONAG
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Figure 6 supporting information  
Facilitators and their roles in ongoing local schemes 
Managing Intermediaries
International 
NGOs and 
donors 
NGOs 
(national  
and local)
Government 
(national)
Government 
(local)
Academic
sector
Trusts
User 
associations
None
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya
India – 
Sukhomajri
India – Kuhan
Indonesia – 
Brantas  
Indonesia –
Cidanau
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya
Philippines – 
Maasin
Philippines – 
Mt Kanla-on
Mexico – 
Zapalinamé
El Salvador – 
Morazan
Guatemala – 
Cerro San Gil
Honduras – 
Jesús de Otoro
Nicaragua – 
Esteli
Bolivia – 
Los Negros
Pakistan – 
Mangla Dam
Philippines – 
Maasin
Costa Rica – 
CNFL
Costa Rica – 
Energia 
Global
Costa Rica – 
La Florida
Costa Rica – 
Platanar
China – 
Meijang 
(village 
committee
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya
Nepal – 
Kulekhani
Pakistan – 
Mangla Dam
El Salvador – 
El Imposible
El Salvador – 
Tacuba
Nicaragua – 
San Pedro 
Norte
Colombia – 
Fuquene
Ecuador – 
Pimampiro
Costa Rica –
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Nicaragua – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP 
Mexico – 
Fidecoagua
Mexico – 
Valle de 
Bravo
Guatemala – 
San 
Jeronimo
Brazil – PCJ
Ecuador – 
Cuenca
Ecuador – 
FONAG
Honduras – 
Campamento
Colombia – 
Valle del 
Cauca
Ecuador – 
Pedro 
Moncayo
Costa Rica – 
ESPH
Costa Rica –
ICE
Costa Rica – 
La 
Esperanza
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International NGOs 
and donors 
NGOs 
(national and 
local)
Government 
(national)
Government 
(local)
Academic
sector
None Uncertain
India – Sukhomajri
India – Kuhan
Indonesia – Brantas
Indonesia – Cidanau
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya
Nepal – Kulekhani
Philippines – 
Maasin
Philippines –  
Mt Kanla-On
Mexico –  
Valle de Bravo
Mexico – 
Zapalinamé
Costa Rica – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
El Salvador – 
Morazan
El Salvador – Tacuba
Guatemala –  
Cerro San Gil
Guatemala –  
San Jeronimo
Honduras – 
Campamento
Honduras –  
Jesús de Otoro
Nicaragua –  
San Pedro Norte
Nicaragua – Estelí
Nicaragua– 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Bolivia – Los Negros
Colombia – Fuquene
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador –  
Pedro Moncayo
Ecuador – 
Pimampiro
India – Kuhan
Indonesia – 
Brantas
Indonesia – 
Cidanau
Nepal – 
Kulekhani
Mexico - 
Zapalinamé
Costa Rica – 
CNFL
Costa Rica – 
Energia Global
Costa Rica – 
La Florida
Costa Rica – 
Platanar
Guatemala – 
San Jeronimo
Ecuador – 
Pedro 
Moncayo
Ecuador – 
Pimampiro
India – 
Sukhomajri
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya
Philippines – 
Mt Kanla-On
Mexico – 
Fidecoagua
Mexico – Valle 
de Bravo
Mexico – 
Zapalinamé
Costa Rica – 
ESPH
Costa Rica – 
ICE
Costa Rica – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Nicaragua – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
China – 
Meijang 
(township 
and county 
government)
India – Kuhan
Guatemala – 
San Jeronimo
Colombia – 
Valle del 
Cauca
Ecuador - 
FONAG
India – 
Sukhomajri
India – Kuhan
Indonesia - 
Brantas
Indonesia – 
Cidanau
Indonesia – 
Sumberjaya
Mexico – Valle 
de Bravo
Costa Rica – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Nicaragua– 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Costa Rica – 
La Esperanza
Pakistan – 
Mangla Dam
Costa Rica – 
El Imposible
Ecuador – 
Cuenca
Other Facilitators
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Figure 7 supporting information Drivers of PWS initiatives
Scheme
Demand led/
Downstream water 
use
Supply led/ 
Upstream water use
Solution led Mixed/unclear
Ongoing 
national
South Africa –  
Working for Water
China – Forest 
Ecological 
Compensation and 
Sloping Land 
Conversion 
programmes
Costa Rica – PSA
Guatemala – MAGA
Colombia – Plan Verde
Mexico – PSAH
El Salvador – 
Ecoservicios
Philippines 
– Watershed 
Rehabilitation 
Fund
Ongoing 
local
China – Meijiang
India – Sukhomajri
Pakistan – Mangla dam 
(national programme)
Philippines – Maasin
Philippines –  
Mt Kanla-on
Costa Rica – CNFL
Costa Rica –  
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica –  
La Esperanza
Costa Rica – La Florida 
Costa Rica – Platanar
El Salvador –  
El Imposible
Honduras – Jesus de 
Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua – San Pedro 
Norte (Pasolac)
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia –  
Valle del Cauca
Ecuador – Cuenca
Ecuador –  
Pedro Moncayo
Mexico – Fidecoagua
El Salvador – Pasolac 
(Chalatenango)
El Salvador –  
Pasolac (Morazan)
El Salvador –  
Pasolac (Tacuba)
Guatemala –  
Cerro San Gil
Honduras – 
Campamento (Pasolac)
Bolivia – Los Negros
Colombia –  
Fuquene (C Andinas)
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador – Pimampiro
Mexico –  
Valle de Bravo
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
India – Kuhan
Indonesia – 
Brantas
Indonesia – 
Cidanau
Nepal – Kulekhani
Costa Rica – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP 
Nicaragua – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral 
RISEMP
Indonesia 
– Lake Toba
Indonesia 
– Sumberjaya 
(with RUPES)
Guatemala 
– San Jerónimo 
(GTZ)
Advanced 
proposals
Philippines – Makiling
Guatemala –  
Sierra de las Minas 
Bolivia – Tarija
Ecuador –  
Ambato (C Andinas)
Peru – Alto Mayo 
(Cuencas Andinas)
India – Bhodi
India –  
Bhoj wetlands
Indonesia –  
Singkarak Lake 
(RUPES)
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Figure 8 supporting information  
Mechanisms for determining payment levels to suppliers in local schemes
Scheme
Administratively 
determined
Direct negotiation 
buyer–seller
Intermediary NGO 
and trust
Intermediary 
government
Ongoing 
national
South Africa –  
Working for Water
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation and 
Sloping Land Conversion 
programmes 
Philippines – Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund
Costa Rica – PSA
Guatemala – MAGA
Colombia – Plan Verde
Mexico - PSAH
El Salvador – 
Ecoservicios
Ongoing 
local
China – Meijiang
Indonesia – Sumberjaya 
(with RUPES)
Pakistan – Mangla dam 
(national programme)
Costa Rica – CNFL
Costa Rica –  
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – La Florida 
Costa Rica – Platanar
Costa Rica –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP 
Nicaragua –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia – Fuquene  
(C Andinas)
Colombia –  
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Colombia –  
Valle del Cauca
Ecuador – Cuenca
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador –  
Pedro Moncayo
Ecuador – Pimampiro
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica –  
La Esperanza
Nicaragua –  
San Pedro Norte 
(Pasolac)
India – Kuhan
India – Sukhomajri
Indonesia – Brantas
Indonesia – Cidanau
Nepal – Kulekhani
Philippines –  
Mt Kanla-on
Honduras –  
Campamento (Pasolac)
Honduras – Jesus de 
Otoro (Pasolac)
Bolivia – Los Negros
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Mexico –  
Valle de Bravo
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
Philippines – 
Maasin
El Salvador –  
El Imposible
El Salvador – 
Pasolac (Tacuba)
Guatemala –  
Cerro San Gil
Advanced 
proposals
India – Bhodi
Philippines – 
Makiling
Indonesia –  
Singkarak Lake 
(RUPES)
Guatemala –  
Sierra de las Minas 
Bolivia – Tarija
Ecuador – Ambato  
(C Andinas)
India –  
Bhoj wetlands
Peru – Alto 
Mayo (Cuencas 
Andinas)
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Figure 9 supporting information  
Terms of payment to suppliers in national and local schemes
Scheme In-kind, one-off 
In-kind, 
periodical
Cash one-off Cash periodical
Ongoing 
national
Philippines 
– Watershed 
Rehabilitation Fund
Colombia – 
Plan Verde
China – Sloping 
Land Conversion
China – Sloping Land 
Conversion
China – Forest Ecological 
Compensation and 
Sloping Land Conversion 
programmes
Mexico – PSAH
Costa Rica – 
PSA National
El Salvador – 
Ecoservicios
Guatemala – MAGA
Ongoing 
local
China – Meijiang
Indonesia 
– Sumberjaya 
(with RUPES)
Nepal – Kulekhani
Pakistan – Mangla 
dam (national 
programme)
Philippines – 
Mt Kanla-on
Mexico – 
Valle de Bravo
El Salvador – 
Pasolac (Tacuba)
Honduras 
– Campamento 
(Pasolac)
Brazil – PCJ
Colombia – Fuquene 
(C Andinas)
Colombia – 
Valle del Cauca
Ecuador – Cuenca
Ecuador – FONAG
Ecuador – 
Pedro Moncayo
Bolivia – 
Los Negros
India – Kuhan
Indonesia – Brantas
Philippines – Maasin
India – Sukhomajri
Indonesia – Cidanau
Mexico – Fidecoagua
Mexico – Zapalinamé 
Costa Rica – CNFL
Costa Rica – 
Energia Global
Costa Rica – ESPH
Costa Rica – ICE
Costa Rica – 
La Esperanza
Costa Rica – La Florida 
Costa Rica – Platanar
Costa Rica – 
Silvopastoral RISEMP 
El Salvador – 
El Imposible
Guatemala – 
Cerro San Gil
Honduras – Jesus de 
Otoro (Pasolac)
Nicaragua – San Pedro 
Norte (Pasolac)
Nicaragua – 
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Colombia – 
Silvopastoral RISEMP
Ecuador – Pimampiro
Advanced 
proposals
India – Bhoj 
wetlands
Indonesia 
– Singkarak Lake 
(RUPES)
Guatemala – 
Sierra de las Minas 
Bolivia – Tarija
Ecuador – Ambato 
(C Andinas)
India – Bhodi Philippines – Makiling
Peru – Alto Mayo 
(Cuencas Andinas)
Natural Resource Issues
If poverty is to be reduced and livelihoods improved, significant shifts in policies, institutions 
and markets will be required to encourage sustainable natural resource management. How to 
go about this is a major challenge facing governments and civil society groups. Much guidance is 
available for farming, forestry and fisheries, but in reality livelihoods depend upon many forms 
of natural capital and are not amenable to sectoral interventions. This series of reports aims to 
present material on key cross-cutting themes of significance to many natural resource sectors, 
including water, soil, biodiversity, carbon and climate.
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A growing international debate calls for downstream beneficiaries of wise 
upstream land and water use to dig into their pockets and pay. The International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) stimulated the debate several 
years ago with a ground-breaking review of the scene (Landell-Mills and Porras. 
2002. Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold?). Now we have gone further – with this  
in-depth international review and analysis of all accessible ongoing initiatives  
and advanced proposals for market mechanisms for watershed services. This 
report highlights the main trends in the evolution of these proposals and 
initiatives, synthesising the available evidence on their environmental and  
social impacts and drawing lessons for the design of future schemes.  
 
Free online case study resources can be downloaded from the website that 
accompanies this study: www.watershedmarkets.org  
This study was funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) as part of a multi-country project coordinated by IIED on Developing 
Markets for Watershed Services and Improved Livelihoods. The views expressed 
in this study do not necessarily represent those of the institutions involved, nor 
do they necessarily represent official UK Government and/or DFID policies.
